HELPING MOZAMBIQUE BECOME AN EFFECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MAPUTO 000945

SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2009
TAGS: MASS MARR PREL KPKO BY MZ ACOTA
SUBJECT: HELPING MOZAMBIQUE BECOME AN EFFECTIVE
PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTOR

Classified by Amb Helen LaLime; Reasons: 1.4 (b and d)


1. (U) This is an action request -- see paragraph 8.


2. (C) Summary: Mozambique continues to seek a more active
role in peacekeeping, especially in Africa. Despite very
limited resources, the Mozambican Armed Forces have worked
effectively at reinforced company strength in the Africa
Union's PKO in Burundi. As that mission comes under U.N.
control, Mozambique has been asked to increase its presence
to battalion strength. The U.S. and Mozambique are closely
engaged in meeting Mozambique's long-term training
requirements for peacekeeping through the ACOTA program.
Mozambique, however, also needs short-term equipment support
to equip itself for the Burundi operation. Having proven
itself effective at conflict prevention and resolution in the
diplomatic realm, Mozambique should be considered for
assistance to also give it military peacekeeping
capabilities. End Summary


3. (C) Mozambique seeks to become a peacekeeping nation:
Under the direction of President Chissano, Mozambique is
seeking to increase its capabilities to serve in peacekeeping
operations. Mozambican political leaders have described this
policy as a logical extension of Mozambique's increasingly
effective diplomatic engagement in conflict prevention and
resolution. During his presidency of the Africa Union,
President Chissano engaged effectively in the Great Lakes,
Sudan, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia and Sao Tome. Mozambicans are
proud to cite their own history of effective conflict
resolution, including the UN PKO in Mozambique, as a model
they can share with other countries struggling to come out of
conflict.


4. (C) Initial PKO Steps: The Mozambicans have frequently
engaged in peacekeeping but at a modest level. Small
contingents were deployed to East Timor, the DRC and the
Comoros. The Mozambicans this month deployed five military
to Darfur to help plan for AU deployment needs (Mozambique
does not presently plan to send a contingent to any long-term
Sudan PKO). In 2003, Mozambique undertook its most ambitious
PKO initiative by deploying a 220-person reinforced company
to participate with South African and Ethiopian units in the
AU's Burundi PKO. Meeting the equipment and funding
requirements for that PKO was a daunting task. The British
provided over $5 million in equipment and budget support to
make it happen. Prior to their deployment, observers in the
field were frankly skeptical that the Mozambicans would
provide any value-added to the mission given their poor
resources and lack of experience. Half a year into their
deployment, we are told the Mozambicans have greatly exceeded
expectations and are performing creditably their assigned
tasks.


5. (C) Gearing Up for More: Following the decision that
the U.N would assume the peacekeeping mission in Burundi, the
Mozambicans were asked to not only maintain their presence in
Burundi but to increase their deployment to an 850-man
battalion level. President Chissano took the political
decision to comply with the request leaving the military
struggling to meet the standard equipment requirements the
U.N. has set for the battalion. The Mozambicans are in close
negotiations with the U.N. to determine what type of
equipment and funding support will be available. At the same
time, they have approached donors to seek equipment support.
Among the standard items the U.N. has specified for any
battalion participating in a PKO, the Mozambicans have
highlights as critical gaps the following:
-- 50 KVA Generators (2)
-- 30 KVA Generators (7)
-- APC (1)
-- Armored Command Vehicle (1)
-- Armored First Aid Vehicle (1)
-- Armored Ambulance (1)
-- Ambulances (4)
-- Jeep-type 4x4s (15)
-- Radio Jeeps (10)
-- 2.5-5tn Transports (16)
-- First-aid truck (1)
-- Maintenance Truck (2)
-- Water Trucks (3)
-- Fuel Trucks (2)
-- Refrigerator Truck (1)
-- Bucket Loader (1)
-- Forklifts (2)
-- Cargo trailers (20)
-- Water Trailers (12)
-- Fuel Trailers (12)
-- 100 Watt Radio (3)
-- 20 Watt Radio (21)
-- 5 Watt Radio (45)
The Mozambicans also shares a preliminary budget of support
costs for the first 60 days of the Mission of $1.9 million.


6. (C) Where the U.S. is helping: The USG was unable to
provide direct support to Mozambique for its 2003 deployment
to Burundi. What limited assistance was available was
instead directed to the Ethiopian contingent. Since that
time, the USG has engaged the Mozambicans on the ACOTA
program with the expectation that we will be able to help the
Mozambicans develop the training capacity over several years
to prepare troops for peacekeeping operations. Negotiations
to date have been positive and ACOTA has proposed holding a
strategic meeting in September with some 30 Mozambican
military, political and diplomatic experts to clarify their
long-term training needs. It is hoped that training of
Battalion Officers and military trainers can start in January
2005 if not earlier. The ACOTA team is looking initially to
train up four companies to meet Mozambique's stated desire to
have at least one trained battalion ready for peacekeeping
operations. In addition to he training, the ACOTA program
will provide some unit equipment including field hospital,
communications and water treatment material. ACOTA
specifically will not provide vehicles or lethal equipment.
While the Mozambicans welcome this contribution to the
long-term capabilities of their military, they are aware this
training will have little or no impact on their current
operational requirements.


7. (C) Where the U.S. can help more: We are aware the USG
will not be in a position to meet the extensive list of
equipment requested in paragraph 4. If the U.N. really want
Mozambique to expand its presence in Burundi they will have
to work with them to meet their equipment needs or scale back
the equipment list by reducing the complexity of the mission
order or pairing Mozambique with a better equipped partner.
That said, we believe it is in U.S. security interests to
support Mozambique's efforts to contribute immediately in
Burundi and, over the longer term, in the region. The
Mozambicans would be extremely appreciative of any tangible
support that can be given to their immediate operational
needs.


8. (C) Action Request: Embassy requests that the
Department, in conjunction with DoD, identify items that
could be provided to meet some of the Mozambican equipment
requirements for the Burundi Mission. If EDA proves the best
avenue to meet some of these needs, we would welcome a DoD
team to come discuss the program with the Mozambicans and to
work out FMF financing to cover any make-ready or shipping
costs. We underline that while we have been applauding
Mozambique's increasingly active and effective peacekeeping
initiatives over the past several years -- we have yet to
provide any tangible support for these efforts. It's time to
do something.


9. (U) Minimize considered.
LA LIME