SPAIN ON POLISARIO RHETORIC, WESTERN SAHARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 004080

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF MO AG SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN ON POLISARIO RHETORIC, WESTERN SAHARA
RESOLUTION

REF: A) STATE 223135 B) ALGIERS 2251

Classified By: Political officer Ricardo Zuniga; reasons 1.5 (B) and (D
)


1. (C) Summary. Spain will convey a message to the Madrid
Polisario representative calling on the Polisario to cease
threats to resume armed conflict with Morocco. MFA Maghreb
Office Director Carlos Fernandez Arias also shared Spain's
views on the state of play in Western Morocco, including GOS
priorities for a UN resolution on Western Sahara. Fernandez
Arias said Former Secretary of State Baker was the "best
thing that ever happened" for the Western Sahara negotiations
and made a pitch for the proposal of another U.S. figure as
the UNSYG's special envoy. The Socialist government still
seems to be feeling its way on Western Morocco, generating
some confusion regarding GOS positions on the issue. For
now, Spain's primary objective is simply to keep the peace
process alive. End Summary.

//GOS AGREES WITH USG ON POLISARIO THREATS TO RESUME COMBAT//


2. (SBU) Poloff met with MFA Maghreb Office Director Carlos
Fernandez Arias on 10/18 to convey ref A points requesting
Spain approach the Madrid Polisario representative to express
concern regarding recent Polisario threats to resume armed
conflict in Western Sahara. Fernandez said the USG points
tracked with Spain's views, noting that GOS Deputy Foreign
Minister Bernardino Leon had warned Polisario leaders in
August against continuing to employ aggressive rhetoric.
Fernandez plans to meet with local Polisario representative
Brahim Gali in the next few days and promised to relay
another cautionary message on behalf of the GOS. He said
Polisario leaders are well aware that talk of renewing the
armed struggle is unrealistic, especially since it is not in
Algeria's interests to allow the conflict to resume.

//SPANISH OBJECTIVES IN WESTERN SAHARA//


3. (C) Poloff noted that there was some confusion within the
USG concerning Spain's views on next steps on Western Sahara
and on the mandate of the SGSR Alvaro de Soto. Fernandez
said he was aware that Spain's positions required some
clarification and said that the Spanish DCM in Washington had
recently discussed the issue with NEA DAS Philo Dibble. He
said that the GOS continued to improve ties to Morocco in
hopes that better relations would help nudge Rabat (and
Paris) towards a more conciliatory posture on the Baker Plan.
Fernandez acknowledged that neither Morocco nor France has
reciprocated thus far. He described resolution of the
Western Sahara issue as the linchpin to broader GOS
objectives in the region, including the progressive economic
and political integration of Maghreb states in order to
stabilize Spain's shaky southern flank.


4. (C) Fernandez described Polisario's current attitude as
"extremely tough," especially with respect to Alvaro de Soto.
Polisario had faith in Baker as an interlocutor with
sufficient gravitas to honor commitments made to the parties.
They view de Soto as a mere UN functionary and associate him
with his former boss, UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar,
who led the organization during the worst period in
UN-Polisario relations. Fernandez said Spain agreed with USG
views on the importance of Polisario's release of the
remaining Moroccan POW's, but noted that the Sahrawis are
probably not disposed to trade away one of their few
remaining points of leverage.

//SPANISH SUGGESTIONS FOR A UN RESOLUTION//


5. (C) Fernandez said the GOS will soon share with the USG,
France, and the UK proposed ideas for a resolution on Western
Sahara, to include five key components:

-- Explicit support for the Baker Plan as the "optimal
political solution."

-- An expression of support for UNSYG Annan and for his envoy
Alvaro de Soto.

-- A one-year mandate for the MINURSO mission (though
Fernandez said six months would be acceptable to the GOS).

-- Language that would give de Soto room for maneuver to get
beyond Morocco's rejection of the Baker plan, as opposed to a
call for de Soto to simply implement the plan without any
possibility of modification.

-- Retention of current funding levels for MINURSO.
(Fernandez said he knew we had a different view on this
issue, but said Spain's view is that MINURSO's presence
creates pressure on both sides, especially Morocco, to remain
engaged in the peace process.)

//A PITCH FOR A U.S. ENVOY TO REPLACE BAKER//


6. (C) Fernandez said that in his view and the view of many
others in the MFA, Former Secretary Baker had been the "best
thing that ever happened" for the Western Sahara peace
process. He said Baker's genius was in keeping the parties
pointed in the right direction and in generating momentum for
an otherwise stalled process. Fernandez fears that with
Baker's departure, the dynamic created by high-level USG
interest will stall (especially in the case of Morocco) and
both parties may simply retrench. This would leave a
festering and destabilizing wound in Moroccan-Algerian
relations, blocking European plans to foment a more stable
and prosperous Maghreb. Fernandez said the best solution
would be for another high-profile U.S. figure to take Baker's
place as the UNSYG's personal envoy. He asked that poloff
inquire with the Department whether this would be possible.
Poloff agreed to forward the inquiry, but said he was unaware
of any consideration of another U.S. candidate for the
position.

//COMMENT//


7. (C) We believe the main reason for the mixed signals
regarding GOS positions on Western Sahara is that the GOS
itself is still working out its approach on the issue.
Whereas Maghreb expert Fernandez has stressed continuity in
GOS policy, his superiors in the MFA have sent positive
signals towards Morocco and France in hopes that those
governments would reciprocate and show greater flexibility
towards the Baker Plan. This strategy has not succeeded and
the GOS now seems to be tacking towards less ambitious
objectives. Spain's fundamental objective is to keep the
peace process alive and both parties at the table. Anything
short of a mutually-agreed solution is seen as a lasting
threat to Spanish interests in the Maghreb.


ARGYROS