RUSSIA-YEMEN: RESPONSE TO THERMOBARIC WEAPONS

S E C R E T MOSCOW 014726


DEPT FOR EUR/PRA, EUR/RUS, NP/ECNP, INR/SPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2014
TAGS: ETTC KSTC PARM PREL PTER YM RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-YEMEN: RESPONSE TO THERMOBARIC WEAPONS
DEMARCHE

REF: A. STATE 188657

B. MOSCOW 12002

C. 03 MOSCOW 19214

Classified By: A/POL Bruce Donahue. Reasons 1.4 (a),(b),(d),(e) and
(g).


1. (S) SUMMARY: On November 22 Igor Matveyev, of the MFA's
Military and Technology Cooperation Division, provided a
response to our demarche (reftels) requesting that the GOR
not transfer thermobaric weapons to Yemen. Matveyev would
not say whether the GOR had made a decision on the matter or
if the transfer had taken place. A non-paper provided by
Matveyev states that the GOR considers the Yemeni loss of
control of SA-7 MANPADS used in terrorist attacks in Kenya
and Saudi Arabia to have been the result of events related to
Yemen's civil war, and amounted to "force majeure."
According to the MFA, the GOR was pressuring its Yemeni
partners not to allow similar losses in the future. Matveyev
invited the U.S. to provide additional information on Yemeni
violations of end use certificate requirements or other
diversions of weapons. END SUMMARY.


2. (S) On November 22 we received from Igor Matveyev of the
MFA's Arms Control and Technology Division a non-paper in
response to our September 7 request that the GOR not permit
the transfer of thermobaric weapons to Yemen. (NOTE: A copy
of the non-paper has been sent as a .pdf file to EUR/PRA.
END NOTE.) Matveyev would not say whether the GOR had made a
decision on whether to transfer thermobaric weapons to Yemen.
He said the GOR strictly follows its national laws in
pursuing military-technical cooperation with countries such
as Yemen, and Russia's national laws are in accordance with
international arms control and non-proliferation agreements.
Matveyev said that the GOR had looked into the Yemeni loss of
SA-7s during the civil war in that country, and, calling it
the result of "force majeure," the GOR considered it to have
been unexpected, unpredictable and unpreventable.


3. (S) He added that the GOR was working to persuade its
Yemeni partners to prevent a similar loss of control over its
weapons from happening again. When questioned on this point,
Matveyev told us that at the working level the Russians have
made clear they would stop cooperation with the Yemenis if
Russian end user requirements were not met. Transfers to
Yemen would be secured with end user certificates
guaranteeing that any products received from Russia would not
be used improperly. In response to our inquiries, Matveyev
said end user certificates might contain terms permitting
inspections by the Russian side. Separately, the GOR was
establishing an additional legislative basis for permitting
the conduct of inspections in recipient countries to
determine whether end user requirements were being followed.
Matveyev asserted that this legislation would assist in
persuading possible recipients of military-technical
cooperation to accept inspections by authorities from the
Ministry of Defense and the Federal Service for
Military-Technical Cooperation. When pressed on the status
of the legislation, Matveyev indicated it had not been
submitted to the Duma, but would be made public when enacted.


4. (S) Towards the end of the meeting, Matveyev stressed the
GOR interest in preventing the diversion of Russian weapons
into terrorists hands. He also invited the U.S to provide
information on Yemeni violations of end user certificates,
specific incidents showing that stockpiles were not secure,
or other confirmed examples of Yemeni authorities losing
control over weapons. When asked, he said the GOR had no
timetable or deadline for receiving such information.
Without concrete information, however, he said there was no
reason to prevent the transfer. After all, he argued, Yemen
had the right to defend itself and the transfer was
permissible under Russian and international law.


5. (S) COMMENT: Although Matveyev would not say whether the
GOR had made a decision on this transfer, his invitation for
us to provide specific information on Yemen's record of
compliance with end user controls suggests that no final
decision has yet been made. The GOR had no qualms about
letting us know in December 2003 that it had decided to sell
thermobaric rockets to Sudan despite our demarches against
that sale (ref C).


BEYRLE