Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04MANAMA526
2004-04-14 11:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Manama
Cable title:  

BAHRAINI LEADERS ON IRAQ: FOCUS FIRST ON

Tags:  OVIP PREL BA 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAMA 000526 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2014
TAGS: OVIP PREL BA
SUBJECT: BAHRAINI LEADERS ON IRAQ: FOCUS FIRST ON
SECURITY, LATER ON DEMOCRACY

Classified By: Robert S. Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAMA 000526

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2014
TAGS: OVIP PREL BA
SUBJECT: BAHRAINI LEADERS ON IRAQ: FOCUS FIRST ON
SECURITY, LATER ON DEMOCRACY

Classified By: Robert S. Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The King, Crown Prince and Foreign
Minister told visiting American officials on April 13 that
the U.S. needs to focus more of its effort on restoring
stability in Iraq immediately, and to worry less about
building democracy there in any short time frame. The King
and Foreign Minister suggested Arab states should help with
security issues in consultation with the U.S. End Summary.


2. (C) Bahrain's King, Crown Prince and Foreign Minister
told visiting U.S. officials that the U.S. needs to
concentrate its attention now on restoring stability in Iraq,
and worry less about building democracy there. King Hamed
told CJCS General Myers on April 13 that the U.S. can't leave
Iraq until stability and order are securely reestablished.
He dismissed the Iraqi Governing Council as unable to make
tough decisions. Iraq needs to be a republic, but Arab
republics historically are weak, he said. Therefore, the
U.S. Government needs to find a strong leader able to steer
the republic and guide the security services. It is vital,
the King asserted, that a strong leader rebuild the Iraqi
Government's authority and credibility among the Iraqi
public. The King stated that it didn't matter if that strong
man was a Sunni, a Shia or a Kurd; even Salahadin was a Kurd,
he exclaimed.


3. (C) Crown Prince Salman was characteristically blunt to
CJCS Myers at the April 13 lunch also attended by the King.
Salman asked when the U.S. would shift its focus from
building democracy in Iraq - a nearly impossible task in the
short term - and instead concentrate on building security.
He wondered if it was possible for the U.S. political
establishment to understand that the democracy goal in Iraq
was not achievable this year.


4. (C) Speaking to Congressman Issa on April 13, Foreign
Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Mubarak wondered where the U.S.
could find an Iraqi "Adenauer" who could to address Iraq's
many problems. Sheikh Mohammed added that restoring law and
order has to take precedence over issues like a constitution
or democracy. The U.S. also had to keep aggressive neighbors
like Iran out of Iraqi affairs, the Foreign Minister added.


5. (C) The King and Foreign Minister both said on April 13
that regional states should take a greater role in Iraq. The
King said it is unfortunate U.S. troops are patrolling
cities. This is a job better left to Iraqi security or even
Arab forces while American units secure the borders. The
Arab League should be brought into play. Speaking
separately, the Foreign Minister said that the U.S. should
secure an agreement in principle from the Arab League so that
"select" Arab states could send forces to help the Coalition.
(Sheikh Mohammed specifically cited the UAE, Jordan and
Bahrain.) The Foreign Minister said that last year the U.S.
rejected such an idea. He suggested the time has come to
revisit that decision.


6. (C) King Hamed also urged that the U.S. try harder with
Sunni tribes in western Iraq. He recalled that historically
tribal leaders could be paid to guarantee security across
large expanses of territory. He recommended the U.S. focus
more intently on building ties to tribal leaders; the
Jordanians could help a great deal in this, he added. Hamed
also cautioned against letting religious figures, especially
among the Shia clerical establishment, get too involved in
Iraqi political affairs.


7. (C) Hamed expressed confidence the U.S. ultimately would
prevail; he was not especially alarmed by the recent spike in
fighting. He was more interested on April 13 in giving
advice about how to make the Iraq campaign easier.
Nonetheless, all three officials underlined the primacy of
restoring stability in Iraq, while dismissing the chances of
democracy, more clearly than we have ever heard them do
before.


8. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
FORD