FOR INDIA UN PANEL REPORT IS ONLY A START

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 007675

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM IN UN GOI
SUBJECT: FOR INDIA UN PANEL REPORT IS ONLY A START

REF: A. NEW DELHI 4391

B. NEW DELHI 6787

C. NEW DELHI 5201

Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).


1. (C) Summary: The report of the High-Level Panel on UN
Reform represents the beginning of a long-term process in
which India has significant stakes, MEA Joint Secretary (UN
Political) BS Prakash told PolCouns on December 3.
Downplaying FM Natwar Singh's apparent rejection of a
permanent Security Council seat without a veto during
December 2 remarks before Parliament, Prakash took a more
nuanced view, saying India would deliberate carefully over
the range of issues addressed in the report before reaching
any conclusions. While a permanent seat is broadly supported
by all facets of the Indian political establishment,
Opposition parties could use a veto-less Security Council
seat as a means of attacking the UPA-government. The
Congress-led government will also likely have to contend with
public concerns about "second-class status" should a
permanent seat without a veto become an option. Still, given
the symbolic importance India attaches to a Security Council
seat, New Delhi would probably in the end be content with
permanent membership with or without veto authority. End
Summary.

Panel Report Just the Beginning
--------------


2. (C) The report of the High-Level Panel on UN Reform
represents the beginning of a long-term process in which
India has significant stakes, MEA Joint Secretary (UN
Political) BS Prakash told PolCouns on December 3. Prakash
downplayed FM Natwar Singh's December 2 comments before
Parliament in which he said that a Security Council Seat
without a veto "would not be acceptable to the country,"
emphasizing that the GOI plans to take a deliberative
approach to the report and UN reform. Despite some initial
press reports and political criticism of what is being
described as the "second-class status" of veto-less permanent
membership, Prakash noted that Security Council reform is
only one aspect of the report, and noted that the panel's
mandate included a review of the entire UN system.


3. (C) Prakash said that India would probably release a
statement on the overall work of the panel within the next
few days, but did not feel obliged to respond collaboratively
with the G-4 (Brazil, Germany, Indian, and Japan) on specific
panel recommendations. The G-4 did release a very general
coordinated statement on December 3 urging the international
community "to embrace this opportunity wholeheartedly to
bring about the needed change" in the UN, and reiterating the
need for Security Council expansion. MEA Director (UN
Political) Pankaj Sharma underlined to Poloff New Delhi's
commitment to solidarity with the other candidate countries,
saying that India would reject any outcome that excludes
Brazil, Germany, or Japan from permanent membership.

"By Any Objective Measure, India Deserves a Seat"
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4. (C) Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, speaking before the
release of the report, noted that "in terms of demography,
contributions to peacekeeping or abilities at furtherance of
the objectives of the UN, India more than fulfills the
criterion" for permanent membership on the UN Security
Council. MEA Director (UN Political) Pankaj Sharma echoed
this view, stating that while the GOI views UN Security
Council (UNSC) reform as one component of UN reform, and "not
an end in itself," New Delhi clearly believes that the time
has come for India to join the ranks of the Security Council
as a permanent member. India has the will and capacity to
contribute to the UN, he said, describing the current
Security Council configuration as lacking the ability to
respond to the realities of today's post Cold War world. The
Council is "frozen in time," Sharma complained, emphasizing
that the UN must evolve in order to retain its relevance and
effectiveness.
What India Wants
--------------


5. (C) Despite GOI insistence on Security Council reform,
India has yet to elaborate on the details behind its vision
for permanent membership in the Security Council, or on UN
reform more generally. New Delhi has clearly stated its
support for greater representation of the developing world,
and its opposition to rotational or semi-permanent seats,
arguing instead for the addition of both permanent and
non-permanent members. The MEA's Sharma claimed that the
idea of a rotational seat for regional groupings like the EU
"would not translate in South Asia," as neither SAARC nor
ASEAN qualify as a "union." He argued that Security Council
members should have a global focus, taking into consideration
"the interests of the entire world," and observed that a
regional seat does not "pass this test." Beyond this,
however, the GOI position is vague.

Mixed Messages on the Veto
--------------


6. (C) Responding to questions in Parliament on December 2,
FM Natwar Singh stated that a Security Council Seat without a
veto "would not be acceptable to the country," but tempered
his comments by observing that Security Council expansion was
an "extremely complicated issue with wide ramifications."
According to J/S Prakash, Natwar's comments came in response
to questions unrelated to the predetermined topic (PM
Manmohan Singh's September trip to the US) for which the
Foreign Minister had been prepared. The Foreign Minister's
comments were not the last word on India's view of the Panel
report, he emphasized.


7. (C) Other MEA officials and GOI foreign policy advisors
expressed surprise at Natwar's comments, and offered a more
pragmatic approach to the veto. Ambassador KV Rajan, former
Additional Secretary (East),described a general Indian
consensus that there is "not a snowball's chance in hell"
that India will gain a veto in addition to permanent
membership. He commented that most GOI officials believe
that permanent membership would be "fantastic, even without
the veto." MEA Director (UN Political) Pankaj Sharma
(protect) echoed this view, asserting (before Natwar's
comments in Parliament) that India would not make veto power
"a point in our case for membership," given the "ticklish"
nature of the subject. He emphasized that New Delhi has no
official position on whether veto authority should be
extended beyond the P-5, but added, "When the time comes,
India will be prepared to discuss this."

The Campaign
--------------


8. (C) Illustrating the importance the GOI places on UN
reform, particularly Security Council membership, the
Congress-led UPA government has undertaken a systematic and
largely successful campaign to garner international support
for a permanent seat. As part of this campaign, New Delhi
spearheaded a coordinated effort among the G-4 contenders,
and lobbied aggressively at the bilateral level. (refs A-C)
With the notable exception of the US, India has requested
support for its Security Council bid during nearly every
high-level bilateral interaction, with countries ranging from
Nigeria to Burma, Vietnam to China. The GOI has also sought
support from regional organizations, such as the EU. The
campaign has been largely successful, with dozens of
countries expressing support for an Indian seat. During a
joint press conference with PM Manmohan Singh during a
December 3 visit to New Delhi, however, Russian President
Vladimir Putin stated that veto power should not be expanded
beyond the P-5. "We believe it would be absolutely
unacceptable to erode such tools of the UN," he said.

9. (C) To solidify its claims to the Security Council, the
GOI has also begun to assert itself more visibly within the
UN, particularly after suffering a humiliating defeat in the
October 1996 election for a rotating UNSC membership.
Viewing election to ECOSOC as a pre-cursor to Security
Council membership, New Delhi lobbied hard for an ECOSOC
seat. GOI officials, including Natwar Singh, have
interpreted India's wide margin of victory there (174 votes
-- "the highest number earned by any country") as recognition
of New Delhi's ability to mobilize a majority of UN members.

Approaching the US
--------------


10. (C) According to Ambassador Rajan, the GOI remains
unsure about the US position on Security Council reform,
viewing Washington as uninterested in genuine reform. For
this reason, India has so far been hesitant to push the issue
of UNSC expansion in a US-India context. He said that some
sectors of the GOI view US support for a Security Council
seat as "a litmus test of the strategic partnership," though
most recognize the complex issues surrounding Security
Council reform. Former Indian Ambassador to the US Lalit
Mansingh acknowledged that US support for India will be "the
deciding factor," observing that without US support an Indian
seat will not become reality.


11. (C) In discussions with Poloff, MEA's Sharma sought to
downplay the sometimes marked differences between the US and
India at the UN, particularly on human rights issues,
commenting that New Delhi and Washington agree on the need
for an effective, credible, and efficient council. India
does not work in contradiction with US values, he emphasized,
adding that New Delhi had often served as a moderating voice
among the NAM and G-77 countries on resolutions targeting
Israel.

What About Pakistan?
--------------


12. (C) Asked whether the GOI worried about Pakistani
opposition to permanent Indian membership on the Security
Council, Sharma stated bluntly that "India is not worried
about opposition, by Pakistan or any other country," adding
that each of the G-4 candidates have some opposition. He
offered no strategy for overcoming opposition that could come
from Pakistan, or from other Islamic countries, but said
India was confident of receiving the two-thirds vote
necessary to join the Security Council.

Comment
--------------


13. (C) For India, permanent UN Security Council membership
has come to symbolize India's arrival as a global power, and
for this reason has become a high-profile issue for the
government and foreign policy elite. Debate among the wider
public is just beginning, and in this context Natwar's
comments to Parliament further complicated the already vague
Indian position on a desirable outcome for UNSC reform.
However, it is probable that Natwar's remarks were made
off-the-cuff and do not represent the official GOI stand. As
one of our contacts put it, "By now we should all know that
Natwar does not have the last word." The Indian Government
is likely to be satisfied with a permanent Security Council
seat sans veto, but whether the public and Opposition parties
will accept this outcome remains another matter.
MULFORD