Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04QUITO2251
2004-08-13 16:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Quito
Cable title:  

PARTY POSTURING PROMPTS BUCARAM RETURN RUMORS

Tags:  PGOV KDEM KCOR PREL EC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 002251 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2014
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KCOR PREL EC
SUBJECT: PARTY POSTURING PROMPTS BUCARAM RETURN RUMORS


Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.5 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 002251

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2014
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KCOR PREL EC
SUBJECT: PARTY POSTURING PROMPTS BUCARAM RETURN RUMORS


Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.5 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: President Lucio Gutierrez's recent comments
favoring the return of exiled former President Abdala Bucaram
have ignited a political firestorm in Ecuador, with leading
opposition parties promising that impeachment proceedings
would shortly follow. Bucaram, whom Congress removed in
February 1997 on "mental incapacity" grounds, subsequently
fled to Panama and enjoys political asylum there; he
continues to lead the Ecuadorian Roldosista party (PRE) en
absentia. Analysts surmised that Gutierrez, seeking an
alliance between the PRE and his own Patriotic Society party
(PSP),had acquiesced to the former's primary goal and
platform plank, "the return of Abdala." The Social
Christians (PSC) loudly opposed, arguing that court orders
demanding Bucaram's immediate arrest for fraud remained in
force. PRE leadership, however, assert that a provincial
judge rescinded the orders in 2001, allowing for the swift
return of their beloved master. Non-partisan Embassy
contacts and Presidency officials consider the PRE's public
bluster, announcing Abdala's imminent arrival, a gambit
designed to energize the bases. We agree, viewing
Gutierrez's discourse as another political test balloon. END
SUMMARY.

--------------
The Man They Call El Loco
--------------


2. (C) Historians and political analysts rate Bucaram
Ecuador's most corrupt leader, an impressive achievement in a
country that Transparency International consistently ranks
amongst the hemisphere's worst kleptocracies. A
self-proclaimed "loco" (he recorded a song titled "A Madman
in Love"),Bucaram campaigned as a leader for the poor. His
raiding of the public till, combined with widescale fraud
perpetrated by cabinet officials, worsened his constituents'
poverty. Public demonstrations calling for his ouster
reached such levels in February 1997 that Ecuador's Congress,
itself not lilly-white, impeached Bucaram on grounds of
mental incapacity. The president lost the subsequent vote,
44-34, and eventually fled for Panama and political asylum.
Embassy contacts and media speculate he bought his status.



3. (U) In remarks to Quito daily El Comercio August 5,
Gutierrez welcomed the disgraced former president's return.
"...I would like Bucaram to come back, because he didn't
commit the crimes he was accused of. Some politicians are
terrified at his return (I am not). But as president, I
can't tell him to come, nor can I oppose him." In an El
Comercio interview published August 6, Bucaram proclaimed his
innocence and thanked Gutierrez for displaying admirable
political courage. The deposed leader claimed the law was on
his side. "I could return tomorrow," Bucaram claimed, "but I
need guarantees I won't be detained illegally." His stated
intention was to return in time to present his candidacy for
the October Guayaquil mayoral race (August 17 is the cutoff
date).

--------------
Method to the President's Madness?
--------------


4. (U) Media speculated that Gutierrez's show of Bucaram
support had political motivations. Ecuadorian electoral law
stipulates that parties not winning five percent of the vote
in multi-candidate races shall be disbanded (Ecuadorian
legislative elections are more parliamentary than
presidential, with parties presenting candidate lists).
Gutierrez's PSP fell below the threshold in 2002 national
elections, and pollsters predict a similar showing in the
October 2004 local races. Allying with Bucaram's PRE offered
the PSP greater prospects and a stay of execution. Minister
of Government Raul Baca lent weight to these theories August
4, telling TeleAmazonas TV that PSP and PRE deputies already
had joined forces in Congress.

--------------
Enemies Line Up For Fight
--------------


5. (U) Opposition forces quickly denounced Gutierrez. PSC
stalwart Leon Febres Cordero led the pack, arguing that any
move by the president to facilitate Bucaram's return
represented an impeachable offense. Press report that two
criminal cases remain active against the former leader, both
stemming from alleged misuse of government funds. Were
Gutierrez to order the police not to enforce the court order,
he would "commit an attack against the security of the
state," Febres Cordero asserted, violating the constitutional
mandate for separation of powers.


6. (U) In a meeting with Poloff August 10, PSC Congressman
Carlos Torres added personal recollections of the last days
of Bucaram. The PRE leader had attempted to buy "no"
impeachment votes at $1 million per. Losing the vote and the
presidency, he left Ecuador with literally baskets of cash,
stolen from the Central Bank. By law, the fraud
investigations against Bucaram had frozen upon his departure
from Ecuador, but the charges remained outstanding. Torres
discounted the PRE-publicized decision by an Esmeraldas judge
who, via a constitutional challenge, supposedly had cleared
the ex-president's name. "The PRE owns Esmeraldas," the PSC
legislator asserted, and only the Supreme Court could issue
such a challenge.


7. (U) PRE discourse announcing Bucaram's imminent return
was old hat, Torres continued. The party was really a cult
of personality, directionless without its leader. In the
seven years since Bucaram fled, PRE leaders had trotted out
the "he's coming" line before every election, hoping to get
the faithful to the polls. Torres believed Gutierrez
eventually would wise up and retract support for Bucaram's
return.


8. (U) Guayaquil Mayor Jaime Nebot (PSC),perhaps the
front-runner for the presidency in 2006, was convinced
Bucaram did not want to return. He would be arrested at the
airport, Nebot told the Ambassador August 12, and he knows
it. The PRE leader's effectiveness is greatest from afar,
lobbing charges against any and all parties. Last, Nebot
argued that the PRE's few serious politicians did not want
the tarnish that Bucaram's return would bring.

--------------
And Supporters Say Abdala Was Framed
--------------


9. (U) Ernesto Valle and Mario Touma, PRE legislators,
maintained their boss's innocence, telling Poloff August 10
that Bucaram's ministers were to blame in any malfeasance.
"A leader can't be faulted for the actions of his followers,"
Valle incredulously explained. Besides, there was no
"documentary" proof of wrongdoing. The Esmeraldas judge's
finding was binding, as the government had not appealed
within the mandated time limit. ANd Gutierrez, as chief
executive, was bound by law to enforce court rulings and thus
allow Bucaram's return.


10. (C) "He owes us," Valle continued, revealing a four
year-old verbal agreement between PRE congressmen and the
then-cashiered Army colonel. Under that deal, the PRE bloc
would vote to amnesty Gutierrez and other participants in the
2000 presidential coup, in exchange for future support in
bringing Bucaram back. There were tapes of the conversation,
Valle threatened. Touma insisted that Bucaram's return
presented little political risk to the president. The PSC
might impeach, but the votes needed - 67, or two-thirds of
Congress - were not there. It would be one more crisis
Gutierrez could overcome, he thought.

--------------
One Expert's View
--------------


11. (U) Prominent analyst Adrian Bonilla ventured that
Gutierrez's support for Bucaram was tongue-in-cheek.
Although the president had committed numerous gaffes before,
he was not so dumb as to miss the risks inherent in calling
Bucaram home. Only by removing Baca (a PRE demand) could
this occur, since the MinGov was a straight-shooter certain
to oppose instructions to ignore pending arrest warrants.
Baca's departure spelled disaster, Bonilla believed, as he
was one of few serious politicians in the current cabinet.
Although he doubted Gutierrez would do it, he urged the
Embassy to reconsider its support if he did.


12. (U) Bonilla predicted the PSP would survive, regardless
of its October showing. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE)
had proven unsuccessful at decertifying parties commanding
far fewer votes - its orders were essentially toothless.
Additionally, PSP prospects looked good in Ecuador's jungle
provinces. He thus thought Gutierrez could jettison the PRE
with minimal adverse effects.

--------------
COMMENT:
--------------


13. (C) We have argued before that, despite numerous
missteps and mounting political pressures, we don't see the
silver bullet to take Gutierrez down. A Bucaram return to
Ecuador looks lethal, however, regardless of Touma's vote
tally. Thankfully, Gutierrez's comments appear more another
test balloon, less a well-formed policy decision.
Presidential Legal Advisor Carlos Larrea August 11 confirmed
that Gutierrez had not issued Bucaram's travel orders, nor
had he requested a legal opinion for political cover. Larrea
was confident the ex-president would remain in Panama. END
COMMENT.
KENNEY