BAHRAIN MOI'S PLANNING, PREPARATION, AND C2 AVERT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000039

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ATA, DS/ITA, NEA/EX

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2014
TAGS: ASEC
SUBJECT: BAHRAIN MOI'S PLANNING, PREPARATION, AND C2 AVERT
NEW YEAR'S EVE RIOT REPEAT

REF: 03 MANAMA 0059

Classified By: CDA Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.5 (b and d)


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: RSO has obtained details from senior GOB
Interior Ministry (MOI) officials on how the Ministry
planned, prepared for, and executed a major police deployment
in Bahrain to prevent a repeat of last year's New Year's eve
riots. The MOI's preparations were impressive and
demonstrated clear progress in the MOI's capability to
provide security to major events. The MOI's drawing on
lessons learned from ATA training is also a clear testimonial
to the value of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program.
END SUMMARY.


2. (S/NF) BACKGROUND CONTEXT: On New Year's Eve, 31 DEC
2002, Bahrain was rocked by spontaneous, violent, and
damaging, albeit relatively disorganized, riots that
destroyed over 100 cars, caused more than USD 250,000 total
damage in area hotels, and left the country shaken, confused,
and in search of a motive and organizer (RefTel). Various
Embassy contacts offered a range of hypotheses on the
composition and motivations of the rioters from "saboteurs,"
committing "deliberate acts" intended to "create chaos and
instability, provoke the police, and undermine the country's
stability and achievements," to laying blame on the numerous
Shi'a political societies. Some asserted that most of the
rioters were opportunist hooligans who capitalized on an
event that spun out of control. At any rate, the riots stung
the Interior Ministry, humiliating their law enforcement
efforts, and undermined the credibility of an already
oft-maligned government department. END BACKGROUND CONTEXT


3. (SBU) On Wednesday, 01/07/04, Asst. RSO spent an hour
with Colonel Ibrahim Al Ghaith, Director of the "Training and
Guards Directorate." Col Al Ghaith put together the MOI New
Year's Eve 2003 plan, implemented it under the authority of
the MOI Undersecretary, MajGen Daij Khalifa Daij Al Khalifa,
and briefed it to Asst. RSO as follows.


4. (SBU) Several weeks before the event, Col Al Ghaith met
with an entire working shift (about 450 policemen) from the
various police sub-stations around Bahrain. The purpose of
this meeting was to ascertain, from the viewpoint of the
"street-level" patrolmen, where problems were anticipated and
what the policemen recommended as appropriate countermeasures
thereto. The policemen recommended robust foot patrols in
the areas of Exhibition Avenue, downtown Manama, the Bahrain
Exhibition Center, and Gudaibya. They further requested that
patrols consist of two officers each.


5. (SBU) Col Al Ghaith explained that, upon reflection, he
preferred patrols consisting of 5 officers each. These
patrols were deployed in the aforementioned areas. Further,
each patrol of 5 policemen was comprised of 1 policeman from
the cognizant sub-station supplemented by 4 policemen from
the "Guards" Directorate. This way, the leader of the patrol
was highly familiar with the area, plus he had a capable team
under him. On the ground, they utilized dispersion by
breaking each 5-man patrol into two smaller groups of 2/3 and
separated them by a half-block. They worked together, but
did not cluster too closely.


6. (SBU) Each of these foot patrols was assigned an area of
responsibility. Multiple teams covering the larger
jurisdiction would report to a high-level officer resident at
the cognizant sub-station, who then reported to the MOI's
Command Center at the Fort (HQ).


7. (SBU) Special Security Force Directorate (SSFD, the
Directorate that provides the riot police/tactical teams)
pre-positioned a react force at the Manama, Gudaibya, and
Exhibition Center police stations and two at the Fort. These
teams were on standby to react to an incident beyond the
capabilities of the above-mentioned foot patrol teams. The
chain of command and communications worked like this: The
foot patrol leader would call the OIC at the sub-station, who
would call the Command Center at the Fort. The Command
Center would deploy the React Forces as needed.


8. (SBU) Col Al Ghaith and his counterparts ran the Command
Center and remained there all night. The Undersecretary was
in charge overall.


9. (C) COMMENT: Of note, this demonstrates the benefits of
Post's robust ATA training agenda. Senior police officials
solicited input from lower ranks with ground-level knowledge,
developed a cohesive plan, and then effectively executed this
plan. Through pre-event publicity and advertising, meetings
and discussions with various political society leaders, a
well-organized force, and sound Command, Control, and
Communications, the effort was by all accounts a success.
The MOI officers are clearly learning these skills, in large
part, through the various ATA courses. Col Al Ghaith added
that this plan and methodology will be the model for future
coverage of large/special events. This is good news for the
future. Col Al Ghaith is completely sold on ATA and the
modern method of assessing a task and accomplishing a
mission. He is a strong contact for the RSO office and, as
we have come to learn from his superiors, one of the future
leaders of the MOI. He has already been identified for the
senior-level echelons in the near future. END COMMENT
FORD