Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04MADRID4115
2004-10-22 15:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
Cable title:  

CUBA: SPAIN CONFIDENT IT CAN OVERTURN EU MEASURES

Tags:  PREL PHUM PGOV CU SP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 004115 

SIPDIS

WHA FOR DAS FISK
WHA/CCA FOR WHITAKER, SIBILLA, BEAN
USEU FOR HUIZINGA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV CU SP
SUBJECT: CUBA: SPAIN CONFIDENT IT CAN OVERTURN EU MEASURES
ON SUPPORT FOR OPPOSITION


Classified By: Political Counselor Kathy Fitzpatrick; reason 1.5 (B) an
d (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 004115

SIPDIS

WHA FOR DAS FISK
WHA/CCA FOR WHITAKER, SIBILLA, BEAN
USEU FOR HUIZINGA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV CU SP
SUBJECT: CUBA: SPAIN CONFIDENT IT CAN OVERTURN EU MEASURES
ON SUPPORT FOR OPPOSITION


Classified By: Political Counselor Kathy Fitzpatrick; reason 1.5 (B) an
d (D).


1. (C) Summary. Spain is determined to roll back key
elements of the June 2003 EU "restrictive measures" on Cuba
implemented in the wake of Castro's crackdown on the
opposition. MFA officials are confident they have sufficient
support within the EU to do so. The GOS counts the UK,
France, Sweden, Greece, Belgium, Austria, and Finland allies
in their efforts to abolish the policy requiring EU missions
to invite dissidents to national day celebrations. Deputy
Foreign Minister Bernardino Leon told visiting EUR DAS Glyn
Davies that Spain wants to reestablish contacts with GOC
officials in order to be able to influence the post-Castro
leadership. MFA Director General for Latin America Javier
Sandomingo will travel to Cuba on 10/27, in part to explain
Spain's inititative to the dissident community. Sandomingo
would like to brief USG officials in Washington as well,
perhaps in late November. Popular Party members are critical
of Zapatero's approach on Cuba, but do not seem to have the
political weight to rein in GOS policy on Cuba.


2. (C) Madrid cannot be moved on this issue. We believe the
only way to blunt Spain's ambitions on EU Cuba policy is to
energize Cuba critics within the EU, such as Poland and the
Czech Republic, in order to prevent an EU consensus in
Brussels in favor of Spain's new approach. End Summary.

//SPAIN SHIFTS EMPHASIS FROM CIVIL SOCIETY TO CUBAN
GOVERNMENT//


3. (C) Shortly after Zapatero came to office, MFA and other
government officials indicated they wanted to take a "new"
approach on Cuba out of frustration with their lack of access
to Cuban Government interlocutors. They blamed the June 2003
EU measures in support of Cuban dissidents -- especially the
policy of inviting dissidents to EU national day celebrations
-- as a major impediment to normal diplomatic relations with
the GOC. Deputy FM Leon told EUR DAS Davies on 10/19 that
Spain wants to eliminate the EU policy on invitations in
order to regain access to, and perhaps influence, GOC

officials who could lead Cuba once Castro is gone. Leon said
Spain's objective is to prevent chaos in Cuba in the
post-Castro era. He told Davies that MFA Director General
for Latin America Sandomingo would travel to Cuba soon and
would also like to visit Washington at a later date to brief
USG officials. Davies underscored USG policy on Cuba and
warned against policies that would allow Castro to simply eat
"carrots" handed him by foreign interlocutors without
requiring Castro to ease political and economic restrictions.


//MFA - EU MEASURES WERE "A MISTAKE FROM THE START"//


4. (C) Poloff met with MFA Deputy Director General for the
Caribbean Pablo Gomez de Olea on 10/21 to get a readout on
the 10/19 EU Latin American Committee (COLAT) meeting on Cuba
and to express USG concern regarding the direction of GOS
policy towards Cuba. Gomez said that, contrary to press
reports, the COLAT meeting had gone well from Spain's
perspective. The GOS had not expected a vote on its proposal
to "modify" the June 2003 measures on Cuba and was content
with the COLAT's decision to request input from resident EU
missions in Havana for a November 16 discussion. Gomez
listed the UK, France, Sweden, Greece, Belgium, Austria and
Finland as strong backers of the Spanish proposal.


5. (C) In an effort to block new EU members states viewed as
hostile to Cuba from scuttling Madrid's plans, Spain asked
that only countries with an embassy in Cuba (i.e. - those
affected by the Cuban "freezout" of EU diplomats) vote on
whether to eliminate the invitation of dissidents to national
day events. Poloff noted that Finland - a GOS supporter on
Cuba - has no embassy in Havana, while the Czech Republic and
Poland do have missions in Havana and could have a different
view. Gomez said Poland and the Czech Republic are coming
around to Spain's view on the issue.


6. (C) Gomez, a holdover from the Aznar administration,
complained that the 2003 EU measures were "a mistake from the
start" and argued that even had the Popular Party (PP) won
the March elections the GOS would still seek to roll them
back. He said the Greek EU Presidency had rammed the
measures through in 2003 without proper consideration and
without leaving the EU an exit strategy in case the measures
backfired. Gomez said that the EU should simply have enacted
the measures without announcing them and should have made the
invitation of dissidents voluntary in order to leave EU
missions some wiggle room. He said it was regretable that
some EU missions had broken EU discipline by canceling
national day events in order to avoid conflict with the GOC,
citing Austria as a particularly egregious example.

//SPAIN STILL CARES ABOUT THE OPPOSITION, BUT...//


7. (C) Poloff said the USG has significant reservations about
the change in Spanish policy towards Cuba, fearing Castro
will interpret it as a victory for Cuban intransigience on
human rights. Gomez insisted that Spain remains committed to
pressing for improvements in Cuba's human rights practices.
He reiterated previous assertions that Spain's plans
including ramped up contacts with the opposition in meetings
other than national day events. He said DG Sandomingo's
primary reason for going to Cuba on 10/27 is to meet with the
opposition and seek their understanding with respect to
Spain's new direction. He asserted that most dissidents had
already indicated their acceptance of Spain's rationale, with
only "right wing" activists Oswaldo Paya and Martha Beatriz
Roque refusing to budge in part because the GOS had failed to
engage them sufficiently on the issue. Poloff challenged
Gomez on this point, noting that center-left activist
Vladimiro Roca had recently sent a scathing letter to the GOS
accusing Spain of abandoning the opposition. Gomez said the
Spanish Embassy in Havana had spoken with Roca and convinced
him of Spain's good intentions. (NOTE: In a separate
meeting, the brother of Oswaldo Paya told poloff that
Sandomingo had asked him in August how Paya would view the
termination of invitations to national day events. The
brother responded that Paya would reject the shift in policy,
since it was the EU's only concrete measure in support for
pro-democracy activists in Cuba. END NOTE.)


8. (C) Poloff noted FM Moratinos' recent comments to the
press suggesting that Spain's policy shift had led to the
release of seven jailed dissidents since mid 2004, saying the
USG saw no connection between Spanish diplomacy and the
release of the dissidents. Gomez replied that Moratinos'
comments had been misinterpreted. What he meant to say was
that the EU measures had not led to the release of any
dissidents and that they were only let go when Spain began
speaking of the need for dialogue with the Castro regime.
However, Gomez agreed with poloff's point that Castro more
likely had his own reasons for releasing the detainees,
irrespective of any Spanish initiatives.


9. (C) Asked about Cuban Foreign Minister Perez Roque's
recent favorable comments regarding Zapatero's Cuba policy,
Gomez said neither the statements of the GOC nor those of the
opposition had an influence on Spanish policy. He said Spain
feels no sense of urgency and will adjust its Cuba policy at
a pace determined by Madrid's long-term objectives in Cuba.
Poloff raised rumors circulating through Madrid's exile
community that political prisoner Raul Rivero would be
released by the GOC in order to reward Zapatero and give him
leverage to ease EU policies towards Cuba. Gomez discounted
the rumors, saying Rivero is too big a prize for the GOC to
release at the moment, given Castro's personal dislike for
the jailed poet.

//PP A GADFLY ON CUBA, BUT CAN'T SWAY GOS POLICY//


10. (C) On 10/21, DCM, the political counselor, and poloff
met with PP Parliamentarian and chief of the PP's
International Affairs DepartmentJorge Moragas and PP Senator
Luis Fraga to discuss foreign policy issues, including Cuba.
Moragas, who made front page news in Spain when he was denied
entry to Cuba on 10/16 for planning to meet with dissidents,
said GOS policy on Cuba is a "disaster." He said Spanish and
EU policies may not be able to influence Castro, but they
should at the very least fall on the side of a principled
defense of human rights. Moragas, who appears close to both
PP leader Mariano Rajoy and former President Aznar, favors a
"scorched-earth" style of opposition and said the PP would
keep Cuba at the forefront of its differences with the
Socialist government. He called on the USG to encourage
Central European EU members to block Spanish initiatives in
Brussels and make clear to Zapatero Washington's differences
with Spain on Cuba.


11. (C) Fraga, who is friendly with FM Moratinos and recently
traveled with Socialist officials to Chile and Colombia and
says he will travel with Zapatero's delegation to the Ibero
American Summit in Costa Rica, was more conciliatory, saying
he is attempting to broker joint PP-PSOE positions on policy
towards Cuba (as well on policy towards relations with the
U.S.) He agreed with the GOS thesis that there are figures
within the GOC who could be influenced by Spain, but thought
the GOS had taken the wrong approach in adjusting its policy.
He said the PP should balance PP "sticks" (i.e. - Moragas)
with "carrots" such as his pursuit of a common policy on
Cuba. Interestingly, both Fraga and Moragas described MFA
officials Sandomingo and Gomez de Olea in favorable terms,
saying that GOS direction on Cuba was driven by PSOE
operatives around FM Moratinos and President Zapatero.
Neither legislator seemed optimistic that the PP would be
able to alter Zapatero's Cuba policy.

//COMMENT//


12. (C) We are not going to be able to convince the GOS to
refrain from taking the lead within the EU to revamp policy
towards Cuba. MFA hands may be counseling a correct
diplomatic approach in making this shift, but they
nevertheless strongly support the decision to terminate the
invitation of dissidents to national day celebrations. We
are not swayed by GOS assertions that they will ramp up other
contacts with dissidents since there is no reason to believe
the Spanish ambassador in Havana would approach such contacts
with any enthusiasm.


13. (C) However, Spain's efforts may still be blunted at the
EU level if a country such as Poland or the Czech Republic
were able to block consensus on Spain's proposals during the
November 16 COLAT. Such a loss in momentum might be enough
of a setback to convince Zapatero and FM Moratinos that
changing EU Cuba policy is not worth the political effort. A
loss in Brussels would also open the door for domestic
critics of Zapatero's approach towards Cuba, which would act
as a further brake on Socialist activism on Cuba.
ARGYROS