Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04PARIS9146
2004-12-28 10:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRANCE AND CENTRAL AFRICA (SOUTH)

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM BY CF CG CT EK GB RW TP ZF XA 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 009146 

SIPDIS

EUCOM FOR POLAD SNELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/25/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM BY CF CG CT EK GB RW TP ZF XA
SUBJECT: FRANCE AND CENTRAL AFRICA (SOUTH)

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 009146

SIPDIS

EUCOM FOR POLAD SNELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/25/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM BY CF CG CT EK GB RW TP ZF XA
SUBJECT: FRANCE AND CENTRAL AFRICA (SOUTH)

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. France continues to seek solutions for the
crisis in the Great Lakes through policies designed to
support DRC President Kabila and the transition process and
to block Rwandan interference in Congolese affairs. France's
history in the Rwandan genocide complicates their ability to
engage with Rwanda, leading the GOF, whether by inclination
or out of necessity to seek P3 cooperation. END SUMMARY.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DRC)


2. (C) French President Chirac believes that DRC President
Joseph Kabila is "a decent man who deserves support...part of
the solution...a man of the future" Coupled with continuing
suspicion between Paris and Rwanda's "anglophone, Tutsi"
leadership, Chirac's belief informs the French policy process
regarding the Great Lakes region. Our MFA contacts feel that
Kabila is doing as well as can be expected, but is poorly
advised by the "dinosaurs" in his entourage who want him to
assume total control, at the expense of his four
Vice-Presidents, something the GOF feels would imperil the
transition process.


3. (C) The GOF acknowledges that the presence in DRC of the
ex-FAR/interahamwe has provided a pretext (not a
justification) for military operations by Rwanda and/or its
surrogates, principally the RCD/G. Accordingly, the French
have focused on the need for credible DDR programs,
occasionally suggesting that such programs be coupled with
the establishment of a buffer force along the DRC/Rwanda
border, all of this to be undertaken by the UN. Thus, we
have seen consistent French support for increased MONUC force
levels with a vigorous Chapter VII mandate.


4. (C) The French are proud of their leadership of the EU's
operation Artemis in Bunia during the summer of 2003. Asked

by UNSYG Annan in May to intervene until sufficient UN forces
could be deployed, Chirac laid down several conditions,
including UNSC approval, participation by British troops, and
U.S. and UK political support to ensure cooperation from
Uganda and Rwanda. With these conditions met, Chirac ordered
a reluctant military to deploy. The French military had
expressed a desire to solicit U.S. military assets for the
mission, but the MFA, perhaps fearing a rebuff or the opening
of a debate on Berlin-plus, finally confirmed to us that the
GOF was not seeking any USG contribution beyond political
support. By September, at the end of the mission, Defense
Minister Alliot-Marie was bragging about the total success of
the French-led operation. However, when Belgian FM Michel
suggested in June 2004 that the EU might send troops to the
Kivus, the French had no appetite for a reprise of operation
Artemis, insisting that MONUC deal with the fighting.


5. (C) With many in the GOF believing that the U.S. and the
UK tacitly or implicitly blessed the 1998 invasion of the DRC
by Rwanda and Uganda, the French now see U.S. policy on the
Great Lakes as converging with their own. The French are
also pleased to see the back of UK International Development
Secretary Clare Short, seen in Paris as an unconditional

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supporter of Rwanda and a persistent thorn in their side on
Great Lakes issues.


6. (C) A number of factors have led to what we believe has
been a reduction in the level of French activism on Great
Lakes issues. First, France's problems in Cote d'Ivoire
have, at times, been all-consuming for senior French Africa
policy-makers. The transfer of Ambassador Levitte, who was
heavily engaged on the Great Lakes, from New York to
Washington, and the subsequent departure of Dominique de
Villepin, a committed Africanist, from the Quai d'Orsay has
also affected French engagement. The French have been
seeking for some time to organize a joint visit to the Great
Lakes region by FM Barnier and UK Foreign Secretary Straw,
possibly including other Europeans, but no mutually
acceptable date has been found. Given their difficulties
with Rwanda (see below) we anticipate that the GOF will
continue to seek to coordinate policies on the Great Lakes
with Washington and London.

RWANDA


7. (C) The French believe they have made several efforts in
recent years to overcome difficulties with Rwanda arising
from their support of former President Habyarimana, the 1994
genocide, and the role played by French forces in "Operation
Turquoise." In August 2001, during the first visit to Rwanda
by a French Foreign Minister since the genocide, Hubert
Vedrine claimed to have "broken the ice" with the Rwandans by
raising the effect of the genocide in France. While
complaining about the portrayal of France's role in Rwandan
media, Vedrine told the Rwandans that the genocide had
traumatized France as well as Rwanda. In Paris, commentators
noted that Vedrine made no apology and attended no ceremony
to pay respects to the victims of the genocide. Vedrine
returned to Kigali in January 2002, accompanied by UK Foreign
Secretary Straw, who delighted the French by delivering a

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tough message to President Kagame on the need to end the
Rwandan presence in eastern Congo.


8. (C) Visiting Rwanda in September 2002, FM de Villepin also
claimed to have had a positive meeting (in English) with
Kagame, notwithstanding the vehement criticism by the
then-permrep Jean-David Levitte of Rwanda's role in the May
massacres in Kisangani. Meanwhile, Kagame filed a lawsuit
in Paris against Paris-based Cameroonian author Charles Onana
for defamation. Onana's book, "The Secrets of the Rwandan
Genocide," asserts that Kagame's Rwandan Patriotic Front was
responsible for the downing of Habyarimana's plane on April
6, 1994 - the event generally accepted as the trigger for the
launching of the subsequent genocide. A separate French
judicial investigation, on behalf of the widows of the French
pilots, was leaked to the French press in March 2004, also
implicating Kagame. With the tenth anniversary of the
genocide approaching, the French were concerned by the timing
and pressed the Rwandans for assurances that their
representative at the commemoration ceremonies not be
subjected to anti-French rhetoric. Despite Rwandan
assurances, Kagame delivered an anti-French diatribe at the
commemoration ceremony, causing the French representative,
junior minister Muselier, to cut short his visit to Rwanda
and, according to the MFA, undoing Villepin's efforts to
establish a working relationship with Kagame.

BURUNDI


9. (C) Perhaps scarred by their experiences in Rwanda, the
GOF was unreceptive to USG efforts in 2001/2 to coordinate
contingency planning for potential mass killings in Burundi.
The French response was "if you plan for it, you ensure it
will occur." French interest in Burundi briefly peaked in
October 2002, following a call from Nelson Mandela to Chirac
requesting funding for the deployment of an army of troops
from Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania and Kenya to engage the Burundi
rebels military, an idea French officials characterized as
"crazy." Mandela's request came to nothing. However, France
did provide training for Ethiopian and Mozambican troops
participating in the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB),but
felt unable to offer financing or logistical support. With
significant expenses associated with French and African
deployments in Cote d'Ivoire, an MFA official described
Burundi as being in the "third circle" of French interests in
Africa. With no national funding available, France did,
however, push EU partners to provide financial support to
AMIB.


10. (C) The French had a high regard for the efforts of
Pierre Buyoya while President to move the political
transition in Burundi forward. In contrast, the GOF was
skeptical about the qualities of then-Vice President Domitien
Ndayizeye. Thus, the French were surprised by the positive
impression Ndayizeye left, following his January 2004 visit
to Paris as President.

REPUBLIC OF CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)


11. (C) Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso is a regular
visitor to France, both for vacations and for meetings with
Chirac with whom he enjoys warm relations. Sassou's ideas,
including on regional disarmament are taken seriously in
France. However, in early 1994 Chirac's African affairs
advisor undertook a mission to Brazzaville to deliver a
message to Sassou that he needed to adopt a more constructive
attitude in implementing the peace and disarmament agreement
with the armed opposition and in his dealings with the IMF.
It should be noted, that Sassou, like Gabonese President
Bongo (to whom he is related by marriage) is closely tied
into the Franco-African Masonic network.


12. (C) Yet another French judicial investigation has
impacted on the bilateral relationship. However, the inquiry
into the circumstance into the May 1999 so-called Brazzaville
Beach affair concerning the disappearance and probable
killing of approximately 350 refugees was dismissed by a
French court on November 22, 2004, essentially because the
Congolese officials under scrutiny had no residence in France.

GABON


13. (C) Any visit to Paris, of which there are many, by Omar
Bongo (aka Omar El-Haj Bongo Ondimba) is the occasion for a
long procession to the Hotel Meurice of ministers,
politicians, businessmen and industrialists all paying court
to the Gabonese President. Bongo sees Chirac whenever he
wants to, and reportedly even advises Chirac on his
ministerial appointments and other domestic French affairs as
well as on African issues. His tenure as President second by
only a few months to the Dean of the African dictators,
Togolese President Eyadema, Bongo and Chirac have known each
other for decades. Bongo can count on French support
whenever he faces difficulty with the IFIs and Chirac can
count on Bongo to engage in a manner useful to France in
regional crises, as Bongo has done recently in Madagascar and
the Central African Republic. While, on assuming their
duties as Foreign Minister, both Villepin and Barnier
included Libreville among their first stops in Africa, any
issues of importance to Gabon and France are discussed
between the offices of each country's President.

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE


14. (C) While there is constant speculation in the French
press about alleged USG plans to establish a military
presence in Sao Tome, French officials have candidly
described Sao Tome as unimportant to France. Following the
coup in July 2003, the MFA issued statements of condemnation,
but neither Chirac nor Villepin were personally engaged.

EQUATORIAL GUINEA


15. (C) France's principal concern regarding Equatorial
Guinea (EG) is the boundary dispute with Gabon over the islet
of Mbane/Mbanie. According to French officials, Gabonese
President Bongo sees EG as the "little brother" which, due to
its booming petroleum and gas revenues, has become the "big
brother." Beyond making the MFA's archives available to the
UN mediator, France is careful to take no position on the
legitimacy of either sides' claim. They were thus offended
by former Spanish FM Palacios' declaration in favor of EG's
claim.


16. (U) BUJUMBURA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
Wolff