SCENE-SETTER FOR VISIT TO CANADA, 12-14 DEC 2004

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 OTTAWA 003303

SIPDIS

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN

SIPDIS

FOR ADMIRAL KEATING, COMMANDER NORAD, COMMANDER USNORTHCOM

TAGS: DOD
SUBJECT: SCENE-SETTER FOR VISIT TO CANADA, 12-14 DEC 2004
(U)


1. (C) CANADA-U.S. POL-MIL RELATIONS. PRIME MINISTER MARTIN
LEADS A MINORITY GOVERNMENT, WHICH MUST MOVE FORWARD
CAUTIOUSLY ON POLICY ISSUES AND TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE
VIEWS OF THE OPPOSITION BEFORE PROCEEDING. PM MARTIN HAS
GIVEN STRONG SIGNALS HE UNDERSTANDS THE IMPORTANCE OF AND
WISHES TO IMPROVE CANUS RELATIONS. SHORTLY AFTER TAKING
OFFICE LAST DECEMBER, PM MARTIN ESTABLISHED A NEW CABINET
COMMITTEE ON U.S.-CANADA RELATIONS WHICH HE CHAIRS,
ESTABLISHED A DHS-LIKE HOMELAND SECURITY DEPARTMENT (DEPT OF
PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CANADA) HEADED BY
THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, DEVOTED MORE RESOURCES FOR BORDER
AND MARITIME SECURITY, AND TIGHTER IMMIGRATION SCREENING. IN
APRIL, 2004 HE PUBLISHED CANADA'S FIRST-EVER NATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY WHICH FOCUSES ON:


A. (U) PROTECTING CANADA AND CANADIANS AT HOME AND ABROAD;

B. (U) ENSURING CANADA IS NOT A BASE FOR THREATS TO OUR
ALLIES;

C. (U) CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

MARTIN ALSO PUSHED THROUGH THE AMENDMENT TO THE NORAD
AGREEMENT, ALLOWING NORAD TO PERFORM THREAT WARNING
(INTEGRATED TACTICAL WARNING/ATTACK ASSESSMENT) FOR THE
MISSILE DEFENSE MISSION. STILL, WHEN POLITICALLY EXPEDIENT
DURING THE SPRING 2004 ELECTION SEASON, HIS CAMPAIGN RHETORIC
FOCUSED ON DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN CANADA AND THE U.S. IN
ORDER TO BUILD ROOM BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE CONSERVATIVES WHO
SUPPORT MUCH STRONGER TIES TO THE U.S. AND A MORE PROGRESSIVE
DEFENSE AND SECURITY RELATIONSHIP.


2. (U) PRO-U.S. DEFENSE MINISTER DAVID ((PRATT)) LOST HIS
PARLIAMENT SEAT IN THE JUNE 2004 ELECTION AND WAS REPLACED BY
THE HONOURABLE WILLIAM ((GRAHAM)),THE OUTGOING FOREIGN
MINISTER. GRAHAM MOVED TO DEFENSE WITH A GOOD UNDERSTANDING
OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE AND SECURITY ISSUES FACING CANADA.
ONE OF GRAHAM'S STRENGTHS IS THAT HE IS WELL KNOWN IN NATO
CIRCLES
AND IS VERY COMFORTABLE IN MINISTERIALS AND DEALING WITH NATO
ISSUES. HE HAS SPENT THE LAST SIX MONTHS LEARNING THE DEFENSE
BUREAUCRACY AND LEADING A DEFENSE REVIEW. HE ALSO SHOWED
GOOD JUDGMENT WHEN HE CHOSE SEASONED CANADIAN BUREAUCRAT WARD
ELCOCK AS HIS DEPUTY MINISTER (ELCOCK WAS FORMERLY HEAD OF
CSIS - CANADIAN CIA EQUIVALENT). GRAHAM HAS BEEN OUTSPOKEN
ON THE NEED FOR CANADA TO PARTICIPATE IN MISSILE DEFENSE.


3. (U) CANADIAN DEFENSE SPENDING. DUE TO PRESSURE FROM
DEFENSE INTEREST GROUPS AND ECHOING CALLS BY U.S. AMBASSADOR
PAUL CELLUCCI DURING THE LAST FOUR YEARS, A GENERAL
RECOGNITION IS SETTLING INTO THE CANADIAN BODY POLITIC THAT
DEFENSE HAS BEEN UNDERFUNDED FOR TOO LONG AND MAJOR
REINVESTMENTS ARE NEEDED.
INCREASED DEFENSE FUNDING HAS EMERGED AS AN OFTEN-DISCUSSED
POLITICAL AND EDITORIAL ISSUE. WHILE PM MARTIN HAS ANNOUNCED
NEW DEDICATED FUNDING FOR MISSIONS ABROAD AND FUNDED SOME NEW
ACQUISITION PROGRAMS, THE CANADIAN DEFENSE BUDGET IS STILL
WOEFULLY UNDERFUNDED AND NEAR THE BOTTOM OF NATO MEMBERS IN
DEFENSE SPENDING (1.1% GDP).


4. (C) CANADIAN FORCES BACKGROUND. A 20-YEAR LEGACY OF
UNDERFUNDING AND REPEATED DEPLOYMENTS ON PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS HAVE GENERALLY GUTTED THE CANADIAN FORCES.
CAPITAL ACQUISITION ACCOUNTS ARE RAIDED ANNUALLY IN ORDER TO
SUSTAIN O&M REQUIREMENTS. BOTH EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL ARE
STRETCHED. A STRENGTH OF 82,000 IN 1990 HAS ATROPHIED TO
SLIGHTLY MORE THAN 50,000, OF WHICH ROUGHLY 19,000 IS
DEPLOYABLE. THE RESERVES CANNOT DEPLOY AS UNITS, EVEN DOWN
TO THE COMPANY LEVEL, AND ARE PRIMARILY USED AS A LABOR POOL
AUGMENTING REGULAR FORCES ON BOTH DOMESTIC AND OVERSEAS
OPERATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, THE QUALITY OF CANADIAN FORCES
LEADERSHIP AND PERSONNEL AT ALL RANKS KEEPS THE FORCES GOING.
PM MARTIN ANNOUNCED CANADA WOULD ADD 5,000 ACTIVE SOLDIERS
AND 3,000 RESERVISTS; HOWEVER, THESE SOLDIERS WOULD BASICALLY
JUST ROUND OUT THREE UNDER-MANNED BRIGADES AND THEY WILL TAKE
UP TO SIX YEARS TO BE RECRUITED, TRAINED, AND FIELDED.


5. (C) CURRENT AND PROJECTED FORCE DEPLOYMENTS. THE CANADIAN
FORCES ARE JUST ENDING A SERIES OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL
COMMITMENTS THAT LEAVES THE FORCES WITH LITTLE CURRENT
DEPLOYABLE COMBAT CAPABILITY. MAJOR DEPLOYMENT REDUCTIONS
(FROM ISAF IV - V LEADERSHIP IN AFGHANISTAN AND HAITI) TOOK
PLACE IN AUGUST 2004, AS THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE ENTERED INTO
A ONE YEAR 'OPERATIONAL PAUSE' TO RECONSTITUTE THEIR FORCES.
(AUGUST 2004 FORECAST IN PARENS; *AIR FORCE DEPLOYMENT):

AFGHANISTAN - 2300 (700)
SFOR - 650 (80)
HAITI - 500 (100 CIVILIAN RCMP POLICE VICE SOLDIERS)
GOLAN HEIGHTS (UN OBSERVERS/LOGISTICIAN) - 225 (225)
AFRICA - 20 (20)
ARABIAN GULF/OEF-DEPLOYED WITH GW CSG - 225 (0)
*ARABIAN GULF C-130 TRANSPORT DETACHMENT - 240 (200)


6. (C/NF) CANADIAN MILITARY FORCES CAPABILITIES: WHAT LIES
AHEAD. ALL SERVICES OF THE CANADIAN FORCES ARE STRETCHED AND
OVER-TASKED, SURVIVING PRIMARILY ON THE QUALITY OF THEIR
PEOPLE. INSIDERS INVOLVED WITH DEFENSE ISSUES BELIEVE THAT
CANADA IS STILL UNABLE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE KINDS OF
CHOICES IT MUST MAKE IN ORDER TO PREVENT ITS MILITARY FROM
BECOMING IRRELEVANT. WHILE SMALL NUMBERS OF HIGHLY CAPABLE
FORCES EXIST, SUCH AS JTF-2
TIER-1 SOF COUNTER-TERRORISM FORCES (LESS THAN 300 SOLDIERS
OF WHICH ABOUT 150 ARE TRIGGER-PULLERS),CANADA IS UNWILLING
TO MOVE INTO THE NICHE AREAS WHICH THE BUDGET CAN SUPPORT.
FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, CANADIAN FORCES WILL REMAIN
AROUND 50,000 - CERTAINLY NOT EXCEEDING 60,000. EVEN WITH A
DOUBLING OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET CANADA COULD NOT RECAPITALIZE
ITS EXISTING FORCE STRUCTURE FOR PERHAPS 15 YEARS, AND NO ONE
PREDICTS THOSE SORT OF FUNDING LEVELS (UNLESS PERHAPS IN THE
UNFORTUNATE EVENT CANADA WERE TO EXPERIENCE A MAJOR 9-11 TYPE
ATTACK). GIVING UP ON MAJOR MISSION AREAS, SUCH AS AN
OPERATIONAL BLUE WATER NAVY (AND MOVING TO SUPPORT/TRANSPORT
AND 200 MILE SECURITY MISSIONS),IS THE ONLY WAY CANADA CAN
FULLY FUND AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS WITH EXISTING (OR FORECAST)
BUDGETS. THE CURRENT DND LEADERSHIP IS VERY NAVY-HEAVY, SO
THIS IS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY. CANADA SEEMS DESTINED TO HOBBLE
ALONG WITH ONE OF THE SMALLEST MILITARIES IN THE WORLD TO
FIELD A COMPLETE ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE. THE FACT OF THE
MAT
TER IS CANADIAN FORCES AND THE DEFENSE BUDGET HAVE BEEN
NEGLECTED SO LONG THERE IS NO WAY WITHIN THE CURRENT CANADIAN
POLITICAL CONTEXT AND WITH COMPETING BUDGETARY PRESSURES FOR
THEM TO RETURN TO PREVIOUS CAPABILITIES.


7. (U) CURRENT MILITARY RELATED ISSUES:


A. (U) HOMELAND DEFENSE. IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS INAUGURATION,
THE PM CREATED A NEW MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS CANADA (PSEPC),AN INSTITUTION ANALOGOUS TO THE
U.S. DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY. THE AGENCY'S GOAL IS TO
PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY AND COORDINATE EMERGENCY
RESPONSES. ALTHOUGH THE LINES OF AUTHORITY OF THIS MINISTRY
ARE STILL BEING DRAWN AND THEY ARE MORE FOCUSED ON INTERNAL
ORGANIZATION THAN STANDING UP A WORKING ORGANIZATION, IT
ALREADY HAS ESTABLISHED LINES OF COMMUNICATION WITH
COUNTERPART USG AGENCIES, ALBEIT WITHOUT THE SAME SENSE OF
URGENCY.


B. (U) MARITIME SECURITY. ALTHOUGH THIS IS SLOWLY CHANGING,
CANADA'S MARITIME SECURITY STRUCTURE HAS BEEN ADMINISTERED IN
AN UNCOORDINATED FASHION BETWEEN A PLETHORA OF GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES. IN TERMS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY AND
RESPONSIBILITY, THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE (RCMP) IS
THE ONLY NATIONAL AGENCY WITH A DAY-TO-DAY, LEGISLATED
MANDATE TO POLICE ALL TERRITORIAL CANADIAN WATERS. IN SOME
CIRCUMSTANCES, CANADIAN MARITIME FORCES (NAVY) CAN AND HAVE
BEEN GIVEN LAW ENFORCEMENT POWERS AND BECOME INVOLVED IN
MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS IF SPECIAL AUTHORITY IS GRANTED
BY GOVERNMENT. THE CANADIAN COAST GUARD, ON THE OTHER HAND,
IS A SUB-AGENCY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES AND
OCEANS (DFO),IS TASKED WITH A COLLECTION OF MARINE PROGRAMS
AND SERVICE MISSIONS, AND DOES NOT FULFILL A LAW ENFORCEMENT
FUNCTION. BOTH THE CANADIAN COAST GUARD AND NAVY USUALLY
PROVIDE THE PLATFORMS FOR RCMP AGENTS TO CONDUCT LAW
ENFORCEMENT MISSIONS OFF THE CANADIAN COAST. SINCE THE
INCEPTION OF CANADA'S FIRST EVER NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY IN
APRIL 2004, COLLECTIVELY THE NAVY, COAST GUARD, RCMP AND
OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES HAVE BEEN WORKING OUT THE DETAILS
OF OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES TO MEET THE SPECTRUM OF
OPERATIONS THAT ARE REQUIRED TO ENSURE MARITIME SURVEILLANCE
AND SECURITY OF CANADIAN WATERS. CANADA WITH THE WORLDS
LONGEST COASTLINE MEASURING ALMOST 150 MILLION MILES IS
WOEFULLY UNDER RESOURCED WHEN IT COMES TO NUMBERS OF MARITIME
VESSELS AND APPROPRIATING OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE BUDGET
DOLLARS. THE FIELDING (AND EVEN THE ACQUISITION PROCESS) OF
FOUR USED SUBMARINES RECENTLY PURCHASED FROM THE UK IS BEING
CALLED INTO QUESTION IN THE WAKE OF AN ACCIDENT (FIRE AT SEA)
DURING THE MAIDEN VOYAGE TRANSIT TO CANADA OF ONE OF THE SUBS
THAT CLAIMED THE LIFE OF A CANADIAN NAVAL OFFICER. A RECENT
STUDY BY CANADA'S SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND
DEFENSE CONCLUDED, "THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT THE
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO END THE
FRAGMENTED AND LARGELY AD HOC DEFENSE OF CANADA'S COASTLINE".


C. (C/NF) MISSILE DEFENSE. ON 5 AUG 04, CANADA ANNOUNCED
THAT IT HAD AGREED TO AMEND THE NORAD AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE
THE MISSILE DEFENSE THREAT WARNING AND ATTACK ASSESSMENT
MISSION WITHIN NORAD. THE MARTIN GOVERNMENT HAS TRIED TO
KEEP THIS DECISION SEPARATE FROM MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM, A
CONTENTIOUS ISSUE IN CANADA, WHERE SOME OPPOSITION PARTIES
EQUATE MISSILE DEFENSE WITH WEAPONIZATION OF SPACE.


D. (C/RELCAN) NORAD RENEWAL/TRANSFORMATION. NEGOTIATIONS
HAVE BEGUN FOR THE 2006 RENEWAL OF THE NORAD AGREEMENT. THERE
IS AN APPETITE AMONG SOME, NORAD/NORTHCOM IN PARTICULAR ON
BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER TO TRANSFORM NORAD INTO A
MULTI-DOMAIN COMMAND, IN LIEU OF ITS CURRENT AEROSPACE
CHARTER. MANY ENVISION NORTH AMERICAN DEFENSE COMMAND WITH
USNORTHCOM AS ITS U.S. COMPONENT. THE BINATIONAL PLANNING
GROUP HAS BEEN STUDYING NEW MISSION AREAS INCLUDING MARITIME
SURVEILLANCE/DOMAIN AWARENESS, CROSS-BORDER MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (MACA),CROSS-BORDER
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT, AND THE ADDITION OF THE MISSILE
DEFENSE MISSION. WHILE U.S. AND NORAD STAFFS ARE
READY TO PROCEED WITH INCORPORATION OF THESE MISSIONS/TASKS.
THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HAS NOT GIVEN THE MANDATE TO
NEGOTIATING ENTITIES. HOW FAR AND HOW FAST NORAD TRANSFORMS
WILL BE DETERMINED DURING NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE COMING
MONTHS, BUT FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES TO NORAD ARE CERTAINLY NOT
ASSURED, GIVEN THE
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN OTTAWA.


E. (C) NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY. IN APRIL OF THIS YEAR, THE
CANADIAN GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED A NEW NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
THAT - WHEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED - WOULD INTEGRATE DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES TO ENHANCE AND ENSURE SAFETY AND
SECURITY OF CANADIANS AND THEIR ALLIES AND CONTRIBUTE TO
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. THE PROPOSED 690 MILLION CANADIAN
DOLLARS (520 MILLION USD) INITIATIVE WILL FOCUS IN SIX KEY
AREAS - INTELLIGENCE, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC HEALTH,
TRANSPORTATION, BORDER SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.
PREVENTING ATTACKS UPON ALLIES (READ U.S.) FROM CANADIAN SOIL
AND ENHANCING MARITIME SECURITY ARE TWO PRIMARY OBJECTIVES.


F. (C) DEFENSE REVIEW. CANADA IS CONDUCTING BOTH
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE REVIEWS BEFORE THE END OF
CY2004. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE HAS NOT BEEN A FORMAL
DEFENSE REVIEW SINCE THE 1994 WHITE PAPER, GRAHAM HAS NIXED A
FORMAL REVIEW IN FAVOR OF INTERNALLY-STAFFED ONE. SOME
BELIEVE THIS DEFENSE POLICY REVIEW IS SHAPING UP TO BE A
WATERED DOWN DOCUMENT WITHOUT MAJOR CHANGES OR NEW
INVESTMENTS FOR THE FY05 BUDGET (APRIL 2005). EXPECTED
CHANGES INCLUDE: MORE ROBUST MARITIME SURVEILLANCE AND
SECURITY CAPABILITIES; IMPROVED C4ISR; STRATEGIC SEA AND
AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS; MORE SPECIAL FORCES; SOLDIER C3,
MOBILITY EQUIPMENT, AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS MORE INTEROPERABLE
WITH U.S.
FORCES; AND A DRAMATIC DOWN-SIZING OF TANKS AND HEAVY
ARTILLERY PLATFORMS. THE NEW CANADIAN NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY IS AVAILABLE AT HTTP://WWW/PCO-BCP.GC.CA. SEARCH ON
'NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY'.


8. (U) RECOMMENDED THEMES AND TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR TALKS
WITH DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICIALS:


A. (U) WE NEED TO BRING MORE DOMAINS CRITICAL TO HOMELAND
DEFENSE INTO A NORAD-LIKE STRUCTURE. IT IS TIME TO
INSTITUTIONALIZE THE FINE WORK OF THE BINATIONAL PLANNING
GROUP (BPG) IN COLORADO SPRINGS. I THINK WE ALL AGREE THAT
WE NEED TO ENHANCE OUR COOPERATION ON MARITIME DOMAIN
AWARENESS AND MARITIME SECURITY.


B. (U) WHAT OTHER DOMAINS DOES CANADA ENVISION AS APPROPRIATE
FOR A TRANSFORMED NORAD? CYBER SECURITY? MILITARY ASSISTANCE
TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES? CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT?


C. (U) THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE HAS A KEY ROLE IN
OUR STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP. HAPPY TO SEE CANADA HAS A NEW
AND ACTIVE CHAIR (JUDI LONGFIELD). WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE
RESULTS OF THE PJBD MEETING IN MARCH 2005.


D. (U) AS PSEPC MOVES FORWARD IN ITS INTERAGENCY
RELATIONSHIPS PLEASE CONSIDER ASD-HD AVAILABLE TO ASSIST IN
BENCHMARKING ALONG OTHER U.S. AGENCIES SUCH AS DHS. WE ARE
ALL IN THE PROCESS OF LEARNING HOW TO FUSE THE RIGHT
CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT THE HOMELAND DEFENSE MISSION. ONE
PLACE PSEPC LEADERS SHOULD DEFINITELY VISIT IS NORTHCOM AND
THEIR INTERAGENCY COORDINATING GROUP. ANOTHER IS JTF-CIVIL
SUPPORT WHERE THEIR PLANNERS ARE DOING GREAT WORK IN
DOCUMENTING BOTH CRITICAL AND SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE IN
CASE OF A CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT EVENT.

9. (U) POC FOR THIS MESSAGE IS CAPT JOHN K MCCLAIN, NAVAL
ATTACHE, USDAO OTTAWA. UNCLAS 613-688-5380. SIPRNET:
DIMCCJK(AT)NOTES.DAWN.DIA.SMIL.MIL.

CLASSIFIED BY: COL DAVID BRACKETT, DATT, USDAO OTTAWA
REASON: 1.5(C,D)
DECL: X1