Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04PARIS9145
2004-12-28 10:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRANCE AND THE INDIAN OCEAN STATES

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM CN MA MP SE XW XA FR 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 009145 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/25/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM CN MA MP SE XW XA FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE AND THE INDIAN OCEAN STATES

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 009145

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/25/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM CN MA MP SE XW XA FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE AND THE INDIAN OCEAN STATES

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The standoff in 2002 between Marc
Ravalomanana and Didier Ratsiraka following the disputed
election in Madagascar was a serious political crisis for the
government of France, exposing divisions between the MFA and
the presidency. With the crisis resolved, France's attention
to the Indian Ocean states is largely focused on economic and
development issues, in large part resulting from the
proximity of the French territories of Mayotte and Reunion to
the Comoros and Seychelles respectively. END SUMMARY.

MADAGASCAR


2. (C) The French response to the Madagascar crisis during
the first six months of 2002 revealed a relatively rare
glimpse of inter-agency rivalry within the GOF, specifically
between the MFA and the Presidency. The crisis produced a
notable casualty when Michel Dupuch, President Chirac's
advisor on African affairs resigned his position July 5
following then-FM de Villepin's travel to Antananarivo to
confer French recognition on Marc Ravalomanana. Although the
crisis straddled the change of leadership at the MFA
following French elections in April 2002, the MFA recognized
early in the crisis that Ravalomanana was likely to emerge
victorious from the standoff with Didier Ratsiraka. However,
at the Presidency Dupuch, and possibly Chirac himself, were
unwilling to dump Ratsiraka. The stated reason was that
France (and the U.S.) should not get ahead of the OAU, which
was reluctant to accept Ravalomanana's victory. It is also
likely that decades of personal contact and friendship
between Chirac and Ratsiraka also played a role in the
Elysee's disinclination to support Ravalomanana. If Dupuch
was the loser, Stanislas de Laboulaye, who was the French
Ambassador during the crisis, and reportedly argued in favor
of accepting Ravalomanana's victory, was a winner. Following
French recognition of Ravalomanana in July 2002, Villepin
appointed Laboulaye (an ENA classmate) as the MFA political

director (P-equivalent),a post he still occupies.
Meanwhile, Ratsiraka is in exile in the Paris suburbs,
apparently on the condition that he "behave," i.e., that
there be no repetition of the June 2002 chartered flight
carrying twelve mercenaries destined for Madagascar, which
obliged Villepin to intercede with the government of Tanzania
to ensure that they were turned around in Dar es Salaam.


3. (C) With 24,000 French nationals (60 per cent of whom are
dual nationals) in Madagascar, the GOF is doubtless pleased
to have moved beyond the crisis. France has made efforts to
establish a working relationship with Ravalomanana,
notwithstanding initial concerns about his and his
supporters' religious fervor, his lack of fluency in French
and his origins as a businessman. The French were pleased to
see Ravalomanana attend the France/Africa summit in France in
February 2003 and again in August this year to commemorate
the 60th anniversary of allied landings in southern France.
Chirac will attend the summit of Indian Ocean states in March
in Antananarivo, having already been to Madagascar, stopping
in Antananarivo in July this year in conjunction with his
summer vacation. The MFA claims that Ravalomanana has joined
other Chirac friends such as Gabon's Bongo and Congo/B's
Sassou as recipients of Chirac's warm embraces. The MFA
views the situation for Ravalomanana's TIM party and its
allies as fragile, but notes that notwithstanding traditional
Malagasy views about land, the GOM has taken courageous steps
in creating conditions for foreign ownership.

COMOROS


4. (C) The GOF is supportive of a Federal structure for the
Comoros under the Fomboni accords, as exemplified by the
refusal of French ministers to meet with Anjouan President
Mohammed Bacar during his visits to Paris. The GOF has been
discouraging Bacar's desire for an independent Anjouan and
views him as overly authoritarian. Unfortunately for France,
they find the Federal government incompetent, not even able
to produce a budget for review by the IMF. About the only
thing the government can do, an MFA contact told us, is to
pursue Comoros' territorial claim to Mayotte. MFA contacts
occasionally remind us that Comoros is the closest African
country to France, just over 100 miles from the French
territory of Mayotte (claimed by Comoros). They express
concern about the strong presence of Madrasa schools
established by individuals coming from Saudi Arabia, Sudan,
and Pakistan, which preach extreme pro-Islamic, anti-western
tenets to Comorian youth. France is also concerned about
trafficking of goods and money laundering in the Comoros as
well as "boat people" seeking to flee to Mayotte. The MFA
claims that there are 40,000 clandestine Comorians in Mayotte
and that 70 per cent of the births in Mayotte are to Comorian
mothers. The GOF is concerned about the drain on welfare
resources caused by these illegal immigrants and the growth
of violence, including by vigilante groups against the
Comorians.

MAURITIUS


5. (C) MFA contacts told us in February 2004 that the visit
to France of Mauritian PM Paul Berenger had gone very well.
They noted with satisfaction that FM Cuttaree did not share
the anti-French sentiments of his predecessor Anil Gayan.
French interests in Mauritius are essentially economic (given
Mauritian engagement on WTO issues) and commercial, although
both countries are engaged on the issue of Comoros.

SEYCHELLES


6. (C) After 27 years of rule by Albert Rene, new President
James Michel is relatively unknown to the French. The GOF
sees much of the Seychelles' economy dominated by Rene
cronies, with the majority of Seychellois economically
marginalized. France views the economic situation in the
Seychelles as very bad, with almost all commerce under the
control of the Seychelles Marketing Board. The MFA drew an
analogy with Cuba, saying that there were constant food
shortages. The French also have concerns about the political
situation, fearing that elections scheduled for 2006 will go
badly.
Wolff