Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04NEWDELHI7735
2004-12-08 07:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:
DIXIT REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO INDO-PAK RAPPROCHEMENT; CAUTIOUS ON IRAQ
how-toThis record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 007735
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2014
TAGS: PREL PTER IN PK IZ INDO PAK
SUBJECT: DIXIT REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO INDO-PAK RAPPROCHEMENT; CAUTIOUS ON IRAQ
Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford, Reasons 1.4 (B,D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 007735
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2014
TAGS: PREL PTER IN PK IZ INDO PAK
SUBJECT: DIXIT REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO INDO-PAK RAPPROCHEMENT; CAUTIOUS ON IRAQ
Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford, Reasons 1.4 (B,D).
1. (C) Summary: Meeting December 7 with the Ambassador, Indian NSA Dixit offered a guardedly optimistic assessment of the Indo-Pak peace process, reaffirming the PM's commitment to ""innovative solutions"" but also cautioning that there will be no territorial concessions by India. ""Short of that,"" he added, ""many things are possible."" Reflecting the continued GOI willingness to climb down from established positions in furtherance of normalization, Dixit described a new GOI approach to the issue of cross border documentation that he hoped would facilitate a bus service between the two sides of Kashmir. Pointing to the recent expert talks on cross border train service, Dixit expressed suspicion that the Pakistani establishment had decided to put the brakes on Indo-Pak people to people exchanges. Speaking briefly on Iraq, Dixit said New Delhi was torn between ""our heart and our head"" -- the former argues for assisting the United States at a time of difficulty, although intellectually India is cautious of involvement while the security situation is so unsettled and the domestic Indian politics are difficult. Dixit looked forward to a further discussion of these issues with Secretary Rumsfeld. End Summary.
SIPDIS
Iraq: How to Deliver?
--------------
2. (C) The Ambassador opened this December 7 discussion by expressing puzzlement that India, despite its large interests in the Gulf, has been so reluctant to be involved in the construction of Iraqi democracy. Dixit confided that he has been discussing with the Prime Minister how India could be more supportive in Iraq. He recalled that the BJP ""wanted to send troops"" and was prevented from doing so by a Parliamentary resolution pushed by Congress. That legacy, and the pressure of the left parties, creates ""a major political problem"" for any further Indian involvement. He added that the PM was ""still cogitating"" on what India can do. ""The US is important and Iraq is very important,"" Dixit added, noting that ""if we don't contribute to stabilization, Islamic radicalism may go out of control"" in a way that threatens India. Reflecting the GOI dilemma, Dixit related that ""the heart says join the Americans to help, but the head says to be very careful."" He concluded by noting that although the PM was unlikely to convey any specific offers of assistance, the GOI would look forward to an Iraq discussion with Secdef Rumsfeld.
Pakistan: Keeping the Momentum
--------------
3. (C) Turning to Indo-Pak relations, Dixit queried about Musharraf's visit to the White House, expressing relief at the US intention to remain engaged on the problem of cross-border terrorist infiltration. Stepping back, Dixit argued that ""somehow the message has to get to Pakistan that Manmohan Singh is inclined to envisage innovative solutions.""
However, he continued, there is ""one basic limitation -- jurisdictionally to give up the Valley or other areas in J&K is not on."" ""Short of that, many things are possible."" ""If Pakistan signals that it is not insistent on disturbing borders or the LOC as it exists,"" the NSA continued, ""then its relevance can be eroded by other devices."" Getting Pakistan to recognize this opportunity is the object of Dixit's back-channel dialogue with Tariq Aziz. However, the NSA concluded, ""I know it will be a long haul.""
Indian Concession on Bus Documentation
--------------
4. (C) As evidence of India's resolve to keep pushing the Indo-Pak peace process, Dixit cited a new GOI position on documentation for travelers using the proposed bus from Srinagar to Muzaffarabad on the two sides of the LOC. Pakistan has objected to using passports and visas on this route (as is done for Kashmiris traveling by air) since that could imply recognition of Indian jurisdiction on their side of the LOC. Instead, Dixit recounted, ""India has accommodated 60-70%"" of the GOP position by offering to use a separate ""certificate"" for crossing the LOC which would be stamped by both sides ""without in prejudice to jurisdiction.""
A passport would be used only to establish identity when procuring this LOC crossing certificate from the relevant High Commission.
5. (C) Dixit lamented that the GOP appeared to have rejected this offer, insisting that no form of national identification could be used for crossing the LOC. He expressed strong suspicion that ""the Pakistanis don't really want contacts to happen."" As evidence, he cited the Pakistani insistence that the proposed rail line between Rajasthan and Sindh would take three years to complete, even though there is meter gauge rail on both sides of the border that could be ready for use in a few months. Similarly, Dixit complained that Islamabad had quashed a proposal to allow free flow of text books and educational books, fearing that this could ""erode the ideology of Pakistan.""
6. (C) Despite these frustrations, Dixit underlined that the PM is strongly committed to get the bus service started, and to launch a parallel route between Sialkot and Jammu. Dixit was also encouraged by the positive meeting between Manmohan Singh and Punjab Chief Minister Choudhary Pervez Elahi. He insisted that this kind of people-to-people contact will ""make an impact on the broader political environment."" He recognized the Pakistani fear that too much connectivity will detract from a focus on Kashmir, and worried that Islamabad would be tempted to claim that India was being obstinate, and then walk away from the Composite Dialogue process. He was encouraged by the continued decline in infiltration (which he attributed to both Pakistani policy and improved Indian counter-insurgency performance),and placed great importance on the continuation of the LOC cease-fire. But, he worried that Pakistan still had unrealistic objectives.
Kashmir
--------------
7. (C) Dixit struck a similar note of conditional optimism regarding the Kashmir internal track. He said the PM was happy with his visit to Srinagar, but disappointed that the Kashmiri Hurriyat parties were unwilling to speak to him. He confided that some in the GOI had opposed authorizing travel documents for Hurriyat leaders who planned travel to an early December Pugwash (Track II) dialogue in Kathmandu. However, the PM had intervened personally to see that they would be allowed to travel with no restrictions on their passports.
""We want them to acknowledge the privileges of being a citizen of a democratic country,"" Dixit declared, underlining New Delhi's view that Hurriyat leaders like the Mirawaiz are subject to Indian authority.
MULFORD
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2014
TAGS: PREL PTER IN PK IZ INDO PAK
SUBJECT: DIXIT REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO INDO-PAK RAPPROCHEMENT; CAUTIOUS ON IRAQ
Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford, Reasons 1.4 (B,D).
1. (C) Summary: Meeting December 7 with the Ambassador, Indian NSA Dixit offered a guardedly optimistic assessment of the Indo-Pak peace process, reaffirming the PM's commitment to ""innovative solutions"" but also cautioning that there will be no territorial concessions by India. ""Short of that,"" he added, ""many things are possible."" Reflecting the continued GOI willingness to climb down from established positions in furtherance of normalization, Dixit described a new GOI approach to the issue of cross border documentation that he hoped would facilitate a bus service between the two sides of Kashmir. Pointing to the recent expert talks on cross border train service, Dixit expressed suspicion that the Pakistani establishment had decided to put the brakes on Indo-Pak people to people exchanges. Speaking briefly on Iraq, Dixit said New Delhi was torn between ""our heart and our head"" -- the former argues for assisting the United States at a time of difficulty, although intellectually India is cautious of involvement while the security situation is so unsettled and the domestic Indian politics are difficult. Dixit looked forward to a further discussion of these issues with Secretary Rumsfeld. End Summary.
SIPDIS
Iraq: How to Deliver?
--------------
2. (C) The Ambassador opened this December 7 discussion by expressing puzzlement that India, despite its large interests in the Gulf, has been so reluctant to be involved in the construction of Iraqi democracy. Dixit confided that he has been discussing with the Prime Minister how India could be more supportive in Iraq. He recalled that the BJP ""wanted to send troops"" and was prevented from doing so by a Parliamentary resolution pushed by Congress. That legacy, and the pressure of the left parties, creates ""a major political problem"" for any further Indian involvement. He added that the PM was ""still cogitating"" on what India can do. ""The US is important and Iraq is very important,"" Dixit added, noting that ""if we don't contribute to stabilization, Islamic radicalism may go out of control"" in a way that threatens India. Reflecting the GOI dilemma, Dixit related that ""the heart says join the Americans to help, but the head says to be very careful."" He concluded by noting that although the PM was unlikely to convey any specific offers of assistance, the GOI would look forward to an Iraq discussion with Secdef Rumsfeld.
Pakistan: Keeping the Momentum
--------------
3. (C) Turning to Indo-Pak relations, Dixit queried about Musharraf's visit to the White House, expressing relief at the US intention to remain engaged on the problem of cross-border terrorist infiltration. Stepping back, Dixit argued that ""somehow the message has to get to Pakistan that Manmohan Singh is inclined to envisage innovative solutions.""
However, he continued, there is ""one basic limitation -- jurisdictionally to give up the Valley or other areas in J&K is not on."" ""Short of that, many things are possible."" ""If Pakistan signals that it is not insistent on disturbing borders or the LOC as it exists,"" the NSA continued, ""then its relevance can be eroded by other devices."" Getting Pakistan to recognize this opportunity is the object of Dixit's back-channel dialogue with Tariq Aziz. However, the NSA concluded, ""I know it will be a long haul.""
Indian Concession on Bus Documentation
--------------
4. (C) As evidence of India's resolve to keep pushing the Indo-Pak peace process, Dixit cited a new GOI position on documentation for travelers using the proposed bus from Srinagar to Muzaffarabad on the two sides of the LOC. Pakistan has objected to using passports and visas on this route (as is done for Kashmiris traveling by air) since that could imply recognition of Indian jurisdiction on their side of the LOC. Instead, Dixit recounted, ""India has accommodated 60-70%"" of the GOP position by offering to use a separate ""certificate"" for crossing the LOC which would be stamped by both sides ""without in prejudice to jurisdiction.""
A passport would be used only to establish identity when procuring this LOC crossing certificate from the relevant High Commission.
5. (C) Dixit lamented that the GOP appeared to have rejected this offer, insisting that no form of national identification could be used for crossing the LOC. He expressed strong suspicion that ""the Pakistanis don't really want contacts to happen."" As evidence, he cited the Pakistani insistence that the proposed rail line between Rajasthan and Sindh would take three years to complete, even though there is meter gauge rail on both sides of the border that could be ready for use in a few months. Similarly, Dixit complained that Islamabad had quashed a proposal to allow free flow of text books and educational books, fearing that this could ""erode the ideology of Pakistan.""
6. (C) Despite these frustrations, Dixit underlined that the PM is strongly committed to get the bus service started, and to launch a parallel route between Sialkot and Jammu. Dixit was also encouraged by the positive meeting between Manmohan Singh and Punjab Chief Minister Choudhary Pervez Elahi. He insisted that this kind of people-to-people contact will ""make an impact on the broader political environment."" He recognized the Pakistani fear that too much connectivity will detract from a focus on Kashmir, and worried that Islamabad would be tempted to claim that India was being obstinate, and then walk away from the Composite Dialogue process. He was encouraged by the continued decline in infiltration (which he attributed to both Pakistani policy and improved Indian counter-insurgency performance),and placed great importance on the continuation of the LOC cease-fire. But, he worried that Pakistan still had unrealistic objectives.
Kashmir
--------------
7. (C) Dixit struck a similar note of conditional optimism regarding the Kashmir internal track. He said the PM was happy with his visit to Srinagar, but disappointed that the Kashmiri Hurriyat parties were unwilling to speak to him. He confided that some in the GOI had opposed authorizing travel documents for Hurriyat leaders who planned travel to an early December Pugwash (Track II) dialogue in Kathmandu. However, the PM had intervened personally to see that they would be allowed to travel with no restrictions on their passports.
""We want them to acknowledge the privileges of being a citizen of a democratic country,"" Dixit declared, underlining New Delhi's view that Hurriyat leaders like the Mirawaiz are subject to Indian authority.
MULFORD