Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04MANAMA368
2004-03-16 14:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Manama
Cable title:  

BAHRAIN AND ARTICLE 98: SLOW MOTION

Tags:  PREL KTIA KICC BA JUS 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAMA 000368 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2014
TAGS: PREL KTIA BA JUSLBA KICC
SUBJECT: BAHRAIN AND ARTICLE 98: SLOW MOTION

REF: A. MANAMA 322


B. MANAMA 336

C. MANAMA 283

Classified By: CDA Robert S. Ford, reason 1.5 (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAMA 000368

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2014
TAGS: PREL KTIA BA JUSLBA KICC
SUBJECT: BAHRAIN AND ARTICLE 98: SLOW MOTION

REF: A. MANAMA 322


B. MANAMA 336

C. MANAMA 283

Classified By: CDA Robert S. Ford, reason 1.5 (d)


1. (C) The Bahraini Government is still pondering what to
do about bringing our signed Article 98 agreement into
effect. Charge on March 16 again asked the MFA Minister of
State whether the Government would agree to a confidential
exchange of notes. The Minister, clearly annoyed that Charge
was again raising the subject, said some legal experts inside
the Government believe the Article 98 agreement must go to
the Parliament to be ratified. Others in Government
disagree, and the argument is ongoing. Charge pointed out
that the American law originally envisioned that the U.S.
Government would suspend some kinds of military assistance to
those countries which failed to finalize Article 98
agreements; we could not exclude that this might happen to
Bahrain as time goes by. We had warned the GoB about this
when we began the process two years ago, Charge recalled. He
urged the GoB to decide upon a course of action and move
ahead.


2. (C) The Minister said he had received a report from the
meeting in Washington between NEA PDAS Larocco and the
Bahraini Ambassador. The GoB has the message, he stated
flatly. He then asked Washington to understand the GoB's
situation. Anti-American sentiment in the Parliament now is
very strong and the elected lower house will not approve the
Article 98. At the same time, the MFA does not want to go
around the Parliament if the law requires that the agreement
go to the deputies for ratification; the experience from the
parliamentary investigations of financial sector misdeeds
shows the harm which can come to a Ministry responsible for
legally dubious policies. The Government is trying to find a
middle ground solution that enables it to bring the agreement
into force and yet scrupulously follows the law and
parliamentary preogatives. In the meantime, the Minister
stressed, the GoB will not turn over a U.S. servicemember to
the ICC.


3. (C) Separately, POL/ECON chief learned on March 16 from
the deputy director of the legal advisor's office at the
Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (attached to the Prime Minister's
Office) that Cabinet Affairs had decided the Article 98 would
have to go to the Parliament because it relates to the rights
of individuals. It has told the MFA the only way to move
forward is through the Parliament.


4. (C) Comment: The Minister is not exaggerating about
Parliament. As we have reported in recent months (see refs b
and c for example),the Parliament is more assertive and it
has caused powerful ministries such as Finance major
headaches when it disagreed with Ministry policies (refs b
and c). Our read of the ascendent Islamist bloc in the
Parliament is that they would never agree to the Article 98,
perceiving it as a special favor to the American military for
which they have no affection.


5. (C) Comment Continued: The MFA is searching anxiously
for a way out of sending the Article 98 to Parliament. We
are doubtful that the MFA will find it quickly if at all. In
the meantime, they are holding the signed agreement. We are
confident that the GoB would not turn over a servicemember to
the ICC. The bilateral military relationship, centered
around the longstanding, and basically trouble-free, presence
of NAVCENT's headquarters, is the cornerstone of our
bilateral relationship. The GoB went out of its way to
provide access to facilities for OEF and OIF; it deployed air
and naval forces in support of U.S. forces in those
operations. IMET and FMF assistance are key to boosting
Bahraini forces' interoperability with our own in such
operations. Cancelling that assistance because the
Government is reluctant to face a losing confrontation with
its democratically elected parliament over an issue which has
never before been a problem in our bilateral relationship
would send a message to the Bahraini leadership that we
neither value their contributions nor trust their word. Ford
FORD