Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04MUSCAT1943
2004-10-29 12:58:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Muscat
Cable title:  

EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 11/03/2004

Tags:  AEMR ASEC AMGT PTER CASC KHLS MU EAC 
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S E C R E T MUSCAT 001943 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT. FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/DSS/CC, DS/OSAC,
CA/OCS, NEA/EX, NEA/ARPI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1
TAGS: AEMR ASEC AMGT PTER CASC KHLS MU EAC
SUBJECT: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 11/03/2004

REF: A. MUSCAT 1912

B. USDR DOHA DTG 291258Z OCT 04

Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III.
Reason: 1.4(c).

-------
SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T MUSCAT 001943

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT. FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/DSS/CC, DS/OSAC,
CA/OCS, NEA/EX, NEA/ARPI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1
TAGS: AEMR ASEC AMGT PTER CASC KHLS MU EAC
SUBJECT: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 11/03/2004

REF: A. MUSCAT 1912

B. USDR DOHA DTG 291258Z OCT 04

Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III.
Reason: 1.4(c).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) The Ambassador chaired a meeting of the core Emergency
Action Committee ("EAC") on November 3 to reassess the
Embassy's security posture prior to the local weekend, to
discuss any security implications following the death of
United Arab Emirates (UAE) President Sheikh Zayid bin Sultan
al-Nahyan, and to re-evaluate the Embassy's Force Protection
Condition in the wake of United States Defense Representative
(USDR) Doha, Qatar's recent elevation from Bravo to Charlie
(reftel B).

-------------- --------------
Response to the Death of UAE President Sheikh Zayed
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) The EAC reviewed the passing of Sheikh Zayed and
possible security implications in Oman. The EAC determined
that Zayid's death has little to no/no security implications
for the Embassy.

--------------
Re-evaluation of Embassy's FPCON
--------------


3. (S/NF) The EAC re-assessed the Embassy's FPCON following
USDR Doha's recent increase from Bravo to Charlie (reftel B).
The EAC concluded that Doha's actions are based on the
recent threat reporting specific to Qatar and are not/not
applicable to Oman. The EAC concluded that there has been no
change in the local security environment since the last
meeting held on October 31 (reftel A),and that the Embassy's
FPCON (Bravo) and already heightened security posture remain
appropriate. Likewise, members of the EAC cited no security
incidents among their staffs or dependents during the week.
CONS confirmed that there were no security incidents or
related queries from the private American citizen community.
RSO and RMAS affirmed that their Omani government
counterparts continue to emphasize that they have control of
the local security situation and are poised to respond to any
imminent threat to American personnel or interests in Oman.

--------------
Remaining Vigilant
--------------


4. (S/NF) Prior to concluding the meeting, RSO reiterated
that members of the EAC should continue reinforcing to both
their staffs and family members the need for vigilance
regarding all aspects of personal security, including the
need to maintain a low profile and to remain unpredictable.
RSO also re-emphasized the importance of immediately
reporting suspicious activity or security-related incidents,
especially those involving suspected surveillance, to Post
One. The EAC remains acutely aware of the need to monitor
both the regional and local security environments, and is
prepared to take the necessary countermeasures should changes
to either occur. AMB, DCM, A/RSO, RMAS, CONS, OMC (USDR),
and ECA (USCENTAF) participated in the meeting.
BALTIMORE