Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04OTTAWA3374
2004-12-16 15:53:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Ottawa
Cable title:  

CANADIAN SENATE RELEASES REPORT OUTLINING DEFENCE

Tags:  PGOV PREL ASEC PTER MCAP CA EIAR 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 OTTAWA 003374 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PTER MCAP CA EIAR
SUBJECT: CANADIAN SENATE RELEASES REPORT OUTLINING DEFENCE
AND SECURITY PROBLEMS


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 OTTAWA 003374

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PTER MCAP CA EIAR
SUBJECT: CANADIAN SENATE RELEASES REPORT OUTLINING DEFENCE
AND SECURITY PROBLEMS



1. (U) Summary: The Canadian Senate's Standing Committee
on National Security and Defence released a report, "The
Canadian Security Guidebook: An Update of Security Problems
in Search of Solutions" on December 8. In the report, the
committee cites eighty-six problems in the following areas:
Border Crossings, Coasts, Canadian Forces, Structure and
Coordination of Government, Ports, Airports, and Emergency
Preparedness. Among the primary recommendations of the
Senate Committee are: the Canadian Defence Budget requires
an increase of $3.2 Billion USD per year, a judicial inquiry
is required to examine the presence of organized crime in
Canada's ports, mail and cargo should be scanned at
airports, and all airport staff should be given complete
background checks. End summary.


2. (U) The Canadian Senate's Standing Committee on National
Security and Defence released a report, "The Canadian
Security Guidebook: An Update of Security Problems in
Search of Solutions" on December 8. The report is the
result of a three-year study of border security and defence
issues that began in January 2001. It is widely accepted
that Senate Committee reports maintain a higher standard
than those of the House of Commons for the following
reasons: 1) Senators are considered very capable and
experienced, 2) investigations are non-partisan, 3) Senate
investigations are not over-exposed in the media, 4)
Senators are free to invest time in research and analysis,
and 5) Senators can work on a topic for years without
election or reassignment.


3. (U) The Senators identified the following problems and
made recommendations to address the issues.


A. Border Crossings


-- Poor Threat Identification at the Border. The committee
recommends that the government invest in training and give
access to police databanks to border personnel.

-- Long CSIS Processing Times. The committee recommends
that CSIS be given more resources for screening refugee
claimants.

-- Undertrained Part-Time Customs Staff. The committee
recommends that all staff be trained to same standard,
including part-time and summer students.


-- Unsafe Border Posts. The committee recommends that
government not allow border posts to be manned by single
officers.

-- Arm Customs Officials. The committee recommends that
more evidence be collected for better debate on whether or
not to arm border guards.


B. Coasts

-- Canada's Vulnerable Coasts. The committee recommends
that the government turn its stated goals on maritime
security into action.

-- Coastal Radar - Off the Government's radar? The
committee recommends that the Canadian Forces be given the
resources to expand its High Frequency Surface Radar
Project.

-- Inadequate Short-Range Coastal Patrols. The committee
recommends that UAVs be deployed to regularly patrol the
coastline.

-- Inadequate Long-Range Coastal Patrols. The committee
recommends that government study the possibility of
deploying UAVs to long range, extended time surveillance,
including the Arctic.

-- Canada's Toothless Coast Guard. The committee recommends
that the mandate of the coast guard be expanded and that it
becomes an independent agency, not a branch of Fisheries and
Oceans.

-- No Notification Prior to Arrival. The committee
recommends that all ships should notify port authorities 48
hours prior to arrival.

-- Taking Incoming Vessels at Their Word. The committee
recommends that ships be compelled to report their port of
departure and estimated time of arrival in Canada.

-- Need Network for Maritime Warnings. The committee
recommends that Canada trade information on commercial
shipping traffic with other, like-minded states.

-- Unannounced Vessels. The committee recommends that ships
entering Canadian waters must have transponders to allow
comparisons of declared and actual routes.

-- Transponders for Smaller Vessels. The committee
recommends that all ships over 15 tonnes should be equipped
with transponders.

-- Dangerous Containers. The committee recommends that CSIS
officers be deployed to foreign ports to gather information
on container shipping.

-- Lack of Border Officials Abroad. The committee
recommends that Canadian Border Officials be moved from
Newark and Tacoma, U.S.A. to world ports that are more
likely to be the origin of a terrorist attack.

-- Great Lakes Surveillance. The committee recommends that
the same standards set for high-seas shipping be applied to
Great Lakes traffic.

-- Surveillance of Coasts, Lakes and Rivers. The committee
recommends that the RCMP be given the resources to create a
Marine Division to police major ocean inlets and the St.
Lawrence Seaway.

-- Training Delays. The committee recommends that the
government ensure sufficient resources to train staff to use
high-tech equipment at Canada's ports.


C. Canadian Forces

-- Budget Cuts. The committee recommends a minimum defence
budget increase of $4 billion CDN ($3.2b USD)

-- Capital Acquisitions Falling Behind. The committee
recommends that budget increases be purpose driven in
respect to capital procurement, and adjusted for inflation.

-- Overheated Operational Tempo. The committee recommends
that the Canadian Forces be withdrawn from overseas duty for
24 months.

-- Too Few Personnel - Too High Tempo. The committee
recommends an increase in CF personnel to 75 000.

-- Overdue Defence Policy Review. The committee recommends
that the government stop talking and complete its defence
review.

-- Lack of Large-Scale Training Exercises. The committee
recommends the return of regular battalion level exercises
for the Canadian Forces.

-- The Slow Move to Wainwright. The committee recommends
that the Canadian Maneuver Training Centre at Wainwright,
Alberta be made operational as soon as possible.


D. Structure and Coordination of Government

-- Need for Muscle at the Top. The committee recommended
the position of Deputy Prime Minister be made permanent and
be attached to the Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness
portfolio.

-- Need for A Strong Team. The committee recommends a
resources increase for the Deputy Prime Minister to allow
the position to absorb increased responsibility.

-- Coordination at the Top. The committee recommends the
creation of a cabinet committee to address public safety.
(completed)

-- The Missing National Security Policy. The committee
recommended that the government adopt a national security
policy. (completed)

-- Need for Crisis Command Centres. The committee
recommends the creation of an emergency operations centre.
(completed)


-- Need for Canada-U.S. Coordination. The committee
recommended the creation of a Canada-U.S. planning group.
(completed)

-- Slow Progress at Information-Sharing. The committee
recommends the rapid implementation of the Maritime
Information Management & Date Exchange Study.

-- Lack of Surveillance Coordination. The committee
recommends the establishment of surveillance and information
coordination centres.

-- Intelligence Community Understaffed. The committee
recommends increased resources for hiring intelligence
analysts.

-- Weak Overseas Intelligence. The committee recommends
that CSIS be mandated to upgrade overseas intelligence
gathering.

-- Information Fusion Failures. The committee recommends
that information-sharing centres be taken off the drawing
board and made operational as soon as possible.
-- Lack of Oversight. The committee recommends that the
government review whether or not organizations aside from
CSIS or CSE require oversight.


-- Coordination Lacking In Coastal Defence. The committee
recommends the creation of maritime surveillance centres.
(pending)

-- Allocations of Proceeds of Crime. The committee
recommends that confiscated goods be sold and the proceeds
be directed back into border policing capabilities.

-- Canada Too Inward Looking. The committee recommends that
the government study how other countries are upgrading their
port security.


E. Ports

-- Vulnerable Ports. The committee recommends a public
inquiry to investigate organized crime and how port police
are recruited and trained.

-- Organized Crime in Ports. The committee recommends a
compulsory background check for all port staff.

-- Port Perimeters. The committee recommends a review of
all port perimeter security, including fencing and access
points.

-- Insufficient Police at Ports. The committee recommends
that the RCMP be given primary duty for ports and airports,
with a resource increase to reflect the responsibility.


-- Inadequate Container Screening. The committee recommends
that the Canadian Border Services Agency study requirements
for x-ray and similar detectors and be given the resources
to implement the recommendations.

-- Inadequate Container Supervision. The committee
recommends that the government implement container security.
The Flynn Method.

-- Fragile Ferries. The committee recommends that ferry
traffic to Canada be required to provide passenger
manifests.


F. Airports

-- Screening Checked Baggage. The committee recommends that
all airports be equipped to scan all baggage for weapons and
explosives.

-- Inadequate Background Checks. The committee recommends
that all airport staff be given complete background checks.

-- No Leadership on Airside Passes. The committee
recommends the establishment of a national pass system for
accessing high-security areas in airports.

-- Unprepared Air Crews. The committee recommends that all
aircrews be briefed and trained to help in terrorist
situations.

-- Armed Pilots? The committee recommends that pilots in
Canada not be armed.

-- Alerting Air Crews. The committee recommends that all
flight crew be informed when an armed Aircraft Protection
Officer is on the plane.

-- Role of Aircraft Protection Officer. The committee
recommends that Aircraft Protection Officers have their
powers increased to intervene in all problem situations on
airplanes, including air rage.

-- Vulnerable Cockpit Doors. The committee recommends that
all aircraft be equipped with double doors.

-- Security Training for Maintenance Workers. The committee
recommends that ground crews be given training to assist in
identifying problem situations.

-- Responsibility for Airport Security Needs Clarifying -
Who's in Charge? The committee recommends that a single
government agency be placed in charge of airport security,
and that the agency should report to the RCMP.

-- Known Shipper Makes Aircraft Insecure. The committee
recommends that the `Known Shipper' pass system be abolished
and the same security requirements be made of all cargo
companies.

-- Lack of Security at Fixed-Base Operations. The committee
recommends that private aircraft be subject to the same
security requirements as the major airlines.

-- Small Airports are Weak Links in the Aviation Security.
The committee recommends that passengers arriving from
small, under equipped airports be subject to passenger
screening.

-- Access to Restricted Areas. The committee recommends
that that Canadian Air Transport Security Authority be given
the mandate to search people and vehicles entering
restricted areas.

-- Airmail and Cargo Goes Unchecked. The committee
recommends that mail and cargo traffic be scanned.

-- The Canadian Air Transport Authority Intelligence Gap.
The committee recommends that the Canadian Air Transport
Authority be given the resources to develop an intelligence
branch.

-- Airport Policing is Inadequate. The committee recommends
that all policing responsibility be placed in the hands of
the RCMP (who can contract work to the Canadian Air
Transport Authority).

-- Lack of Transparency for Security Improvements. The
committee recommends that the Canadian Air Transport
Authority should make a complete, annual report on its
activities and expenditures.

-- Air Travellers' Security Charge. The committee
recommends that the government completely account for the
$12 CDN Air Travellers Security Charge.

-- Unnecessary Secrecy. The committee recommends that
Transport Canada be transparent and no longer use secrecy as
a blanket means to avoid scrutiny.

-- Lack of Financial Transparency. The committee recommends
that the Auditor General be given the authority to examine
airport authorities.


G. Emergency Preparedness

-- Lack of Emergency Management. The committee recommends
that the government examine the ability of all government
departments and agencies to function in an emergency.


-- Emergency Ad Hockery. The committee recommends that
Health Canada present a report on its ability to respond to
a disease outbreak.

-- Inability to Deploy Police in an Emergency. The
committee recommends that the federal government negotiate
with the provinces for the rapid transfer of police across
the country in response to an emergency.

-- No Role for Reserves. The committee recommends that the
Canadian Forces improve its ability to act as a first
responder by more efficiently preparing the reserves for
such a role.

-- No Domestic Role for the DART. The committee recommends
that the CF Disaster Assistant Response Team be given a
domestic role.

-- Emergency Caches Mismanaged. The committee recommends
that Health Canada make information on emergency storage
caches available to first responders and local authorities.

-- Lack of Equipment for First Responders. The committee
recommends that the federal government should provide
resources to purchase chemical, biological, radiological and
nuclear response training and equipment.

-- Institutional "Lessons Learned" Memory Bank. The
committee recommends that the Department of Public Safety
and Emergency Preparedness act to keep its lessons learned
files up to date, and that the information be completely
shared with first responders across the country.

-- Lack of Centralized Health Protection. The committee
recommends the establishment of a Health Protection and
Promotion Agency to prepare for and manage events like the
SARS crisis.

-- Poor Collaboration. The committee recommends that the
government negotiate jurisdiction management agreements with
Provinces and Municipalities.

-- Emergency Public Communications. The committee
recommends that the government prepare a system for
emergency communication with the public.

-- Poor Communications Equipment. The committee recommends
that first responders across Canada be given uniform
communications equipment.


-- First Responders Out of Loop. The committee recommends
that local first responders be included in core planning.

-- Weak Central Knowledge Base on Critical Infrastructure.
The committee recommends that the government cooperate with
provinces and municipalities to create a list of vital
infrastructure.

-- Lack of Leadership on Best Practices. The committee
recommends that the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness take on a role of leadership across
jurisdictions and provincial and municipal borders.

-- Large Cities Should Be Helping Regions. The committee
recommends that additional resources be given to urban
centres that is tied to their willingness to support rural
areas in the event of a crisis.


3. (U) The government has started to act on some of the
report's recommendations and the introduction outlines some
of the successes of Paul Martin's Liberal Government. These
are: the creation of the office of the Deputy Prime
Minister Responsible for Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness, the release of the National Security Policy,
the new maritime surveillance operations centres, and the
acknowledgement that the Canadian Forces have been
overstretched and that both resource increases and a period
of rest are required.


4. (SBU) Note: Canadian Senators are patronage appointees
who hold their positions until retirement. Calls for Senate
reform are common. However, it is the responsibility of
Senate Committees to monitor, investigate and report on
issues of interest to their mandate. Senate committees
strive to maintain their role as relevant investigators and
reporters. End note.


5. (U) The online version of the report can be found at the
following hyperlink,
http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/se nate/com-e/defe-
e/rep-e/rep03nov04-e.htm
A PDF print version is located at,
http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/se nate/com-e/defe-
e/rep-e/rep03nov04-e.pdf.

CELLUCCI