Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04MANAMA863
2004-06-07 15:16:00
SECRET
Embassy Manama
Cable title:  

PART I: PARTING THOUGHTS ON BAHRAIN'S POITCIAL AND

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR KMPI BA KAPO 
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S E C R E T MANAMA 000863 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA DAS DIBBLE, NEA/ARP, PI
CAIRO FOR STEVE BONDY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KMPI BA KAPO
SUBJECT: PART I: PARTING THOUGHTS ON BAHRAIN'S POITCIAL AND
ECONOMIC SITUATION: SUMMARY

Classified By: Ambassador Ronalt E. Neumann. Reasons 1.4 (B)(D).

This cable contains the summary of my parting reflections on
Bahrain.

-------
Summary
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S E C R E T MANAMA 000863

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA DAS DIBBLE, NEA/ARP, PI
CAIRO FOR STEVE BONDY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KMPI BA KAPO
SUBJECT: PART I: PARTING THOUGHTS ON BAHRAIN'S POITCIAL AND
ECONOMIC SITUATION: SUMMARY

Classified By: Ambassador Ronalt E. Neumann. Reasons 1.4 (B)(D).

This cable contains the summary of my parting reflections on
Bahrain.

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Summary
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1. (S) Not yet democratic, its stability potentially
challenged by a rejectionist Shia opposition, unemployment
and cultural backlash, Bahrain has yet managed significant
advances in political freedom and economic liberalization in
the nearly three years of my tour. Its already complex
political geography of different agendas between King, PM,
parliament, and constitutional rejectionists has been further
complicated by the growth of conservative Sunnis with a
radical fringe.


2. (S) King Hamad is the fulcrum. He transformed the
nature of the political debate. I believe he will allow
further change, but the pace will be slower than in 2000-2002
and he will insist it come through the parliament. Thus the
rejectionist opposition will not achieve through
extra-parliamentary dialogue the fundamental reordering of
power they seek. Lacking the resources to force change, the
opposition continues seeking controversies with some looking
for a violent reaction that would rally their Shia base.
Hamad has dodged this sectarian confrontation, but has had to
sacrifice some law and order to do so. He may have decided
to use Shia policemen to restore credibility, and take an
issue from the rejectionists . A struggle will go on at least
until the 2006 election when the opposition will face the
stark choice of participating or splitting. Some violence is
possible.


3. (S) We have the right mix of policies; supporting
participants in political evolution with patience and MEPI
programs and encouraging rejectionists to participate while
not accepting their claims that they are the only democrats.
Our programs in law reform and education are part of building
a civic society, but it is important to remember that this is
still a fragile situation with few democratic habits where
unemployment, political shocks from outside -- including
deeply resented American policies -- could empower the
opposition and set back the evolutionary pace. In this mix
our support for job creation through the FTA and economic
reform remains essential The result will be felt in the rest
of the Gulf. Our resources have been significantly increased
to meet our new tasks. It is essential that we maintain the
support necessary for our mission. End Summary.
NEUMANN