SPAIN: INDECISIVE ON ISAF STAGE TWO ROLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 004778

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/RPM
NSC FOR FRIED AND VOLKER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS SP NATO
SUBJECT: SPAIN: INDECISIVE ON ISAF STAGE TWO ROLE

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires J. Robert Manzanares, reasons 1.4(b) a
nd (d).


1. (C) Summary: Charge met December 20 with Spanish
National Security Advisor Carles Casajuana to discuss Spain's
role in ISAF stage two. Casajuana was very reluctant to
commit the Zapatero government to any role in stage two.
Casajuana said it was very unlikely the GOS would announce a
decision on its participation in stage two before early
February, given that parliament will soon recess until late
January. In any event, he believed that if Spain were to
decide to increase its role in Afghanistan, it would most
likely add to its troop presence temporarily to provide
security for parliamentary elections, as it did for
presidential elections in the fall. Casajuana believed it
would be very difficult for Spain to lead a provincial
reconstruction team (PRT). Embassy believes that in
considering its potential role in ISAF stage two, the
Zapatero government remains intensely focused on minimizing
any risk to its forces. End summary.


2. (C) Charge told Casajuana Spain's role in ISAF stage two
would be very important for continued progress in
Afghanistan, and said the U.S. urged Spain to strongly
consider leading a PRT and assisting with the forward support
base (FSB) in Herat. If Spain could not do both, Charge said
we hoped Spain would lead a PRT. The U.S., added Charge,
hoped Spain could announce its decision to increase its role
in ISAF stage two by mid-January to permit ISAF to begin
fortifying itself as soon as possible in preparation for
parliamentary elections.


3. (C) Casajuana replied Spain was considering the PRT and
FSB, and was also weighing the possibility of adding troops
to its contingent in Afghanistan on a short-term basis to
provide increased security for the parliamentary elections.
Unfortunately, it was highly unlikely Spain would be able to
announce a decision on an increased role in Afghanistan
before early February, because the Spanish government would
have to take any proposed change in its posture in
Afghanistan to the parliament, and parliament would soon
recess until late January. Casajuana later hedged a bit on
this, saying the GOS would definitely have to bring a
decision to lead a PRT before parliament, but might not have
to do so to move assets to Herat or increase its troop
presence temporarily. Nonetheless, even in the latter two
cases, Zapatero may want to get parliament's assent "for
political reasons." Casajuana also said the Zapatero
government would have to "address public opinion issues" in
reaching a decision on increasing its role in Afghanistan,
because many Spaniards question why Spanish forces are in
Afghanistan in the first place.


4. (C) Charge said it would be useful if the Zapatero
government could at least reach a political decision on
Spain's role in ISAF by mid-January, even if it would not be
able to bring the decision to parliament before early
February. Casajuana thought it would be very difficult for
the Zapatero government to do so because it did not want to
"get too far out in front of parliament." The easiest
decision for the government to make would be to commit
additional troops for a short period of time to provide
security for the elections, as Spain did in the fall for the
presidential elections.


5. (C) On the question of public opinion, Charge said he
hoped parliament and the average Spaniard understood their
country shares a common interest with the others in
Afghanistan in fighting international terrorism and in
reconstructing a democratic Afghanistan that no longer
harbors terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda. A PRT, in
particular, provides Spain a unique opportunity to
participate in reconstruction efforts and improve the lives
of the average Afghan. This should be something the average
Spaniard could support, emphasized Charge. Casajuana agreed
and said he simply meant the government would have to do a
good job explaining its policy to the public.


6. (C) Charged then explained the GOS was sending mixed
signals on what it was willing to do in Afghanistan, with
Foreign Minister Moratinos suggesting Spain would be willing
to increase its role, and Minister of Defense Bono later
saying Spain would not be sending any more troops to
Afghanistan. Casajuana said Spain's contribution to ISAF is
still very much an open debate, and certainly no decision has
been made not to send additional forces there. Asked what he
believed the chances were that Spain would ultimately lead a
PRT, Casajuana said he thought it would be difficult but he
wasn't ruling it out.


7. (C) Comment: Despite our efforts to draw him out,
Casajuana was extremely reluctant to commit to any position
on Spain's role in ISAF stage two. He left us with the
impression that it was very unlikely Spain would lead a PRT,
and that the GOS remains very much undecided on what other
role, if any, Spain will play in ISAF stage two. One thing
that can be said after this meeting: The Zapatero
government's primary concern in considering whether or not to
increase its role in ISAF remains minimizing any risk that
Spanish forces could suffer a casualty as a result of their
participation.

MANZANARES