Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04MANAMA431
2004-03-29 14:22:00
SECRET
Embassy Manama
Cable title:  

BAHRAINI VIEWS ON IRAQ: WONDERING ABOUT IRAQI

Tags:  PREL IZ BA 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000431 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2014
TAGS: PREL IZ BA
SUBJECT: BAHRAINI VIEWS ON IRAQ: WONDERING ABOUT IRAQI
SHIA, AND SUNNI BUY-IN


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann. Reasons 1.4(B)(D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000431

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2014
TAGS: PREL IZ BA
SUBJECT: BAHRAINI VIEWS ON IRAQ: WONDERING ABOUT IRAQI
SHIA, AND SUNNI BUY-IN


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann. Reasons 1.4(B)(D).


1. (S) Summary: Bahrain's King Hamad remains concerned
about the extent of Shia and Iranian influence in Iraq but is
strongly supportive of our efforts there. His son the Crown
Prince urged us to take care with the de-Baathification
process to avoid alienating Iraqi Sunnis. The King and Crown
Prince both recognized that reestablishing the Iraqi state is
a long-term process. The Crown Prince commented that he
could imagine Iraq's permanent government set up in 2006
might look like the Philippines in the 1980s and 1990s:
pro-Western, no threat to its neighbors but plagued with
problems of corruption and bad governance. This outcome,
while not ideal, would be a big plus over the Iraq of Saddam
Hussein. End Summary.


2. (S) Bahrain's King Hamad bin Issa told CENTCOM Commander
General Abizaid on March 24 that he fears Iraqi instability
after the turnover of sovereignty to an Iraqi government on
June 30. Hamad discounted the political courage of the Iraqi
Governing Council (IGC) and expected the IGC would not make
tough political decisions about Iraq's future over the coming
months. Hamad sharply criticized Ayatollah Sistani for
engaging too much in politics in such a way that would
aggravate sectarian divisions in Iraq. He urged the U.S. to
be careful of Iran's trying to use Iraqi Shia to aggravate
the situation in Iraq. General Abizaid assured the King of
American commitment to reestablishing stability in Iraq. He
also highlighted the Coalition's effort to build up capable
Iraqi security forces. Achieving durable stability in Iraq
would be a long process, he concluded, and Iraq would need
the help of the United States as well as its neighbors.


3. (C) Ambassador explained to the King, Crown Prince and
Foreign Minister on March 28-29 the key events and issues
over the next year as it now looks. The U.S. is committed to
the June 30 transfer of sovereignty. The Coalition
understands that the IGC must be more credible and is looking
at ways to establish a credible Iraqi authority which will
receive power on June 30. The U.N. might be able to offer
useful ideas and will definitely be part of the process. At
the end of 2004 or early 2005, there will be national
elections to elect a temporary parliament. In order to
prepare for those elections, the UN, CPA and the IGC are
working on a new electoral law and how to establish an
election commission to oversee the polls. The temporary
parliament will then operate under the framework established
by the temporary administrative law - a "temporary
constitution" designed to compel competing Iraqi groups to
work together. The temporary parliament will have a
three-man presidency and will also name the rest of the
government. It also will prepare the draft permanent
constitution. Once drafted, that constitution will go to a
public referendum and if approved new elections to establish
the new, permanent government will be held. All three
Bahraini officials underlined their support for the process
as laid out.


4. (S) Bahrain's Crown Prince, Shaikh Salman bin Hamad,
told Ambassador that the Bahraini government has two main
concerns about Iraq over the next six months. First, he
urged that the de-Baathification process in Iraq be
undertaken in such a way as to not alienate the majority of
Iraq's Sunnis. Salman commented that with Ahmed Chelabi in
charge the odds of alienating most Iraqi Sunnis seem to be
higher. Bahrain and other Gulf states want to see Iraq's
Sunnis brought into the process. The Ambassador noted
greater contacts in recent months between the Coalition
Provisional Authority and Sunni leaders, and he pointed to
Sunni political groupings and associations starting to form
in order to take a more active role in the future Iraqi
government. Second, Salman urged that the United States
stand up a capable Iraqi defense force to assume a great
burden on the war against terror in Iraq. Ambassador Neumann
pointed to progress to date and assured Salman that
establishing adequate Iraqi security forces is a high
priority for the United States and the Coalition.


5. (S) Salman observed that rebuilding the Iraqi state
almost from zero is an enormous challenge. He mused that
over the longer term if the United States is successful in
Iraq, he could imagine that Iraq might resemble the
Philippines of the 1980s and 1990s. Salman said in this case
Iraq would be pro-western, and would represent no threat to
its neighbors. It would have a better record on human rights
as well. It also, however, would be plagued with problems of
poor government and corruption. Salman concluded that
despite these shortcoming, such an Iraq would be a vast
improvement in the strategic picture from what Iraq had
represented under Saddam and that it could further develop
over time.
NEUMANN