Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04MANAMA529
2004-04-14 13:19:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Manama
Cable title:  

SCENE SETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE'S VISIT

Tags:  PREL PHUM BA 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000529 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM BA
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE'S VISIT
TO BAHRAIN

REF: MANAMA 528

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000529

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM BA
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE'S VISIT
TO BAHRAIN

REF: MANAMA 528

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Mr. Armitage: We are delighted you are coming to
Bahrain, and the Bahraini Government is as well. King Hamad
has met Generals Abizaid and Myers during the past two weeks,
but as political issues move to the fore in Iraq the King had
hoped a senior State Department official would come here.
Your visit is, therefore, well timed.

--------------
IRAQ
--------------


2. (C) Hamad and his officials are worried about security
and stability in the post June 30 Iraq. Above all, they do
not want a revolutionary Shia state in Iraq. They understand
that Coalition forces will remain in Iraq, but they are not
convinced we have a viable strategy for forming an Iraqi
government to whom we can turn over sovereignty. They will
ask you about this. The King and Crown Prince both think we
need an ex-military strongman. They discount the utility of
promoting democracy or drafting a good constitution during
the next couple of years. Bahraini public opinion,
meanwhile, has been considerably more critical of U.S.
military operations in Iraq due to grim television images
from Fallujah. The elected house of the Bahraini Parliament
issued a statement April 13 denouncing what it called
"horrible massacres at the hands of U.S. military forces."

--------------
REFORMS and U.S. MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE
--------------


3. (C) On foreign policy and domestic issues, the elected
house of Parliament is growing steadily more assertive.
Parliamentarians are scrutinizing the budget and
investigating allegations of government corruption. Several
ministers may lose their jobs because the elected house will
vote for motions of no-confidence or force a cabinet
reshuffle. There is a strong, conservative Islamist block in
the Parliament often antagonistic toward the U.S. (they
pushed the Iraq resolution, for example). The Parliament is
likely to block ratification of our signed Article 98
agreement, and the government has therefore put the Article
98 on hold.
.

4. (C) We are using the Middle East Partnership Initiative
to promote reforms in government, including the Parliament.
NDI's two-year old program is very popular with the
parliamentarians, including the Islamists. MEPI is also
financing American Bar Association experts working with the
Justice Minister on judicial reform. We have launched
programs on civic education, curriculum reform and
U.S./Bahraini university linkages with the Ministry of
Education. The technocrats in Bahrain have some maneuver
room for reforms; the Embassy, however, is almost at its
limit in terms of staff resources to manage new MEPI
programs.


5. (C) Public reaction to our initiative to help reforms
across the region met with some knee-jerk anti-American
responses. More educated persons recognize that the reforms
are good for Arab societies and reformers should access help
where they can find it. The King told Undersecretary
Grossman last month that he strongly backed our effort, but
that we should understand some countries, like Saudi Arabia,
would move relatively slowly. The Foreign Minister told us
April 13 that the next Arab League summit would issue a
statement outlining specific reform principles, such as
democracy, transparency and respect of human rights, which
should guide the future development of Arab society.

--------------
SECURITY
--------------


6. (S/NF) You have raised with the Bahrainis before our
concerns about Sunni extremists who move around freely in
Bahrain. Bahraini surveillance is not particularly good.
There is disagreement within the GoB about whether existing
Bahraini laws suffice to detain these people or charge them
with conspiracy to commit criminal acts. The GoB is drafting
a new anti-terrorism law, and with DS/ATA funding we will
have U.S. Justice Department officials review the draft with
the Bahrainis. There is also a question of political will
within the GoB, and we suggest you reinforce our demarches
that the Government must do more to contain the Sunni threat,
including putting large vehicle scanners on the bridge
linking Bahrain with Saudi Arabia.
--------------
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
--------------


7. (C) The GoB made little concrete progress on TIP in CY
2003 and remains at Tier II. Embassy officers and visiting
Congressional officials have warned this could impede
Congressional approval of the free trade agreement expected
to reach congress next autumn. In particular, the Bahrainis
need to be tougher on enforcement; they need to punish known
traffickers taking advantage of South Asians coming here to
work. They also need to devote some resources to establish a
useful hotline and building a refuge shelter for victims.
Your briefly mentioning these points with the Prime Minister,
who oversees the Cabinet, would reinforce our own frequent
discussions with the Government.
FORD