ARTICLE 98 RATIFICATION IN BAHRAIN: WE CAN GET IT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAMA 000831

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2009
TAGS: PREL BA KIIC
SUBJECT: ARTICLE 98 RATIFICATION IN BAHRAIN: WE CAN GET IT
BUT MAY BE MAKING A MISTAKE

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann. Reasons 1.4(B)(D).


1. (C) King Hamad has promised that he will bring into
force the Article 98 exclusion agreement. The foreign
minister is struggling to find a way to carry this out
without causing a political explosion in Bahrain. I believe
the GOB will honor its commitment to us, but I question
whether we are actually furthering our own strategic
interests.


2. (C) I believe there are strong reasons to credit the
many high level assurances we have received that Bahrain will
never, under any circumstances, turn an American official or
former official over to the International Criminal Court. To
do so would be contrary to the fundamental strategic
relationship that underpins Bahrain's security and survival.
The bilateral relationship is a key pillar of King Hamad's
strategic view of the world and he would not undermine it by
surrendering U.S. personnel. Thus, what we get for
ratification is a legal formula without any real substantive
change, at least in the Bahraini context.


3. (C) Yet, if our Article 98 agreement becomes public it
could touch off a major political problem, pulling Bahrain's
support for our military into the middle of a domestic
firestorm. The Shi'a opposition is looking for issues on
which to force confrontation with the government. They want
to provoke intense responses against which they could
mobilize public support that is now inadequate to their
needs. The abuse of Iraqi prisoners is Abu Ghraib has made
the whole issue of American "criminal" behavior a white hot
issue in Bahrain as it is in the rest of the Arab world. A
leak of a concluded Article 98 agreement at this time and in
these circumstances would be an issue tailor made for the
opposition to take to the streets. Anti-government MPs would
surely rise and demand that it be revoked. Opposition
deputies in parliament would also make a case that the
constitution was being violated by secret passage of what
ought to be publicly ratified treaties. The Article 98
ratification would certainly be undone. Moreover, all of this
focus on the security relationship would tempt political
opponents to try to expand the debate to other "surrenders"
of Bahrain rights, in such matters as the Defense Cooperation
Agreement.


4. (C) My understanding is that the USG has no very certain
way of protecting the confidentiality of an agreement since
it must be reported under the Case Act.


5. (C) As long as our instructions are to secure Article 98
agreement, this embassy will do everything possible to carry
out those instructions. However, I believe I have a
responsibility to tell you that in my judgment pressuring
formal ratification has large potential political pain for
infinitesimal gains. Our desire for formal ratification of
an Article 98 agreement now ought to be reconsidered.
NEUMANN