RENEWING THE ARTICLE 98 PUSH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 003028

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2014
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL EC KICC
SUBJECT: RENEWING THE ARTICLE 98 PUSH


Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Article 98 negotiations in Ecuador have
stagnated of late. Two factors are to blame: continued
push-back from the Embassy's prime interlocutors, the Foreign
Ministry and Congress, and the Gutierrez government's focus
on self-preservation in the face of impeachment proceedings.
Cognizant that increasing deployments of U.S. forces
worldwide makes inking an Article 98 with Ecuador imperative,
we are conducting another offensive. Recent visits of USG
VIPs have helped return the issue to GoE radar screens.
Additionally, the Ecuadorian military's own plans to step up
its fight against narcotraffickers will require greater U.S.
military assistance, perhaps spurring them to fight (and
defeat) the MFA in GoE interagency Article 98 battles.
Finally, imminent turnover in legislative leadership
positions offer us hope we can dilute (but not remove)
opposition in Congress. END SUMMARY.

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Negotiations Stuck in the Mud
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2. (C) We have seen no movement on Article 98 since
Secretary Powell's June visit to Quito for the OAS General

SIPDIS
Assembly. In a high-level bilat June 7, Ecuador President
Lucio Gutierrez told the Secretary he had sought Congress's
formal opinion on Article 98's constitutionality and
appropriateness. We worried then, and are certain now, that
Gutierrez's "consultations" were but a time-buying ruse.
Meanwhile, the MFA's Article 98 point-of-contact has
disappeared, and Congressional moderates' promises to raise
the negotiations in committee meetings went nowhere.


3. (C) Autumn has seen Gutierrez hanging on by a thread. A
broad-based Congressional coalition, including center-right,
center-left, and indigenous political parties, initiated
impeachment proceedings against him November 4. Each
organization filed separate grounds for removal; misuse of
public funds led the list, but poor defense of national
sovereignty (by involving Ecuador in Plan Colombia, for
example) was close behind. The administration won the first
battle, as the opposition November 9 was unable to muster
votes to form a Congressional investigatory committee.
Gutierrez opponents claim they will fight on, however.

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Visitors Underscore Article 98 Imperative
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4. (C) Just two weeks ago, we could not imagine the
administration re-engaging on Article 98, as the mere whiff
of ongoing negotiations on the unpopular measure might have
convinced teetering legislators to vote to impeach. The GoE
emerged more confident after last week's legislative victory,
however, and seems again willing to talk. Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld, in Quito for the Defense Ministerial of the
Americas (DMA),raised Article 98 in a November 16 bilat with
Gutierrez (Septel). While Gutierrez's response was
regrettably old-hat - "I'm waiting for a Congressional green
light before proceeding" - our impatience with the pace of
talks undoubtedly registered with the Ecuadorian president
(and foreign minister, who also attended). In addition, new
Southcom commander General Bantz J. Craddock, also attending
the Quito DMA, calls on Ecuador's minister of defense and
service chiefs November 19. We expect Article 98's necessity
to open his talking points.

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Increasing GoE Ops Tempo Necessitates USG Assistance
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5. (C) Despite bearing the totality of ASPA sanctions,
Ecuador's military never lobbied hard for Article 98 in the
GoE interagency. We surmise they might now rejoin the fight.
New Joint Forces Chief Admiral Victor Rosero recognizes
Ecuador's national security threats, shows vision, and takes
chances. We could not say the same about his predecessor.
We have received briefs recently on two politically sensitive
initiatives - an EC offensive against narcotraffickers in
Sucumbios province, and Ecuador's interest in establishing a
non-lethal Airbridge Denial (ABD) program - each requiring
prior Rosero buy-in. For both, EC military leaders have
requested USG military assistance.


6. (C) While non-ASPA-affected program monies could (and
will) help support these initiatives, we are not missing any
opportunities to flog the military over the need for Article

98. Big-ticket items, such as A-37 upgrades for ABD and
additional helicopters for Sucumbios, are non-starters until
we get an agreement, for example. Further, a joint special
forces counter-terrorism operation, featuring Blackhawk
helos, is underway near Quito. At its conclusion, we expect
Ecuadorian battalion- and brigade-level officers to push
their HQ superiors for similar goodies.

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Additional Hope From Legislative, Government Changes
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7. (C) We are convinced we cannot slip Article 98 by
Ecuador's suspicious, do-nothing Congress; engaging them now,
even as a deal with the executive remains distant, seems
proper. The current Congressional lineup is stocked with
enemies, from President Guillermo Landazuri (who owes
Gutierrez the Article 98 response),to International
Relations Committee Chairman Carlos Vallejo. Thankfully, the
presidency, vice-presidency, and committee leadership turn
over in January 2005, the mid-point of the legislative term.
While we cannot predict their replacements, we can only see
improvements. We will delay our outreach acceleration until
the impeachment furor dies down, however, not wanting to
throw Gutierrez's many opponents additional political
ammunition.


8. (C) Finally, we require approachable MFA interlocutors,
not the lackeys we endure now. The designated POC is
particularly useless, regularly dodging our calls and burying
our correspondence. In higher-level Embassy-MFA gatherings,
we will request that our counterparts name serious officers
to staff their side.

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COMMENT:
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9. (C) Regrettably, Article 98 seems as distant now as in
July 2002, when we began the diplomatic effort. The MFA
continues to believe it can wait us out. It cannot. We are
helped by Washington re-opening the second front, calling in
Ecuadorian Ambassador Raul Gangotena for meetings with
Assistant Secretaries Roger Noriega and Steven Rademaker.
From Quito, Post will report regularly and often on its own
renewed push toward securing a deal. END COMMENT.
KENNEY