SCENESETTER FOR COMBATANT COMMANDER CENTRAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 001467

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2014
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV BA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR COMBATANT COMMANDER CENTRAL
COMMAND TRIP TO BAHRAIN 26 SEPTEMBER 2004

Classified by Ambassador William T. Monroe for reasons 1.4
(B) and (D).


1. (S) General Abizaid, we look forward to seeing you in
Bahrain. We have asked for calls on the King, Crown Prince,
and the Defense Minister apart from your attendance at the
Disaster Preparedness Conference. Since your last visit
here, the travel warning has been lifted and the DOD Bahrain
School reopened, and the detention of the four key terrorist
suspects has been extended into October. On September 14,
the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement,
only the third agreement we have with an Arab country and the
first in the Gulf. Bahrainis, both the government and
private citizens, have been delighted by these events, but
still apprehensive about the summer events and what they
might portend. The King views the NAVCENT presence as
indispensable and our relationship has remained strong
despite the departure of the Navy dependents.


2. (S) Looking to the period ahead, we continue to apply
pressure to the GOB to make sure that the four terrorism
suspects remain in jail. There continues to be uncertainty
about the future of the Bahrain School and what that means
for U.S.-Bahraini relations. Bahrainis worry about the
future of the Navy presence and the continued departure
status of Navy dependents. They have questions about how the
Naval Support Activity in Bahrain will fit into the overall
U.S. military presence in the region. They are aware of the
global defense posture review, and that the Navy is
evaluating issues such as the school, the status of
dependents, and the U.S. military's future footprint in
Bahrain and the region. Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs Mohammed Abdul Ghaffar expressed to the Ambassador
September 22 his concern that any evaluation of the Navy's
future in Bahrain should reiterate a commitment to Bahrain,
and not represent a diminution of the U.S. presence. The
events of the summer generated uncertainty among the Bahraini
government and Bahraini citizens about the strength and
permanence of our commitment.


3. (S) Iraq. The GOB is hopeful we will succeed in
stabilizing Iraq and restarting its economy. The Government
understands the need to establish security in Iraq and fears
the potential regional impact of any deterioration in the
situation. They fear above all massive instability in Iraq
leading to a hasty American withdrawal and an Iranian-style
Shia revolutionary government that might influence Bahrain's
own Shia majority. The government views the U.S. presence in
Iraq as absolutely essential to their security. Crown Prince
Salman stated in a recent meeting with a visiting Codel that
the U.S. must remain steadfast in supporting its troops on
the ground so they can get the job done. During your
meetings, officials will be interested to hear your views.

4.(S) Bahrain's Shia majority is satisfied that Saddam is
gone. Many Bahrainis outside of government are suspicious of
American intentions in Iraq, but so far the Government has
not taken any actions to indicate it feels particularly
constrained in being publicly supportive of us. Bahraini
Shia feel an affinity for their fellow sect members in Iraq
and are pained by U.S. military actions in Shia areas such as
Najaf. They publicly pledge their allegiance to Ayatollah
Sistani. At the same time, several Shia leaders have
publicly condemned all violence in Iraq, whether by coalition
forces or Iraqi elements. Specifically, most Bahraini Shia
do not support Muqtada Al Sadr, and many attribute his rise
to prominence on his father's reputation and sacrifice.


5. (C) The GOB and the Iraqi Embassy signed a memorandum of
understanding September 14 to train 4,000 Iraqis in civil
defense. The Bahrainis also have offered technical
assistance to help rebuild Iraq's banking sector. The
Government does not perceive itself as wealthy enough to
offer financial assistance.


6. (S) Bilateral Security Ties: The GOB has accepted the
departure of the Navy dependents and our desire for a smaller
footprint, but remain hopeful they will return. The decision
to keep the DoDDs school open was very well received.
However, we need to make a decision as soon as possible
concerning the future status of the school's administration.
The continued operation of military operations from the base
and the presence of NAVCENT headquarters, including the DODEA
Bahrain School, are ultimate indicators for the GOB of our
military commitment here. Should the basing of the Navy here
ever come into doubt, it will have a significant impact on
our relationship. We have a Military Consultative Council
meeting scheduled for Feb 2005. This will provide a good
forum to review our mil-to-mil programs and set a future
course.


7. (S) Coalition Force Contribution: The King offered some
naval support to provide security in the Northern Arabian
Gulf to Iraq. However, the GOB still awaits a formal request
from the IIG before they will deploy their ship(s). The USN
has provided an ops/intel brief to the BDF to prepare them
for the mission and the BDF now has an LNO at NAVCENT HQ.
The GOB decided not to participate with airpower because they
did not see a need, and did not offer ground forces in Iraq
because they have no deployment or sustainment capabilities.
Further, the GOB have indicated they will need a GCC decision
supporting ground troops in Iraq before they even consider
this option.


8. (S) Foreign Military Financing: Bahrain received USD
24.85 million FMF grant from the FY04 DoS budget. This now
brings their FMF total over the past two years to USD 145
million. They have used these funds to purchase a TPS 59
radar (due to arrive late 2006),an infrared countermeasures
suite for the head of state's new 747-400 (due in 12 months),
the refurbishment of 14 Cobra helicopters and multiple spare
cases for all services. Due to the BDF,s equipment age
increasing and the growing maintenance costs, the BDF sees
FMF as an important means to bridge their budget deficits to
sustain their readiness.


9. (S) Security: The King and Prime Minister are adamantly
determined to maintain security for Americans here. Whenever
we make requests for extra security at an event, the police
respond immediately and appropriately. As you know, of the
six Bahraini extremists who were re-arrested in mid-July,
four continue to be held in custody and two of the less
threatening subjects were released on September 11. The
four men still in custody will have another court hearing on
October 16 regarding the case against them. The GOB has kept
us informed on the continuing status of this case. They have
committed to working with the USG to establish a
Counter-Terrorism Operations Center (CTOC) and a
Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Center (CTIC) along with
openly accepting specialized training for CTOC operators. In
addition the Parliament is expected to consider a
counter-terrorism law for passage when it reconvenes in
mid-October. The law will apply stiff penalties for
conspiracy to commit terrorist acts.


10. (S) Democratic Development: Bahrain is a monarchy that
in 2002 adopted a constitution reinstating a legislative body
with one elected chamber, the first since the early 1970,s.
The majority Shia mostly adhered to the call by the Al Wifaq
Shia political society to boycott the 2002 parliamentary
elections. As a result, those Shia present in the elected
lower house of parliament, the Council of Deputies, do not
necessarily represent the views of their constituents.


11. (S) During the 2003-04 parliamentary session, the process
of presenting and passing legislation ground to a halt. The
constitution is unclear about whether the government or the
parliament should take the lead role in proposing
legislation, and differing interpretations led to a
constitutional crisis. In response to protests and a
petition drive, the government decided to launch a
constitutional dialogue led by the Minister of Labor and
Social Affairs with leaders from four opposition political
societies. In early September, the oppositionists submitted
proposed constitutional amendments for the government's
consideration. The Minister of Labor announced he would
present the government's response in early October. The
Government is also encouraging the societies that previously
boycotted elections to participate in the 2006 parliamentary
elections.


12. (S) Economy: The United States and Bahrain signed a free
trade agreement (FTA) on September 14, marking a new level of
commitment in our bilateral economic relationship. Bahrain
is the first country in the Gulf region to have an FTA with
us, and joins Jordan and Morocco as the only Arab states with
FTAs. We hope to use the Bahrain FTA as a springboard to
promote economic reform, openness, and transparency in the
region, and as an important step in realizing the President's
vision of a Middle East Free Trade Area by 2013. Bahrain
will cite the FTA as the United States, endorsement of its
economy and to market Bahrain as a regional center for
finance, insurance, banking, business services, education,
and health care.


13. (S) Middle East Peace: The Bahraini government is deeply
troubled by the continuing violence in Israel and the
Palestinian territories. Though far from the conflict,
Bahrainis identify with the Palestinians. The Crown Prince
has told us that he would like to work with the Israeli
government, in particular in fending off threats from Iran,
but he cannot do so in the absence of some sort of settlement
between Israel and the Palestinians. The Crown Prince
appreciates that the President has gone far to promote the
establishment of an independent, viable Palestinian state,
but he has asked that the Administration make a gesture to
relieve the suffering of the Palestinian people. Flare-ups
in violence in the territories transfer directly into
heightened emotions among average Bahrainis.

MONROE