MFA CLAIMS SURPRISE AT CUBA'S NORMALIZATION OF TIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 004500

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2014
TAGS: PREL CU SP
SUBJECT: MFA CLAIMS SURPRISE AT CUBA'S NORMALIZATION OF TIES


Classified By: Political Counselor Kathy Fitzpatrick; reason 1.5 (B) an
d (D).


1. (C) Summary. MFA DG for Latin America Sandomingo told
Polcouns that the GOS had been surprised by the Cuban
Government announcement that it would resume official
contacts with the Spanish Embassy in Havana after more than
17 months of having "frozen" such ties. Sandomingo cast the
move as a Castro effort to divide the EU over Cuba policy.
While reiterating Spain's commitment to the EU Common
Position on Cuba, Sandomingo predicted that Spain would soon
gain EU consensus for eliminating the policy of inviting
dissidents to EU national day events. He discussed Spain's
alternatives to national day invitations, insisting that EU
contact with dissidents would increase rather than decrease
under the Spanish plan. We are skeptical that the GOS did
not know in advance of Castro's move, as well as of
protestations that the GOS is acting in the best interests of
the Cuban opposition. FM Moratinos and Socialist officials,
rather than MFA professionals, seem to be driving a GOS
policy towards Cuba that appears more focused on breaking
with Aznar's policies than with achieving progress on human
rights issues. We recommend continued USG action behind the
scenes to block Spanish efforts to weaken EU measures against
Cuba, as well as a call from WHA A/S Noriega to DG Sandomingo
to emphasize the depth of USG concern with respect to the
direction of Spain's Cuba policy. End Summary.

//END OF THE CUBAN DEEP FREEZE//


2. (U) Spanish dailies provided extensive coverage of the
Cuban Government's 11/25 announcement re-establishing normal
contacts between the GOC and Spanish diplomats in Havana,
ties "frozen" by the GOC in 2003 in the wake of the EU's
imposition of "Restrictive Measures" on Cuba. The Cuban
action was widely interpreted as an acknowledgement of the
Zapatero Government's efforts to end the EU policy of
inviting dissidents to EU national day events. Opposition
Popular Party officials suggested that the GOC move was
simply an effort to divide the EU and to disrupt
transatlantic ties. Socialist Parliamentary spokesman
Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba discarded the possibility of any
impact on U.S.-Spain ties, saying it was "compatible to have
good relations with the U.S. while maintaining Spain's own
foreign policy identity."

//MFA CLAIMS SURPRISE AT CUBAN ANNOUNCEMENT//


3. (C) Polcouns and poloff met with MFA Director General for
Latin America Javier Sandomingo on 11/26 to discuss the Cuban
announcement. Sandomingo acknowledged the basic facts,
saying GOC Foreign Minister Perez Roque had summoned Spanish
Ambassador in Havana Carlos Saldivar to inform him that the
GOC would resume normal official contacts with the Spanish
Embassy after more than 17 months of having refused such
contacts with most EU embassies. Sandomingo said the GOS had
asked Perez Roque not to announce the reopening of official
links, but that the GOS had unilaterally decided to publicize
its decision. Sandomingo spoke with EU counterparts to
reassure them that this development came solely at the
initiative of the GOC and not as a result of Spanish-Cuban
deal organized outside of EU channels.


4. (C) Sandomingo said he did not know why the GOC had acted
now, but ventured that Castro could have been trying to
foment disunity within the EU, "which he did not manage to
do." He was unsure whether Spain would respond to Cuba's
public announcement, other than the brief "clarification"
already issued by the GOS stating Spain's objective as
normalization between Cuba and all EU countries, not just
between Cuba and Spain. Asked whether he viewed the Cuban
announcement as an effort to influence the EU COLAT
discussions on the EU's "Restrictive Measures" on Cuba,
Sandomingo allowed that that might be the case, but insisted
that even without Cuba's announcement Spain had expected to
gain EU consensus for easing the measures by January 2005.
He was encouraged by the fact that none of the main Cuban
exile groups had "reacted badly" to the announcement of
normalized ties and had only called on the GOS to undertake
actions they intended to pursue anyway, such as continued
pressure on the GOC on human rights issues.

//SPAIN STICKING TO EU COMMON POSITION//


5. (C) Sandomingo reiterated Spain's commitment to the EU
Common Position on Cuba. He said he was convinced that
Spain's plan for increased contacts with Cuban opposition
figures would be even more problematic for the GOC than the
current EU policy of inviting dissidents to national day
events. He said the Spanish plan calls for a structured EU
dialogue with the opposition that would include monthly
meetings between EU diplomats and dissidents, biannual
meetings between dissidents and EU ambassadors, and regular
invitations to activists to visit EU countries. Spain's
eventual objective is to reopen its cultural center in
Havana, which he described as Spain's "most significant
contribution to Cuban civil society."


6. (C) Poloff pointed out that EU diplomats already meet
regularly with dissidents and that the creation of a formal,
structured dialogue would not be sufficient to offset the
blow to the activists' morale as a result of being disinvited
from the national day events. Polcouns suggested that a
better alternative would be both the continuation of
invitations to national day events and the initiation of a
formal dialogue between the EU and the democratic opposition.
Sandomingo agreed on the need for the EU to recognize
activists as legitimate political figures, but said that GOC
antagonism towards including them in national day events was
a barrier to potentially useful relations between the EU and
Cuba. The EU could have "improved" contacts with dissidents
in other venues.

//CUBA MOVING THE GOALPOSTS//


7. (C) Poloff noted that the Polish Embassy had already
explored this purportedly less conflictual alternative by
hosting a reception for a broad range of Cuban civil society
figures on a date other than its national day. Rather than
ignoring the event, the GOC threatened to PNG the Polish
Ambassador if he ever hosted such a reception again.
Sandomingo was familiar with the Polish episode and said that
Cuban FM Perez Roque had tried a similar tack with FM
Moratinos during the Ibero American Summit in San Jose.
After having told Moratinos in May that the main irritant for
the GOC was the invitation of dissidents to national day
events, Perez Roque now claimed that a structured EU dialogue
with the opposition would also be viewed very poorly by the
Castro regime. According to Sandomingo, Moratinos told Perez
Roque bluntly that the issue was not negotiable and that the
structured dialogue was the only viable alternative to
inviting dissidents to national day events. Sandomingo said
it would be up to Castro to decide whether to PNG EU
diplomats or "freeze" relations again in response to
continued EU activism on human rights.

//COMMENT//


8. (C) The GOC announcement may have been embarrassing for
the GOS, but Spain has clearly been angling for a positive
signal from Havana in order to increase Spanish leverage in
EU negotiations over the Restrictive Measures. We find it
difficult to believe that nobody in the GOS was aware of
Cuba's intention to "reward" Zapatero for his break with
Aznar's Cuba policies. The course of events and our
conversations with GOS officials suggest that FM Moratinos,
Socialist Party insiders, and the Spanish Ambassador in
Havana are driving Cuba policy far more than MFA officials
such as Sandomingo. Unfortunately, our experience suggests
Moratinos and other Socialist leaders are more concerned with
burnishing their leftist (and anti-Aznar) credentials than
with establishing a credible policy intended to promote
Cuba's democratic transition. In our view, we should work
behind the scenes with receptive EU governments to block
Spain's efforts to water down the EU Restrictive Measures
since alternative plans are unlikely to outweigh the symbolic
damage caused by the end of invitations to national day
events. We also note the Socialist Parliamentarian's claim
that Spain's search for rapprochement with Havana has not
affected U.S.-Spain relations. A call from A/S Noriega to DG
Sandomingo may help remind the GOS that Washington is closely
(and perhaps skeptically) watching Spain's shifting policy
towards Cuba.
MANZANARES