Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04PARAMARIBO1
2004-01-02 18:09:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Paramaribo
Cable title:  

SURINAME INTRODUCES SURINAME DOLLAR TO BOLSTER

Tags:  SENV ETRD ECON EFIN NS 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS PARAMARIBO 000001 

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR WHA/CAR MSEIBEL, FOR EB, AND FOR EPSC: SENRIQUEZ

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SENV ETRD ECON EFIN NS
SUBJECT: SURINAME INTRODUCES SURINAME DOLLAR TO BOLSTER
CONFIDENCE IN CURRENCY BUT WILL IT WORK?

REF: PARAMARIBO 520

UNCLAS PARAMARIBO 000001

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR WHA/CAR MSEIBEL, FOR EB, AND FOR EPSC: SENRIQUEZ

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SENV ETRD ECON EFIN NS
SUBJECT: SURINAME INTRODUCES SURINAME DOLLAR TO BOLSTER
CONFIDENCE IN CURRENCY BUT WILL IT WORK?

REF: PARAMARIBO 520


1. Summary: On January 1, 2004, Suriname will launch its new
currency, the Surinamese dollar. The new currency will be
set at an exchange rate of SR$ 2.80 to one USD, versus Sf
2,800 to one USD. According to Central Bank President Andre
Telting, the introduction of the new currency is meant to
bolster public confidence in the local currency The GOS has
enacted a number of measures to curb government spending and
reduce liquidity, which Telting believes will stabilize the
exchange rate while at the same time reduce inflation and
local interest rates. Still, real economic stability will
only come when the GOS enacts a program to encourage private
sector expansion. End Summary.

--------------
GOS Introduces the Suriname Dollar
--------------


2. On January 1, 2004, Suriname will launch its new
currency, the Surinamese dollar (SR$),removing 3 zeros from
the exchange rate. In a lunch hosted by the Paramaribo
Diplomatic League (PDL) attended by diplomats and
representatives of NGOs, Central Bank President Andre
Telting discussed the launch of the new currency and
answered questions. Telting told the gathering that the
introduction of the new currency was meant to bolster the
Surinamese public's confidence in the local currency which
had eroded due to 20 years of overspending by the GOS. The
Surinamese guilder (Sf) had devalued from Sf 200 to one USD
in 1990 to a high of Sf 3,600 to one USD in 2002. Telting
told the assembled representatives that the GOS had chosen
to rename the guilder the dollar so that Suriname's currency
would be more recognizable in the region -- like Guyanese,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaican dollars.


3. As of January 1, 2004, all amounts set in Surinamese
guilders will be converted to Surinamese dollars and divided
by 1,000 so that the SR$ will sell at an exchange rate of
SR$ 2.8 to one USD, versus the current rate of Sf 2,800 to
one USD. To ease the transition for consumers, shopkeepers
will be required to list prices both in the old currency and
in the new currency for a period of three months. Old notes
can be converted to new notes for a period of up to 6 months

at commercial banks, after which exchanges will only be
accepted at the Central Bank (CBvS.) These can take place
for up to 30 years after an investigation into the origin of
the notes, in accordance with recently introduced anti-money
laundering legislation. The new law provides for all
existing contracts written in guilders to be payable in
Surinamese dollars and allows contracts and local prices to
be set in and payable in either the local currency or a
foreign currency such as the Euro or the US dollar.


4. The new bank notes will be in denominations of $1, $2.50,
$5, $10, $20, $50, and $100. Coins, which have not been
used in a decade due to hyperinflation in the 1980s and
1990s, will be accepted back into circulation since the
coins are already in cents. The coins are available in
denominations of 1, 5, 10, 25, 100, and 250 cents. Those
coins will retain their nominal value, in what Telting
called a sort of social dividend for elderly Surinamers who
may still hold them and who suffered the most from
Suriname's 20 years of hyperinflation which ravaged life
savings and rendered pensions worthless. Telting estimated
that the cost of minting new coins would exceed the cost of
reusing the old coins. New sets have been ordered, he said,
but only on a small scale. Telting estimated that the SR$ 1
million in coins still in circulation would not be a
disturbance to the money supply because the government would
not have to pay hard currency to mint new coins, reducing
the cost of recirculating the coins.

--------------
Government Overspending = Hyperinflation
--------------


5. Telting explained that in the 1980s and 90s, gross
overspending by the government led to massive devaluation of
the Surinamese guilder. Telting explained that the CBvS
correlated the change in Suriname's exchange rate to the
rate of inflation and that by stabilizing the exchange rate,


the GOS would stabilize inflation. Suriname, Telting
continued, is a "small open economy" (i.e., that Suriname
imports much of its manufactured and commercial goods and,
therefore, is subject to the vagaries of the world economy)
with a strong import component. In 2001, the GOS was able
to stabilize the exchange rate by reducing government
spending, but following the 2002 civil servant pay raises
(which averaged 60 percent),the guilder lost 35 percent of
its value, while inflation reached 28.1 percent by year's
end. Inflation continues to be a problem in 2003 with
inflation running at 28.6 percent per annum in June 2003,
the last month for which statistical data was available.
(Note: The General Statistics Bureau (ABS) burned down in
June 2003. So far, the ABS has been unable to provide
economic data. See Reftel. End Note)


6. In 2001 the GOS enacted a law that enabled Surinamers to
hold savings in foreign currencies. Because of the
Surinamese guilder's historic instability and its rapid
devaluation in 2002, Surinamers holdings in US dollars
exceed the value of their Sf accounts. Surinamers holding
on to US dollars has put further pressure on the exchange
rate since not enough US dollars are available to meet
market demand, Telting said. According to Telting,
Surinamese confidence in the new currency will encourage
Surinamers to spend their US dollars thus further reducing
this pressure on the exchange rate.

--------------
Controlling Liquidity Controls Exchange Rate
--------------


7. Telting explained that the CBvS began implementing a
program in 2002 to reduce liquidity by raising the
commercial bank reserve requirement to help stabilize the
exchange rate. The CBvS raised its reserve requirement in
2002 to 27.5% to stop the near free fall in the guilder when
it shot from Sf 2,200 in June when exchange controls were
lifted to Sf 3,600 in September. The CBvS raised the
reserve requirement again in August 2003 to 35% to even
further reduce liquidity. This measure has effectively
blocked Sf 170 billion ($607,140 USD) for credit operations,
which in turn has reduced consumer spending in general and
imports in particular -- since Suriname is heavily dependent
on imports for most consumer goods. By reducing liquidity
over the past year, Telting explained, the GOS successfully
stabilized the exchange rate at Sf 2,800 effectively
eliminating the imbalance which gives rise to the parallel
market. (Note: The guilder has maintained a sell rate of Sf
2,700 to one USD on the parallel market since June 2003
while the official rate is Sf 2,800. End Note.) By
reducing liquidity, the local currency becomes more scarce,
driving up its value, Telting said. Telting estimates that
the August 2003 reserve rate hike would continue to have
effects into the new year such as reducing inflation and
local interest rates, which he predicted would slide in the
first months after introduction of the new currency. (Note:
One local commercial bank, the Hakrinbank, recently
announced it would lower interest rates by 2 percent. End
Note.) Telting insisted that by limiting liquidity and
increasing the reserve rate for commercial banks, the CBvS
would not need to intervene in the foreign exchange market
and support the SR$ with hard currency. Telting also
maintained that the GOS expects to eventually eliminate
controls on the foreign exchange rate and go to a floating
rate once the new currency is stable. The GOS is currently
working on an overhaul of foreign exchange laws with the
assistance of a British consultant, he noted.

--------------
Fiscal Control Measures
--------------


8. To shore up fiscal controls, the government has taken a
number of measures. In 2002 it implemented a law to
restrict GOS spending which penalizes the Minister of
Finance for overspending with a 10-year sentence and Sf 2
billion ($715,000 USD) fine. The GOS is currently drafting
similar legislation to restrict the CBvS president from
lending excessively to the GOS. The CBvS president will
face similar penalties if he lends more than 10 percent of
GDP to the GOS. These measures are designed to


institutionalize accountability, to provide a mechanism to
deter the gross overspending responsible for Suriname's long
history of hyperinflation, and give further confidence to
the GOS's ability to maintain a stable exchange rate.

--------------
New Notes Way-Laid
--------------


9. On December 1 the CBvS announced that notes in
denominations of SR$ 5 and higher were delayed. The SR$ 1
and 2.50 notes will be available as of January 1, as will
coins. According to Embassy sources, the notes printed by a
Canadian firm needed to be reprinted because the ink ran.
The Central Bank maintains that it will carry out the
introduction of the new currency despite this hiccup and
will continue to use the old currency until replacement
notes arrive.

--------------
Introduction of New Currency May
Cause Inflationary Pressures
--------------


10. In the past month Surinamers have expressed concern that
with the introduction of the new currency, shopkeepers will
be tempted to round up prices from Sf 2,800 to SR$ 3,
causing additional inflationary pressure. Surinamers point
to the high inflation in the Netherlands after it converted
from Dutch guilders to the Euro and fear that this same
phenomenon would happen in Suriname. Diplomats who attended
the lunch echoed those concerns. The Indian DCM noted that
the GOS is unable to monitor shops to ensure that
shopkeepers don't exploit the introduction of the new
currency to raise prices to cover the fuel price increases
earlier this year, as well as past devaluation of the
currency. Telting responded that the government would
encourage the public to report any unusual price hikes.

--------------
Comment:
--------------


11. Suriname's adoption of the SR$ is a symbol of its
efforts to further distance itself from its colonial power,
the Netherlands. The adoption of the SR$ is also a strong
signal of Suriname's commitment to its membership in CARICOM
and its integration in the Caribbean as a partner in the
Caribbean Single Market Economy (CSME.)


12. Comment Continued: The GOS has put together a program
of fiscal controls which should go a long way toward
stabilizing the value of the new currency and keeping
inflation in check -- provided the GOS adheres to these
measures. The Indian DCM, a trained economist, told the
Embassy that in the short run, the new currency and the GOS
measures to curb government spending will probably provide
the returns sought. As a consumerist economy heavily
dependent on imports, only strong government resolve to
control inflation and the money supply, while supporting the
exchange rate with hard currency, can lead to long-run
stability of the local currency, he maintained.


13. Comment Continued: Telting's explanation of the
connection between the exchange rate and inflation appears a
bit simplistic. After raising the reserve requirement in
2002 and again in 2003, the exchange rate has stabilized yet
inflation persists at 30 percent per annum. The real
culprit in Suriname's history of hyperinflation has been the
GOS's consumptive spending -- particularly on wages. With
over 60 percent of the workforce in civil service and
parastatal jobs, there will be continued pressure on the GOS
to succumb to the anticipated 2004 round of labor strikes,
especially in the run up to elections. Although 2003 was a
quiet year after the 2002 strikes, there have already been
rumblings among labor leaders that civil servants should
expect increases. Telting, however, maintained that the GOS
told labor leaders to expect only modest pay hikes -- 5
percent rather than the 60% average wage increases doled out
in 2002. After two years of 30-percent inflation, it is
likely that workers will want to recoop their lost earning
power with commensurate wage hikes. Businesses too have


suffered from inflation and can be expected to exploit this
opportunity to cover their narrowed profit margins.


14. Comment Continued: The GOS can, in the short run,
control monetary policy to keep a lid on inflation, but only
economic expansion will guarantee the long-term economic
stability that eludes Suriname. Still, the GOS continues to
defer the hard issues that will produce a vibrant economy:
public sector reform and improving investment opportunities
to attract employers for Suriname's large pool of
underemployed and unemployed workers. Until the GOS
implements an economic policy that encourages expansion of
the private sector, only sheer political will to stay the
course with harsh monetary and fiscal policy will ensure
Suriname's economic --and by extension, its political --
stability. End Comment.

BARNES


NNNN