CORRUPTION IN MOZAMBIQUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 MAPUTO 000083

SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/S, AF/EPS, INL/AAE
JUSTICE FOR OPDAT AND ICITAP
TREASURY FOR FINCEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2014
TAGS: PGOV KCOR KCRM EAID MZ
SUBJECT: CORRUPTION IN MOZAMBIQUE

REF: A. 03 MAPUTO 1530

B. 03 MAPUTO 1532
Classified By: Amb. Helen La Lime, reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (SBU) Summary: Any discussion of Mozambique's political
and economic development needs to take into account
corruption. The steady decade-long progress since the end of
the civil war could be slowed or even reversed if corruption
is not checked. Senior Mozambicans in fact cite corruption
as the greatest single impediment to future development.
Corruption is not an easy topic to analyze. By their nature
the worse forms of corruption are hidden from view. Corrupt
practices occur at all levels of society to the point that
many practices are considered "normal." U.S. ideas of
conflict-of-interest do not exist here resulting in some
politicians who have greatly enriched themselves through
government positions seeing themselves as legitimate
champions against corruption. The Mozambicans say the right
things about corruption. They have also taken serious
efforts to lay the institutional and legal framework to
attack the problem. The fundamental question, however, is
whether in a country where none is without sin the
Mozambicans really mean what they say. This cable, which
represents a mission-wide effort, surveys GRM efforts to
combat corruption and USG assistance in those efforts,
placing the issue in Mozambican and regional context, and
identifying criticisms we have encountered from our
interlocutors. Elections scheduled for December could prove
to be a watershed in current and future GRM efforts. End
summary.

Everybody Recognizes the Problem
--------------

2. (SBU) Mozambique is losing its image as the darling of the
donor community as the corruption issue takes a more central
role. After eleven years of peace, reconciliation, and rapid
economic growth, the shine of Mozambique's (and the donor
community's) success story is beginning to tarnish. Concern
is growing among donors that corruption is not being
adequately addressed by the country's leadership. Corruption
is the biggest campaign issue for the opposition as
Mozambique approaches presidential elections in 2004; indeed,
the ruling party candidate is also forced to play a political
dance of condemning corruption in government while distancing
himself from the very party structure that has resulted in
corruption. Businesses cite corruption (particularly petty
corruption) as the biggest hindrance to investment. Polls of
Mozambican citizens of all economic strata cite corruption in
one form or another as a constant in day-to-day life.
Despite the formation of a special unit in the Attorney
General's office and numerous public statements by key
figures in the GRM and FRELIMO, a concerted effort has been
slow to gain momentum. Positive developments have been the
creation of the Anti-Corruption Unit, passage of new
legislation, the GRM public sector reform, and improvement in
public finances; these can be considered first steps in
combating corruption. One watershed event, especially in
terms of pubic perception, was the Carlos Cardoso murder
trial, which led to the sentencing in January 2003 of six
involved in killing the crusading anti-corruption journalist.
The entire populace followed the trial closely and were
taken aback (though not surprised) by testimony that detailed
the world of criminal corruption in Mozambique. The trial
might not have happened if it were not for pressure on the
GRM from the Nordics.

Then and Now
--------------

3. (SBU) The days of Samora Machel: Concerning corruption,
much of the population looks back nostalgically to the early
independence period and the Presidency of Samora Machel from
1975-1986. Stories abound of Machel's intolerance for
corruption and his public shaming and sacking of officials
found to be corrupt. At that time, idealism and enthusiasm
for FRELIMO policies was sincere in most quarters of the
population. It is common to hear "this wouldn't have
happened under Samora" when allegations of corruption are
discussed. The yearning for "the good old days" under Machel
ignores the fact that money wasn't worth stealing because
there was nothing to buy in shops and food shortages were
common. Only government officials and diplomats had access
to hard-currency shops actually supplied with goods. The
grinding civil war, compounded by drought, brought enormous
suffering to most Mozambicans. Machel was, however, an
undeniably charismatic and popular leader and his personal
example of a humble lifestyle can be juxtaposed with the
lavish fortunes of many current and former government
officials who enriched themselves during privatization.


4. (U) The Down Side of Economic Development: Mozambique
has enjoyed growth rates of more than 8% for the last decade,
albeit from a very low base. Before the 1992 Rome Peace
Accords, the country was torn by destructive civil war and
the neighboring South African economy was isolated under
anti-aparteid sanctions. Visitors to Maputo who have not
seen the capital for years are astounded at the level of
construction and development. In addition to private foreign
investment and large donor-financed infrastructure projects,
numerous luxury villas have recently sprung up in Maputo's
more upscale neighborhoods. Deteriorated buildings from the
Portuguese era are either being renovated or replaced with
modern structures. Many state enterprises and parastatal
companies have been fully or partially privatized.
High-ranking FRELIMO party members are generally thought to
have benefited from the privatization program, in which
previously nationalized companies were sold off under a less
than transparent bidding process. With large investments
from South Africa, United Kingdom, and Portugal, the Maputo
Corridor has produced a dynamic economic environment and
increased opportunities for corruption. A growing pie and
weak institutions opened the door for corruption, and the
former revolutionary leaders were the first in line as
newly-converted free marketers.

The Three Forms of Mozambican Corruption
--------------

5. (C) Criminal Corruption: The most serious, and perhaps
most unsettling, type of corruption in Mozambique involves
potential involvement with organized crime by government
officials. Even if guilty of acts of omission rather than
commission, the tolerance of activities such as trafficking
in drugs and stolen vehicles, contraband smuggling,
trafficking in persons, and money laundering are seen as the
worst forms of corruption, along with outright pilferage.
Those involved in shady dealings do not shrink from
contracting for the murder of potential witnesses to thwart
prosecution. The collusion of low level officials with
transborder crime provides a conducive environment for
international crime. The role of the country as a transit
point for narcotics, aliens, and stolen goods has grown
rapidly in the last five years. The murders of investigative
journalist Carlos Cardoso in 2000 and of bank auditor
Siba-Siba Macuacua in 2001 demonstrate the ruthlessness of
criminals involved in this type of corruption. Additionally,
the Assistant Attorney General heading up the UAC was the
victim of an assassination attempt in late 2002.


6. (SBU) Corrupted Elites and "Legal" Corruption: This type
of corruption has become more prevalent and, to some extent,
has become socially accepted in the Mozambican context,
despite public disdain for government officials widely seen
as increasingly corrupt. It is expected that ministers will
have a Mercedes and a large home and family members, friends
and associates of those in high positions expect to also
benefit, and pressure any relative with access to resources.
Considering low government salaries, even for ministers,
fringe benefits, such as free housing or the use of a car are
an accepted fact of life. Even anti-corruption advocates
like prominent members of the NGO Etica have profited from
positions such as university dean or former parliamentary
committee chairman. LINK, the domestic NGO consortium, noted
that less than twenty percent of their members meet their
transparency criteria. Not only NGO's budget decisions are
unduly controlled by their leaders. RENAMO leader Afonso
Dhlakama is not known for his transparent handling of the
main opposition party's finances. There are signs, however,
that the public has become less accepting of business as
usual. For example, after the government confirmed on
January 16 that President Chissano will be provided the use
of a new two million dollar home upon leaving office, as
provided by a 1992 law, media reaction included public debate
questioning the appropriateness of building a mansion at
great expense when so many other pressing needs exist.


7. (U) In discussions with contacts and among mission staff,
the trend of sophisticated corruption was identified.
Individuals involved in corruption exhibit sufficient
subtlety to avoid the appearance of outright theft and
embezzlement. It is considered normal to take advantage of
position to garner kickbacks for oneself and family members.
In addition, the privileged elite, with their access to or
influence within government, can peddle influence to enrich
themselves, while still remaining technically within the law,
since no conflict of interest rules exist. A 1992 law
permitted government ministers to have business interests in
their areas of oversight, enabling many to get in on the
ground floor of private sector activity. While the new
anti-corruption law requires high-ranking officials to
declare their assets, this information will remain archived
and out of the reach of the public. Most government
officials have profited from privatization, most notably
former Transport and Communication Minister Guebuza. The
fact that government officials can enrich themselves without
technically breaking the law, compounded by cultural
expectations, makes it possible for officials to publicly
rail against corruption with a straight face. They can
define corruption to solely include collusion with organized
crime or petty everyday extortion, conveniently leaving out
their own actions.


8. (U) Petty Corruption: As opposed to high-level corruption
aimed at personal enrichment, most day-to-day corruption can
be described as "subsistence corruption." Civil servants,
police, teachers, and health care workers receive extremely
low pay. Often, government employees do not even receive
their salaries on time. Considering the high number of
points in the overly-bureaucratic state where a bribe can be
demanded, it is commonplace to pay small "fees" to expedite
paperwork, such as that for mandatory identity cards or
permits. The lingering cultural effects of Portuguese
colonial bureaucracy and previous dependence on the state
during Marxism-Leninism make transactions with corrupt
low-level officials frequent, exacerbating the problem.
Small-scale extortion in this "household sector"
disproportionately burdens the poorest Mozambicans. This
type of corruption is endemic and is prevalent in the police
(in particular the extortionate traffic police),health
clinics (where payment is often demanded for free services),
and schools. In the 2001 Corruption Survey published by
Etica Mocambique, 34 percent of respondents had been asked
for money in the health care service, and 25 percent by
police or teachers. Only fifteen percent had any trust in
the police, and between 80 and 90 percent believed that
judges, police, and customs officials, along with teachers
and health workers, demand bribes. In the schools, low-payed
teachers often demand cash, or even bags of rice, for posting
student exam results. Unfortunately, this situation also
leads to some teachers demanding sexual favors from students
for good or passing grades.

Saying all the right things
--------------

9. (U) Public statements by the President, Prime Minister,
and FRELIMO Secretary General all indicate a desire on the
part of FRELIMO to show progress in the fight against
corruption. A key aspect of the GRM's anti-corruption
campaign has been the high-profile launch of an
Anti-Corruption Unit (UAC) within the Attorney General's
Office. It has become a centerpiece of GRM efforts.
Attorney General Joaquim Madeira shook up the political
establishment shortly after coming into office in 2001 by
announcing his intention to combat corruption, starting in
his own office, which was rife with corrupt prosecutors. The
UAC has had some successes in arrests of provincial level
officials engaging in corruption, but has also faced
challenges in staffing and resources. After moving slowly in
hiring and training staff (with USG training assistance),
they are preparing to expand their efforts. Speaking on the
occasion of the UAC's one-year report, PM Pascoal Mocumbi
encouraged the unit to continue making progress and exhorted
them to "show us the faces" of the corrupt. President
Chissano has repeatedly linked combating corruption with the
GRM centerpiece Strategic Plan for the Reduction of Absolute
Poverty (PARPA). Secretary General Guebuza, in his early
campaigning for 2004 (under the official auspices of the 2003
municipal election campaign) has promised to crack down on
corruption in the public sector, causing some unease among
his fellow Frelimistas as to how far he is willing to go.

GRM efforts to combat corruption
--------------

10. (SBU) The Anti-corruption Unit: The UAC began
operations in November 2002. During their first year, 116
denunciations were received by the unit, 26 anonymously, with
11 resulting in charges and 3 cases reaching trial, but still
no convictions. The unit's Maputo office covers the entire
country; regional offices in Beira and Nampula opened in
December 2003. Major accomplishments of the UAC to date
include the selection and training of core staff. In Maputo,
there are currently only five prosecutors and one
investigator, with prosecutors selected and being trained for
the regional offices. The painstaking staff screening
process has had the personal involvement of Attorney General
Madeira and has resulted in selection of a professional,
dedicated staff with an excellent public reputation for being
uncorrupted. AG Madeira informed us in early January that
the Council of Ministers approved a budget that included more
funds than he had asked for, and includes salary incentives
for the UAC. This is one key test of political will to
support Madeira and the UAC. The UAC enjoys such public
confidence that denunciations and complaints involving
complex crimes not directly related to corruption are brought
by citizens to the UAC, in light of their reputation for
responsiveness. This situation, however, prevents the unit
from focusing on cases that require their attention, by
diverting their limited staff and resources to evaluating and
forwarding on cases that should be dealt with elsewhere. The
fact that the population does not trust the police or any
other entity as much as the UAC is gratifying, but distracts
the prosecutors from investigating higher priority cases.
The few successes that the unit can point to involves
time-consuming embezzlement cases in Sofala and Cabo Delgado
provinces.


11. (SBU) The growing backlog and the UAC's isolation within
the judicial sector translate into the lack of successful
prosecutions. Many of the cases investigated by the unit's
prosecutors have been shelved or dismissed by judges for
alleged lack of convincing evidence. With the UAC seen as an
elite group and the Attorney General publicly criticizing the
Investigative Police (PIC),the animosity of the police is an
impediment to the UAC. In light of the Attorney General's
moves to create a judicial police (PJ) to investigate complex
crimes due to the widespread perception that the PIC is
highly corrupt, police investigators are less than helpful.
With the discussion of the accomplishments and challenges of
the first year, the UAC laid out its goals for the next five
years. These include construction of permanent offices in
Maputo, Beira, and Nampula (vs. rented space),staffing
levels of ten prosecutors and five investigators for each
office, hiring of accountants, auditors, and other technical
experts and support staff, development of an efficient
case-tracking system, procurement of investigative equipment,
and improved coordination with other GRM agencies. The UAC
cannot fight corruption on its own, it needs to be part of a
multi-level effort involving different sectors of the
government, including each ministry.


12. (U) Public Sector Reform: The GRM is undertaking a
comprehensive reform of public services, with the goal of a
creating more efficient and less corrupt environment for
economic development. An inter-ministerial working group has
approved a good governance program with the goal of improving
each ministry's internal controls and reforming public sector
hiring, salaries and advancement, to modernize the public
service and prevent corruption. In November 2003, the Prime
Minister officially launched an national survey, based on
World Bank Institute standards, to identify the extent of
corruption in government services.


13. (SBU) Finance Ministry Inspector General's Office:
Minister of Planning and Finance Luisa Diogo has received
high marks for the donor community and IFIs for her attempts
to develop more accountability in the GRM budget. A key
potential ally of the UAC is the MPF's Inspectorate General
for Finance (IGF). The IGF has powers to audit all
government entities, including the Presidency, and to make
unannounced inspections, which have uncovered cases of fraud
in provincial administration. They have a staff of 100, and
regional offices in Beira and Nampula. They chair the
Coordinating Council of Inspectorates, comprising around
twenty ministerial internal inspection units. The Ministry
of State Administration's inspection unit supervises civil
servants throughout the public sectors, but only has three
inspectors.


14. (U) Anti-corruption law: The National Assembly passed
the new Anti-Corruption Law in November 2003 (reftel B). The
law is seen as a good first step, in particular concerning
increased protection for whistle-blowers and higher fines for
official found guilty of corrupt practices. However, the law
lacks teeth in other areas, and if the anti-money laundering
legislation passed two years ago is any indication, it will
be some time before implementing regulations are promulgated.
The legislation provides for the formation of a Central
Office for Combating Corruption (GCCC) with broad powers,
chaired by the Attorney General, which will more than likely
be a re-named UAC.
?

15. (SBU) The Cardoso and BCM Trials: The Cardoso murder
trial, which ended in January 2003, and the ongoing BCM bank
fraud trial, which began in December 2003, have helped to
improve the image of the beleaguered judiciary. The
conviction and long sentencing of six organized crime figures
for the murder of investigative journalist Carlos Cardoso
prompted several newspapers to name the judge presiding over
the cases as "man of the year." The trial was broadcast live
and was followed with great interest. The judge currently
leading the trial of the 14 million dollar BCM fraud case has
not won over the public, but a successful completion of the
case would further strengthen the image of the court system.
The courts and judiciary are also seen as highly corrupt,
with only the poor ending up facing trial. Most people
believe that judges can be bought, putting those with enough
money above the law. The Portuguese-based legal system
invests broad discretion in judges to dismiss cases before
the trial stage.

Para os Ingleses ver?
--------------

16. (SBU) In recent discussions, prominent civil society
figures, business consultants and government officials told
Ambassador and other embassy officers that GRM
anti-corruption efforts are not sufficiently far-reaching,
and often can be described as efforts to simply present the
appearance that something is being done, "for the English to
see." The most commonly heard complaints involve the
argument that the creation of the Attorney General's
Anti-Corruption Unit (UAC) is merely for show and they will
not be given resources or the required room to maneuver to go
after high-level government corruption. Beyond being called
a "Potemkin" operation, the UAC is considered a convenient
way for other government departments to deflect any
responsibility for fighting corruption, by simply stating
that the UAC is the appropriate entity to do so, despite
their small and inexperienced staff that is quickly becoming
deluged with cases. The UAC has now been operating for one
year and is beginning to increase their capacity. Despite
their courage and dedication and the sound progress made to
date, they face a daunting task.

USG Assistance in the Fight Against Corruption
-------------- -

18. (U) The Anti-Corruption Unit: USAID support pays for
rental of the UAC's office space and provision of all office
equipment, computers, and vehicles. INL has funded three
trips of OPDAT short-term advisors to assist the UAC in
developing skills and tracking cases. PD funds have arranged
for the OPDAT advisor to return with his SEC supervisor in a
speakers program and permitted travel of seven UAC staff to
the U.S. Two groups of seven prosecutors participated in the
six-week ILEA Botswana LEED Program in January 2002 and
October 2003. Training was also conducted in Maputo in June
2002 and June 2003 involving experts from OPDAT, FBI, and
Treasury.


19. (U) Police Sciences Academy (ACIPOL): INL funding has
provided an intermittent long-term ICITAP advisor to assist
ACIPOL in management and curriculum development and to
coordinate specialized training courses that have been
conducted at ACIPOL by ICITAP law enforcement experts.
Courses have included crime scene response, investigative
skills, criminal data base management, investigation of
sexual crimes, and problem based learning instructor
development. INL funds are also paying for improved
facilities at the academy and an assessment of developing a
training forensics lab.


20. (U) Post is using PD funds to bring experts to train
Mozambican customs, utilizing Speaker Program participants,
as it did in September 2003 with a series of lectures on
police ethics.


21. (U) Border Security Assistance: Post has requested FY04
INL funds for training of customs, immigration and border
police and for necessary equipment. DAO is also working with
the GRM to complete prerequisites for receipt of EDA coast
guard cutters or other craft for coastal patrol. The
Mozambican Navy currently has no capacity to secure its long
sea border or to prevent illegal exploitation of its
fisheries.


22. (U) Etica and civil society: USAID funded the
ground-breaking Corruption Survey conducted by Etica
Mocambique in 2001. G-11 donors, including AID, are funding
the planned Etica media campaign to raise public awareness
about corruption and citizens rights. Etica is also working
with the UAC to open reporting centers in all ten provincial
capitals with toll-free hotlines for reporting corruption.
These centers will play an ombudsman role and help the UAC
with case intake. USAID mission DG program is also
formulating its strategy to promote "corruption free zones"
at the municipal level as part of its planned support for
eight newly-elected local governments.

Do Donors Promote Corruption?
--------------

23. (SBU) British-based journalist Joseph Hanlon wrote in
2002 that the donors promote corruption in Mozambique. Many
prominent civil society figures, among them Abdul Carimo, the
President of the NGO "Etica Mocambique," agree with certain
aspects of his argument, and were disillusioned to see the
GRM receive from donors more money that it asked for at the
September 2003 World Bank Consultative Group meetings in
Paris. These critics see the donors as afraid to tarnish one
of their few success stories on the continent and blames the
donor community for accepting only talk from the GRM, without
demanding concrete action and progress against corruption.
These watchdogs admit that they are also part of the
privileged elite and live comfortable lives, in part
benefiting from donor largesse in Mozambique. Themselves
well-connected, educated elites in close-knit Maputo circles,
they also recognize the limits of civil society and the
reluctance of the press and NGOs to jeopardize their
situation. Fear of retribution, since the Cardoso murder,
also plays a part. However, in addition to funding good
governance efforts, donor countries should receive credit for
pressuring the GRM to move forward in combating corruption.
Nordic countries, in particular, applied strong pressure for
the Cardoso murder trial to finally take place. The Swiss
Ambassador has also publicly spoken out against corruption,
provoking a sensitive reaction from senior FRELIMO officials.
In his annual address to Parliament in early 2003, the
Attorney General noted particularly the support received from
USAID following the assassination attempt on the head of the
UAC. Internal public accounting has improved in response to
demands from the donor community and many earnest officials,
such as Finance Minister Diogo and former Justice Minister
Aly Douto (now a FRELIMO deputy and key committee chair) have
used this pressure to achieve first results in the fight
against corruption.

After 2004?
--------------

24. (C) Uncertainty surrounding Guebuza: With the end of
the Chissano government less than one year away, speculation
is rife that current high-level GRM officials will partake in
a "feeding frenzy" to sufficiently pad their nests before
leaving office. Candidate Guebuza has repeatedly vowed to
tackle corruption. Guebuza also happens to be one of
Mozambique's wealthiest businessmen. It is widely believed
that he did very well for himself during privatizations while
FRELIMO parliamentary leader and also earlier as Minister of
Transport. Interlocutors have made comparisons between
Guebuza's handling of his son's minor legal troubles (he
actually went to jail for a short period in a dispute
involving a land deal) and the more well-known case of
President Chissano's son Nympine. Since Nympine's
unconvincing and arrogant testimony in the Cardoso murder
trial, he has actually been heckled in public resulting from
perceptions that he was involved in the bank fraud and the
murder, but remains certain he will not face justice. Some
informed observers feel that Guebuza did not make the same
efforts to shield his son from damage, perhaps indicating his
intention to allow party colleagues and cronies to be
punished for corrupt activities when and if they are
revealed. Conversely, Guebuza is among those senior FRELIMO
officials who have applied pressure on Attorney General
Madeira to move slowly in pursuing certain cases.


25. (SBU) A possible RENAMO upset?: In the now unlikely
event of a RENAMO victory, most commentators predict that
corruption would be even worse. Hungry for power since the
1992 General Peace Accord, RENAMO has failed in two elections
to gain power, and if the November municipal elections are
indicative, they are not sufficiently organized to win in

2004. Considering the lack of transparency in party leader
Afonso Dhlakama's policy and personnel decisions, public
opinion holds that RENAMO is mainly interested in power to
enrich themselves and their long-suffering supporters.

Comment
--------------

26. (SBU) While the UAC faces many challenges, public
opinion is beginning to mobilize and many, if not all,
current government officials recognize the negative effects
of growing corruption not only to their image and
re-electability, but also upon foreign investment and
continued donor support. With over half of the GRM budget
based on either direct or indirect donor support, the
impatience of many European donors, combined with USG
pressure on MCA criteria, has the potential to turn the tide.
The planned Etica campaign may contribute to a greater
awareness of ethical standards and civic ideals on the part
of citizens. The factor of the 2004 elections and the
imminent changes in the GRM leadership may also play a role.
Enlightened GRM officials have indicated that they wish to do
more to prevent future corruption, while confiding that it
will prove difficult to go after those who have already
benefited from corrupt dealings. Without at least one
high-profile success on the part of the UAC, the climate of
impunity will not be shaken. Things may get worse before
they get better, if senior officials who assume they will
lose their job in the new government decide to cash in on
their positions while they can.


27. (C) Comment continued: Attorney General Madeira has
admitted to us that he faces pressure from senior FRELIMO
members to back off certain cases involving high level
officials. He has received telephone calls from Guebuza and
FRELIMO Secretary General Tome pointedly inquiring into the
status of particular cases and has been visited by Supreme
Court Chief Justice Mangaze on numerous occasions. He has
apparently been instructed to keep a tighter rein on the
younger and more unpredictable Assistant AG Isabel Rupia, who
leads the UAC. It is often rumored that she will soon be
replaced in her position by Assistant AG Rafael Sebastiao,
who exhibits the same caution as Madeira. It is not clear if
the attempt on her life in December was meant to succeed, or
merely to send her a message to back off. Some commentators
see the UAC as an "escape valve" cleverly used by the GRM to
shift focus away from individual ministries' deliberate lack
of internal controls. While the UAC runs the risk of
becoming swamped, the largest impediment to successfully
prosecuting corruption is stalling by the courts. The
judiciary has disproportionate responsibility for the
inability of the GRM to bring the corrupt to justice.


28. (SBU) The negative effects on investment, from the added
costs and frustrations of doing business, will do great harm
to continued economic development if corruption is not
reduced. Corruption also has wider implications relating to
grand corruption, organized crime, porous borders, and their
possible nexus with terrorist financing. Senior GRM
officials have publicly stated that corruption is a serious
constraint on development. They are also very aware that
Mozambique's efforts on corruption will be evaluated in light
of such programs as MCA and NEPAD. In the last year, we have
seen some glimmers of hope in the fight against corruption.
Mozambique must now move more energetically beyond the
rhetoric and planning to implementation of ambitious,
visible, well-targeted actions, which span all sectors of
government and which, over time, will reverse the current
trend and foster a culture where good governance and
accountability are the norm. End Comment.
LA LIME