DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HADLEY'S DECEMBER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 001890

SIPDIS

NSC FOR DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HADLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MARR MOPS PTER UK IR IZ BA
SUBJECT: DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HADLEY'S DECEMBER
4 MEETING WITH UK FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR SIR NIGEL SHEINWALD


Classified by A/DCM Hallie H. Hahn for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley met with UK
Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister Sir Nigel
Sheinwald December 4 on the margins of the IISS Gulf Security
Dialogue conference in Manama. Sheinwald said that the UK
government had solidified around the January 30 date for
Iraqi elections. He thought that PM Blair could accept a two
to three week extension if the Iraqis could deliver something
substantive in return, such as the participation of a major
Sunni bloc. Sheinwald expressed concern about being forced
to make a public statement about the future of the coalition
deployment in Iraq, and wondered if the coalition should get
out in front and make a statement willingly. DNSA Hadley
thought that a statement would have to be very nuanced, and
we stood by our position of staying as long as necessary and
not one day more. Any statement of a drawdown of forces
should be evidence of success, not an exit. Sheinwald
requested USG information that would bolster the Dutch case
to have the EU list Hizballah as a terrorist organization,
and commented that the Iranians were already saying unhelpful
things regarding the nuclear program negotiations. End
Summary.

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Stick with January 30
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2. (C) UK Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister Sir
Nigel Sheinwald told Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley
December 4 that the UK government had solidified around the
January 30 date for Iraqi elections. In mid-December, the
Iraqis would have to make a final decision about the timing,
and Sheinwald wondered if it was worth giving them a few more
weeks. DNSA Hadley replied that pressure would come at two
separate times: first in mid-December, when the election
lists are due, and second in late January, in the final
run-up to the elections. We can anticipate PM Allawi saying
that he would need a few more months to convince some
particular group of Sunnis to participate in the elections.
This would put the IIG into a bind because a delay could win
some Sunnis but lose a lot of Shia. We would consider
postponing the elections only if Allawi makes the request, he
can deliver a major group of Sunnis before the election, and
doing so will not alienate the Shia and Kurds. But the
President and PM Blair, added DNSA Hadley, will want to stick
with January 30. Sheinwald responded that Blair would accept
a two to three week "once-and-for-all" extension if the
Iraqis could deliver something substantive in return.
However, a six month delay would "drive him crazy."


3. (C) Sheinwald raised the idea of a conference aimed at
getting out the Sunni vote. The latest he had heard was that
if a conference took place, it would have to be inside Iraq.
Sheinwald suggested that the U.S. and UK should encourage
holding a conference, whether inside or outside Iraq. DNSA
Hadley replied that the Jordanians, Saudis, and others
continued to talk about delaying the elections, but they
should be focusing on encouraging the Iraqi Sunnis to
participate.

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Shoring Up the Coalition
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4. (C) Sheinwald said that the UK was concerned with
perceptions of the cohesion of the coalition in Iraq. The
Dutch are holding firmly to their decision to depart. DNSA
Hadley said that the U.S. is dealing with the issue of how to
shore up the coalition. The U.S. approached the Ukrainians
about their deployment, but they begged off, saying it is a
decision "for another day." The United States has some funds
available to assist our allies, if necessary. While some
participants in the coalition may decrease their troop levels
or depart, others may increase their numbers or new countries
may join. The numbers are important, but the mix in type of
deployments is also. The election results could prompt some
partners to reconsider earlier decisions.


5. (C) Sheinwald expressed his surprise that the coalition
presence had not become an issue in the Iraqi election
campaign. The coalition might have to say something publicly
and it would be better to do so willingly and not be forced
into a statement. DNSA Hadley said that the formulation of
an announcement would have to be very nuanced. We have
always said that the U.S. would stay as long as necessary and
not one day more. He suggested that we might emphasize the
second half of that commitment and tie the drawdown of
coalition forces to the development of the Iraqi security
services. Any statement the coalition makes should be
presented as evidence of success, not an exit. Sheinwald
affirmed that the UK does not envision drawing down its
forces during 2005, a time when the number of Iraqi forces
will be growing. This would mean a net increase in troops on
the ground. DNSA Hadley noted that General Abizaid has said
that the Iraqi security services should be in the cities, not
the coalition. But the challenge with the Iraqis is the lack
of leadership and experience. We have to "stiffen" them
through training. Sheinwald commented that the Iraqis have
courage but are unable to feed or transport themselves.

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Case Against Hizballah
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6. (C) DNSA Hadley stated that the Dutch are thinking about
moving within the EU to have Hizballah listed as a terrorist
organization. The United States supports this; Iran and
terror is on our agenda. Sheinwald requested that the U.S.
share with the Netherlands any information it could release
to help make the case against Hizballah in the EU. Regarding
EU negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program, he said that
the two sides will establish working groups by mid-December.
He noted, however, that the Iranians are already saying
unhelpful things about resolving the issue within six months.

MONROE