SPANISH ELECTION: POPULAR PARTY STILL IN SHOCK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000962

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2014
TAGS: PGOV PTER SP PSOE
SUBJECT: SPANISH ELECTION: POPULAR PARTY STILL IN SHOCK


Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen Fitzpatrick per 1.4 (b) and
(d).

Summary


1. (C) The Popular Party remains in shock over the March 14
election results. The government vehemently rejects charges
it withheld information on al Qaeda for election benefit.
The PP accepts defeat but members complain the Socialists
manipulated the March 11 terror attacks to turn the electoral
tables on the PP. The PP does not exclude working with PSOE
on common issues such as counterterrorism and defending the
constitutional order. PP reps are concerned about
Zapatero's pledge to withdraw troops from Iraq, but believe a
new UN resolution might allow Zapatero to save face and keep
the troops there. End Summary.

Accepting the Election Results


2. (C) The mood in Popular Party circles, following the PP's
unexpected electoral defeat March 14, is a mixture of shock,
depression, anger and, now that a few days have passed,
resignation, according to PP contacts. They make clear,
however, as PP leader Mariano Rajoy has said in public
statements, that the PP will not dispute the legitimacy of
the March 14 election results. This is despite the fact
that many in the PP believe the Socialists and their allies
manipulated the fear and emotion surrounding the March 11
terrorist attacks for electoral gain. Office of the
President Parliamentary Affairs Director Ignacio Fernandez
told us March 18 that the PP, as "a serious and responsible
party," would avoid undermining GOS institutions by casting
doubt on the legitimacy of the vote. Coordination on
transition is going well, he said. Vice President Javier
Arenas is already holding meetings with Zapatero's number two
(and likely Vice President),Jesus Caldera.

GOS Denies Charges It Manipulated March 11 Investigation


3. (C) PP contacts react strongly, however, to charges that
the government withheld information related to the
investigation for fear of electoral consequences.
Fernandez and other emphasized to us that Interior Minister
Acebes was not covering up by declaring, only hours after the
March 11 attacks, that there was "no doubt" ETA was
responsible. Fernandez conceded that, in hindsight, it had
probably been a mistake for Acebes to make an unequivocal
declaration of ETA culpability so soon. However, Fernandez
and other PP contacts have stressed to us that his statements
reflected the police analysis at the time. On March 18, the
GOS released police reports from March 11 in an effort to
substantiate that point.

Presumed ETA Role


4. (C) Acebes' Chief of Staff, Miguel Temboury, reiterated to
us that the GOS had expected a massive ETA attack in Madrid
on the eve of the elections. He reminded us that in both
December 2003 and February 2004, Spanish police foiled major
ETA attacks including, on Christmas Eve, an attempted
bombing, using explosives concealed in backpacks, of trains
going to Madrid. Furthermore, Fernandez pointed out, al
Qaeda had never conducted a terrorist attack in Spain before.
Fernandez noted that naturally "everyone," including
opposition party leaders and the Basque nationalists, blamed
ETA in the early hours. The only exception was ETA's
political wing, Batasuna. The GOS suspected Batasuna of
disinformation, hence Acebes' statement early on that
Batasuna's mention of "Arab resistance" as the culprit was
"miserable."

Appearances Hurt


5. (C) Nonetheless, PP contacts affirm that appearances are
what often matter most in politics, and the appearance of a
cover up was extremely damaging. This combined with
widespread anti-Iraq war sentiment and raw fear turned the
tides. The cascade began when Acebes began to reverse
himself late on March 11 after police found a van (near the
train station where the bombed trains came from) with
detonators and an audiotape of Koranic verses in it. On
Saturday March 13, election eve, Acebes announced the arrests
of three Moroccans believed linked to terror cells and on
March 14, within a few hours of the opening of the polls,
came word of the release of a video tape, purportedly from al
Qaeda, blaming the bombing on Aznar's involvement in Iraq and
pledging more attacks if Spanish forces are not withdrawn.
Meanwhile, also on election eve, anti-PP demonstrators by the
thousands gathered at PP headquarters in Madrid denouncing a
cover up. The influential and pro-PSOE Prisa media group,
which includes El Pais, fueled the flames. The timing,
Fernandez noted, could not have been worse and the PP,
because of the suspension of campaigning before the election,
could not answer back.

Loyal Opposition


6. (C) Fernandez said that the PP is reflecting on what else
went wrong in the campaign. He said that the campaign's
media and information strategy was lacking. He noted that
there may be a PP Congress in the next few months, which
could usher in leadership changes. Fernandez said the PP
would, as Rajoy has announced, seek to work with the
Socialists on matters of state, notably counterterrorism and
defending the Spanish constitutional order against Basque and
Catalan nationalist efforts to further loosen central
authority. Rajoy has pledged the PP will be a "loyal
opposition."

Concerns About PSOE Foreign Policy, Iraq, EU


7. (C) To the extent possible, Fernandez said, the PP would
like to cooperate with PSOE on foreign policy. However, he
said the PP was deeply concerned about Zapatero's pledge to
withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq by June 30 absent UN
control over the mission. He said the view in the PP was
that this would be caving in to terrorists. Fernandez
speculated that if the US, France and Germany were able to
agree on a UN resolution that would grant UN authority over
the Iraq mission, Zapatero could be able to save face and
agree to keep Spanish troops in Iraq. Fernandez added that
if Zapatero did not stand up for Spanish voting strength in
the new EU constitution, the PP would make that a major issue
in the June 2004 EU parliament elections.

Aznar


8. (C) In closing, Fernandez said that the vote was a
personal blow for Aznar. Having made counterterrorism the
center of his presidency, Aznar's team, ironically, had been
repudiated as a result of a terrorist attack. Aznar
"didn't deserve this," Fernandez concluded.
ARGYROS