Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04MAPUTO1533
2004-11-29 04:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Maputo
Cable title:  

PRESIDENT CHISSANO ON MUGABE AND MARCH 2005

Tags:  PHUM PREL PGOV MZ ZI LY 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MAPUTO 001533 

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/S AND AF/FO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2014
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV MZ ZI LY
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT CHISSANO ON MUGABE AND MARCH 2005
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

REF: A. STATE 242995


B. MAPUTO 1520
Classified By: Ambassador Helen La Lime for reasons 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MAPUTO 001533

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/S AND AF/FO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2014
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV MZ ZI LY
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT CHISSANO ON MUGABE AND MARCH 2005
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

REF: A. STATE 242995


B. MAPUTO 1520
Classified By: Ambassador Helen La Lime for reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: President Chissano believes that Mugabe is
interested in improving relations with the US, although still
deeply suspicious of US and UK intentions. He will be
receptive only if approached without hostility or
preconditions. Mugabe might be willing to relinquish power
before elections in 2008, if, by doing so, he would not be
seen as giving in to outside pressure, if a strong successor
could be identified, and if the opposition no longer
threatened to split the country apart. Chissano considers
opposition leader Morgan Tsivangirai too extreme to lead
Zimbabwe. He thinks Southern African Development Community
(SADC) observers will limit any critique of March
parliamentary elections to a SADC-internal "peer review"
process rather than go public. End Summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by econ/pol chief
(notetaker),met with President Chissano to deliver the
demarche requested in ref A on upcoming parliamentary
elections in Zimbabwe (March 2005) and to elicit Chissano's
view of Zimbabwe's political crisis. She outlined the dire
economic impact of Mugabe's policies and how his
authoritarian rule jeopardized the opportunity provided by
upcoming parliamentary elections. What could be done to find
a way forward?, she asked.


3. (C) After considering the question silently for a moment,
President Chissano began by saying that he had met with
Mugabe several weeks earlier and Mugabe appeared to him to
want to improve relations with the US. But he remains
suspicious, Chissano added. To approach him, one must do so
as a friend. Chissano then reminded the Ambassador that when
he first met with President George H.W.Bush, he had just
finished visiting Qadhafi in Libya. Subsequently he met with
Qadhafi several times and in his meetings suggested that
Libya ought to improve relations with the West. He said that
Qadhafi was resistant but later came round, mainly through
Qadhafi's contact with middleman Tiny Rowland of the British
mining company Lonrho. Chissano was careful to deny that he

played a major role in the Libyan thaw, but offered Libyan
relations as an example of an approach that might work with
Mugabe. After all, he added, Mugabe is no Saddam: he has no
weapons of mass destruction, he's no terrorist and his power
is hobbled by internal politics. Mugabe might be receptive,
he argued, depending on the proper approach. And if a
dialogue with the US (or the UK) could begin in which he did
not feel threatened or uncomfortable, other SADC
representatives would find dealing with him much easier, too.
?

4. (C) Although Mugabe was largely alienated from the UK
government, Chissano thought that he continued to have,
ironically, good relations with Margaret Thatcher and perhaps
a few others in the English establishment. He doubted that
there was anyone Mugabe felt comfortable with in the current
U.S. administration, but wondered it there might be someone
from earlier administrations, possibly a Democrat, who could
serve as a useful interlocutor.


5. (C) Turning to the March 2005 parliamentary elections,
Chissano informed the Ambassador that Mugabe told him he had
received a letter from Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)
leader Morgan Tsivangirai, but that he decided he would not
respond until after the ZANU-PF congress (now underway).
Moreover, with the MDC losing by-elections and its support on
a downward slide, according to Chissano, there did not seem
to Mugabe much urgency to negotiating now. Mugabe's own
party, ZANU-PF, was in the midst of squabbles over
identifying his successor, Chissano noted, a complication
that also blocked dealing with the MDC.


6. (C) Chissano emphasized that the SADC observer guidelines
agreed upon in August at a SADC meeting in Mauritius stressed
"observe - yes; monitor - no." Pressed by the Ambassador to
explain what this meant, Chissano said that monitoring
implied more involvement than observing, something that
hinted subtly of "control." "Control is a bad word, don't
you think?" he asked rhetorically. He explained that SADC
observers would likely limit any critique of the elections to
a "peer review process," which we take to mean that SADC
criticism of the election process in Zimbabwe would remain
behind closed doors while any public statement would likely
be positive.


7. (C) In Chissano's opinion, Mugabe might be willing to
leave before his term ends in 2008. But to leave early, four
conditions first would have to be met: 1) his departure could
not be seen as the result of "foreign" pressure, 2) ZANU-PF
must unite around a chosen successor, 3) this successor must
be someone who would not divide the country and 4) the
opposition must be willing to behave responsibly rather than
threaten civil war. Regarding the final requirement,
Chissano thought Morgan Tsivangirai did not fit the bill.
Although he admitted he had never met him, Tsivangirai seemed
to him someone who "dropped from the clouds," a trade
unionist who came out of nowhere. He is too extreme,
Chissano said, even to the left of Mugabe. He is not
sufficiently mature, he's never been elected to parliament
and therefore those in parliament have no respect for him.
Chissano considers him not good for the stability of
Zimbabwe, but rather a divider like President Gbagbo of Cote
d'Ivoire. Nevertheless, the MDC has other capable figures
who could play a constructive role, he added.


8. (C) As the hour was ending, President Chissano informed
the Ambassador that he would be visiting Zimbabwe and several
other countries in the region in coming weeks. Meanwhile he
would consider carefully our demarche and look further for
ways to improve the situation in Zimbabwe. The Ambassador
interjected that we very much want to find a way forward.
"Don't bite him," Chissano joked, he's not Saddam Hussein.
He reiterated then that, when discussing his own retirement
from office with Mugabe recently, Mugabe said that it was
still too early for him to retire, that he still needed "to
arrange things." He didn't see how Mugabe could continue on
in power after 2008, when he would be 84, Chissano continued.

9: (C) Comment: President Chissano again and again emphasized
that Mugabe would not respond to pressure, but that an
approach could work if done in a non-confrontational manner.
He suggested that he would try to be helpful in this regard,
but did not offer other specifics as to how. Chissano had no
one in mind but several times mentioned that he thought
Mugabe could be approached by someone from the U.S. He
expressed a willingness to continue a dialogue with us.
LA LIME