JASWANT IN THE WILDERNESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 006998

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PK IZ IN
SUBJECT: JASWANT IN THE WILDERNESS

Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford, Reasons 1.4 (B,D).


1. (C) Summary: In a warm and constructive November 1
discussion with the Ambassador, Parliamentary Opposition
Leader Jaswant Singh reaffirmed his commitment to the
US-India relationship, remarking that "I have paid a
political price for my support of better relations" between
New Delhi and Washington, "but I will continue to do so
because it's the right thing for India." Not surprisingly,
Jaswant was highly critical of Congress' performance in
government, arguing that Manmohan Singh did not have the
stature or temperament to hold together a multi-party
coalition as Vajpayee did. Jaswant cautioned that
suggestions the BJP should support the UPA's efforts to
continue economic reform were undercut by the "personal
vendetta" that some in the Congress have been conducting.
The former Foreign Minister was typically downbeat about US
policy in Pakistan, complaining that Washington had granted
President Musharraf "a veto" over the US-India relationship.
On Iraq, Jaswant worried about the prospect of partition
along ethnic and religious lines. End Summary.


2. (C) Reviving a relationship that began when Jaswant Singh
was Finance Minister, the Ambassador, joined by PolCouns,
called on the Rajya Sabha Opposition Leader at his New Delhi
residence on November 1. Jaswant was completely at ease in
his role as an opposition politician, remarking wistfully on
his official residence "in the servants' quarters" of the
Prime Minister's compound. Jaswant made only a passing
reference to the recent controversy over the Secretary's
description of the US role in helping to sustain efforts at
Indo-Pak diplomacy in April 2003. He recalled that Vajpayee
had made three major efforts at rapprochement with Pakistan
-- at Lahore (1999),Agra (2001) and Srinagar (2003). In
each instance, he argued, the only driver was the Prime
Minister's personal resolve to make peace with Pakistan his
lasting legacy. Without going into details, Jaswant
expressed concern that President Musharraf and the Pakistani
leadership have still not made the strategic decision to
abandon hostility to India.

US-India
--------------


3. (C) On the broader US-India relationship, Jaswant was
unequivocal, recalling how he and the Prime Minister resolved
between themselves to make relations with Washington an NDA
priority. "I have paid a political price for my support of
better relations" between New Delhi and Washington, Jaswant
declared, joking that he had been labeled as a "CIA agent"
within the NDA. He declared that "I will continue (this
support for US-India partnership) because it's the right
thing for India." Jaswant was completely gracious in his
recollection of his early meetings with Bush Administration
officials, describing in detail how touched he had been by
the time that the President spent with him during his May
2001 visit to Washington. Echoing remarks he made earlier
this year to former Deputy Secretary Talbott (and recounted
in Talbott's memoirs),Jaswant offered a long soliloquy on
the unfulfilled potential of the US-India relations. He
lamented that "Musharraf has been given a veto" over the pace
of US-India relations, and complained that the war in Iraq
and our respective election cycles have left both Washington
and New Delhi too distracted to focus on our bilateral agenda.

Arc of Crisis
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador cited the NSSP as evidence of
Washington's commitment to the India relationship and
challenged Jaswant's implication that Iraq was less than an
urgent challenge to international security, which promoted
the former Foreign Minister to back track from his comments.
However, after acknowledging that policy makers must work
with the world as they find it, Jaswant added that he is
gravely concerned about the prospect that Iraq will fracture
along ethnic and religious lines. Pulling from his library a
well thumbed copy of David Fromkin's "Peace to End All
Peace," Jaswant cited the British legacy in the Middle East
as the root of the region's current tumult, reiterating
concern that an artificially drawn Iraq would eventually
splinter.


5. (C) Jaswant stayed in his Dickensian mode as the
conversation turned to Afghanistan, arguing that despite
surface appearances the situation there remained fragile. He
pointed to Karzai's US protection detail as an error of US
tactics that created an image deeply offensive to Karzai's
Pashtun constituency. Drawing on his experience negotiating
with Kabul for the release of a hijacked Indian airliner,
Jaswant counseled against any compromise with the Taliban.


6. (C) On Pakistan, Jaswant recounted the "sad history" of US
engagement with Islamabad to argue that sooner or later India
will be "presented with the bill" for the GOP's current
cooperation with Washington in the war on terrorism. As in
the 1980's, he argued, the United States will eventually find
itself at a dead end with its Pakistan policy.

Whither Reform?
--------------


7. (C) Jaswant's enthusiastic interventions on foreign policy
betrayed his preference for that dimension of his several
previous portfolios. But the former Finance and Defense
Minister also spoke with authority on issues of governance in
India. Jaswant cautioned that the US might want to "aim off"
of (discount) his remarks on Congress, since he speaks now as
a leader of the opposition bench. With that caveat, Jaswant
criticized Manmohan Singh for lacking the stature or
temperament to hold together a multi-party coalition as
Vajpayee did. He called the Home Minister "a disaster,"
described how Pranab Mukherjee had privately acknowledged
that he knew nothing about the Defense portfolio, implied
that Foreign Minister Natwar Singh had already been stripped
of most authority by the PMO, and generally excoriated the
UPA government.


8. (C) Queried about the BJP's approach to economic issues
now that they are back in opposition, Jaswant argued that
Congress' "personal vendetta" against the BJP and other NDA
alliance members made it difficult for people like him who
would be inclined to support the government's effort to
sustain the process of reform. He implied that the BJP at
least for now will be a relentless opposition, taking
advantage of Congress missteps and contradictions with the
Left to score easy political points. He was silent on
questions of BJP leadership, and the struggle between Hindu
hard liners and moderates like himself who recognize that a
middle course is essential to the BJP's hopes for returning
to power.
MULFORD