Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04MADRID4073
2004-10-19 15:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
Cable title:  

GOS ARRESTS SUSPECTED ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS

Tags:  PTER ASEC SP 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

191551Z Oct 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 004073 

SIPDIS

EUR/WE FOR HALL, ZIMMERMAN, AND ALLEGRONE
S/CT
DS/IP/EUR
DS/ICI/PII
DS/DSS/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2014
TAGS: PTER ASEC SP
SUBJECT: GOS ARRESTS SUSPECTED ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS


Classified By: Political Counselor Kathy Fitzpatrick; reason 1.5 (B) an
d (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 004073

SIPDIS

EUR/WE FOR HALL, ZIMMERMAN, AND ALLEGRONE
S/CT
DS/IP/EUR
DS/ICI/PII
DS/DSS/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2014
TAGS: PTER ASEC SP
SUBJECT: GOS ARRESTS SUSPECTED ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS


Classified By: Political Counselor Kathy Fitzpatrick; reason 1.5 (B) an
d (D).


1. (C) Summary. Spanish National Police arrested eight
Maghrebi residents of Spain on charges of planning to bomb
Spain's High Court, which takes the lead in GOS terrorism
investigations. The detentions were based in part on USG
information provided through Legatt channels. According to
news reports, the eight men were in the early stages of
organizing a conspiracy that included plans to purchase 1,000
kilos of dynamite with the aid of an imprisoned ETA bomber,
and, police fear, plans for a number of suicide bombings. A
ninth suspect, reportedly the ringleader of the group, was
arrested in Switzerland approximately one month ago. The
arrests were ordered by high-profile judge Baltazar Garzon,
who is currently also prosecuting suspected al-Qa'ida
members. Police have not established any connection between
the 10/18 and the 3/11 train bombers. Spanish National
Police requested the assistance of Legatt Madrid and other
foreign police agencies in the course of their investigation.
No explosives or weapons have been discovered as yet and it
is not clear whether the authorities have sufficient evidence
to secure a conviction or whether they acted now to disrupt
the extremists out of concern that they would act before the
GOS could obtain stronger evidence for legal purposes. End
Summary.

//EIGHT MAGHREBI DETAINEES//


2. (U) On the evening of 10/18 and early morning of 10/19,
Spanish National Police arrested eight suspected Islamist
militants, including four in Almeria: Ismail Latrech
(Algerian),Mourad Yala (AKA "Abu Anas")(Algerian),an
illegal immigrant Algerian known as "Mehdi," and Magid
Mchmacha (Moroccan). Also arrested were: Ali Omar (AKA
"Jelloul")(nationality uncertain) in Valencia, Djamel Merabet
(Algerian) in Malaga, and Ahmed Mohamed Ahmed (from the
Spanish enclave of Ceuta) in Madrid. An eighth suspect was
subsequently arrested in Pamplona and a ninth, reported to be
the leader of the cell -- whose name has not yet been
released -- has been in detention in Switzerland for the last
month. One suspect, Latrech, was previously known to the
authorities as a drug informant for the National Intelligence

Center (CNI),the main Spanish intelligence service, while
several of the others had served prison sentences for a
variety of crimes. There are no indications thus far of a
connection between the 10/18 detainees and the group that
carried out the 3/11 train bombing.


3. (U) According to press reports citing police sources, much
of the information leading to the arrests was provided by an
imam who is a double-agent for the Moroccan intelligence
service and who has reported reliably in the past, including
on the perpetrators of the March 11 train bombings in Madrid.
The information provided by this source led judicial
officials to order wiretaps on the phones of the suspects,
which allowed police to detect early planning for a terrorist
operation. After four months of collecting information,
police carried out the coordinated arrests of the nine
suspects. During the detentions, police located a manual for
carrying out "martyrdom operations" and other documentation
related to the activities of the group.

//PLANNING FOR "MAJOR ATTACKS" - AN ETA CONNECTION//


4. (C) Police sources tell the press that the nine men were
seeking 1,000 kilograms of dynamite with which to carry out a
truck bomb attack against the High Court, the judicial body
that leads GOS counterterrorism prosecutions, and other
unspecified attacks. Police indicated to Legatt considerable
concern that the group would carry out suicide attacks with a
portion of the explosives. Apparently, these fears are based
in part on information developed through wiretaps indicating
that the nine suspects were attempting to identify Muslim
common prisoners who might be willing to undertake "martyrdom
attacks." The discovery of the manual on suicide attacks
also seems to justify such concerns.


5. (U) Of particular note is the alleged effort on the part
of the Maghrebi group to obtain the dynamite through
convicted ETA terrorist Juan Jose Rego Vidal, who is in
prison for a 1995 attempt to assasinate King Juan Carlos.
According to press reports, the nine suspects knew Rego and
other ETA members from spending time in prison on
non-terrorist charges. The Maghrebis hoped Rego could either
provide a direct source for the dynamite or could direct them
to another person who could help them.
//THE U.S. CONNECTION//


6. (C) In the weeks leading up to the arrests, Spanish
National Police requested the assistance of Legatt Madrid
with respect to correspondence between the suspects in Spain
and Muslim extremists in U.S. prisons. The GOS evidently
requested similar assistance from authorities in Australia
and other countries. Legatt coordinated U.S. assistance and
was able to provide information useful to the Spanish
investigators (sensitive law enforcement information reported
via Legatt channels). However, the information developed by
Legatt does not appear related to the operational planning
aspects of the Spanish cell, nor does it point to activities
by the cell in the U.S.

//COMMENT//


7. (C) These arrests have the makings of a significant
counterterrorism success for both the GOS and Judge Garzon.
(NOTE: Garzon has been handling the case of suspected
al-Qa'ida financier and cell leader Barakat Yarkas, arrested
in Spain in November 2001, while another judge, Juan del
Olmo, has led the 3/11 investigation. END NOTE.) GOS
security agencies have been stung by recent revelations that
police informants had warned police of planning for the 3/11
train bombing, but officials did not follow up. Given this
context, together with lingering fears spawned by the 3/11
bombings, it is possible the Spanish police acted to disrupt
the cell with the full knowledge that they may have
insufficient evidence to successfully try the suspects.
Garzon is a particularly aggressive judge who enjoys the
limelight. He may have determined that the arrests were
justified by the need to derail any plans for terrorist
attacks (and his own need for press attention),even if
convictions would be difficult. The discovery of this cell,
and the ETA connection in particular, may shake the apparent
conviction among some Spaniards that they are safe from
terrorists now that the GOS has withdrawn troops from Iraq.
Unfortunately, it is clear that Spain will remain an active
front for the extemists in the war on terror.
ARGYROS