DEMOCRACY IS HARD WORK ... EVEN IN BAHRAIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000283

SIPDIS

CAIRO FOR U/S GROSSMAN AND DAS ROMANOWSKI
DEPT FOR NEA/FO PDAS LAROCCO AND DAS DIBBLE, NEA/PI,
NEA/ARP, AND DRL/PHD
CAIRO ALSO FOR STEVE BONDY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2029
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM BA
SUBJECT: DEMOCRACY IS HARD WORK ... EVEN IN BAHRAIN

REF: A. MANAMA 268


B. MANAMA 237

C. MANAMA 200

Classified By: CDA Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4(b)(d).

SUMMARY

1.(C) A democratically inexperienced GOB is learning just
how messy democracy can be. Besides dealing with the
boycotting opposition, both elected and appointed
parliamentarians are challenging the government over alleged
scandals and failures. Sunni Islamists are asserting
themselves in directions that are beginning to cause
discomfort among Bahrain's ruling elite. At least one senior
official may be contemplating resignation because he doesn't
enjoy public criticism. On the other hand, top business
leaders are beginning to criticize publicly some Islamist
initiatives that business leaders think could harm business
prospects. Manama is a small place, and its crowded
political circuits are starting to get hot. Overall, the
GOB's reaction appears to be one of slowing the pace of
political reform. This is having an impact on MEPI programs,
requiring the Embassy to spend much more time than
anticipated massaging the system to obtain positive program
outcomes. END SUMMARY

GOB JEKYL OR HYDE ... WHICH ONE RULES TODAY?

2.(C) Throughout the last three years of reforms, the GOB has
often seemed to have a split personality. The King has
implemented a new constitution that provides some elements of
democracy to the Bahraini people. The Royal Court sponsors
NDI's work in Bahrain and the King is driving force behind
Bahrain's negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement with the U.S.
The King has repeatedly stated that he welcomes proposals to
amend the new constitution through the system detailed
therein. The government usually has handled pressures from
the boycotting opposition with tact and reserve. The King
has restrained his security forces, releasing and, when
necessary, pardoning youths arrested for participating in
violent demonstrations.

3.(C) On the other hand, the Government has shown in recent
months a tendency to regress to pre-reform behavior. The
government has intimidated meeting hall owners into canceling
scheduled public political events. In November, the GOB
quickly moved to shut down the political satire "Laysh Abu al
Aysh" (but ultimately failed as the opposition quickly
erected an outdoor theater on a vacant lot). Two weeks ago,
it obstructed the holding a constitutional conference as
reported ref B. As we noted in this year's human rights
report, press censorship and journalist self-censorship
remain constant problems.

PARLIAMENT, SUNNI ISLAMISTS ALSO CHALLENGE THE GOVERNMENT

4.(C) While trying to muzzle those who boycott the existing
political system, the government is also grappling with the
consequences of the political reforms to date. The
GOSI/Pension Fund investigation could very well lead to
parliament's removal of a minister through a vote of
no-confidence (ref C),and members who successfully uncovered
the mismanagement of the pension funds have announced new
investigations of corruption and mismanagement. Meanwhile,
Sunni Islamist deputies are spearheading a new effort to
question the Information Minister about the production in
Bahrain of a reality TV show in which six young unmarried
Arab men are living in the same house with six unmarried
young Arab women (septel). Even the appointed upper house of
Parliament, the Shura Council, is getting into the act. It
trashed the government's draft press law in favor of a more
liberal version prepared by one of the Council's members.

5.(C) Government officials, top business leaders, and ruling
family members are beginning to complain that the GOB may
have stepped into a real mess with political reform, and some
are even blaming the USG. A top MFA official and
well-connected member of the ruling family told Staffdel
Clark on February 14 that he deeply resented Sunni Islamist
activities to limit social freedoms saying there was no way
he would allow religious conservatives to dictate his wife's
choice of apparel. A leading resterauteur and tourism
promoter bitterly complained to P/E Chief about government
constantly conceding to Islamist demands to restrict alcohol
sales. Meanwhile a top Finance Ministry official told Charge
that the Finance Minister may resign soon because of the
public criticism he has endured over the Pension Fund
scandal. According to our contact, the minister just doesn't
want to deal with personal public criticism. Vandals are now
painting barbs on the walls of the minister's (luxurious)
villa, this exasperated source exclaimed.
REFORM PACE SLOWING?
6.(C) We are seeing signs that the GOB is rethinking the pace
at which it will implement reform. Last Spring, PAS began
actively recruiting a U.S. political scientist Fulbrighter to
help the University of Bahrain found a new political science
faculty and program. When we succeeded and notified the
university, we discovered that a political science program is
no longer in the university's near term plans. It took
extensive work to obtain university approval to seat the
Fulbrighter in the business school where he's going to teach
a course on globalization only. Similarly, when PAO recently
previewed to our main reform-minded education ministry
interlocutor new MEPI programs, he told her point blank that
Bahrain is not ready for civic education in the schools. He
cautioned Bahrain could not move too fast.

7.(C) Meanwhile, both MEPI-funded political program managers
have reported to us that their GoB contacts are stressing the
need to go slowly and carefully. As noted ref A, the Justice
Minister wants to "low-profile" the ABA technical assistance
program because he has discovered opposition from Sunni
Islamists within the ministry to American technical
assistance to change the judicial system. He wants to move
forward, but not at the risk of a flank counterattack.
Concurrently, the influential Minister of the Royal Court,
Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa, emphatically told NDI in
January not to include a representative of the boycotting
Shi'a opposition party al-Wefaq in NDI's April Muslim
democracies conference in Istanbul. The NDI rep has also
said that Shaikh Khaled would prefer that NDI made developing
the democratic skills of the government and National Assembly
NDI's top priority over training opposition political
activists.

COMMENT

8.(C) The GOB is struggling at multiple levels to manage
political reform while maintaining the political stability it
needs to attract investment that creates jobs. One one side,
the boycotting opposition's desire for more radical political
change and its refusal to participate challenge the new
system's legitimacy. On the other side, the new political
system has produced an increasingly aggressive parliament
intent on proving its relevance (and that of the new system)
to the Bahraini people by bringing down a minister and
pushing for more reform. The Sunni Islamist bloc in the
parliament is asserting itself in directions that are
beginning to create discomfort among Bahrain's elite. The GOB
appears to be responding by slowing the pace of, but not
altering its commitment to, reform. The GOB, we sense, wants
time to find solutions. As we inject MEPI programs into this
mix, the GOB is responding more cautiously, and the Embassy
must spend increasing amounts of time to work with MEPI
contractors and the GOB to achieve positive program outcomes.
END COMMENT.

FORD