SPAIN QUESTIONS EFFECTIVENESS OF REMOVING CAVEATS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002965

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2014
TAGS: MOPS PREL YI SP NATO
SUBJECT: SPAIN QUESTIONS EFFECTIVENESS OF REMOVING CAVEATS
IN KFOR

REF: STATE 162868

Classified By: KATHLEEN M. FITZPATRICK, POLITICAL COUNSELOR.
REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D)

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Summary
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1. (C) Spain is reviewing restrictions it may have placed on
Spanish forces that are participating in KFOR but would
prefer to help strengthen Kosovo police forces to improve
KFOR's effectiveness, according to Kosovo specialists at the
Spanish Foreign Ministry. Following the outbreak of violence
in Kosovo in March, Spain is more likely to remain committed
to KFOR in support of its overall policy to help maintain
peace and security in Europe, according to MFA experts. End
summary.

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Removing national caveats
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2. (C) We met with Enrique de Yturriaga, Special Assistant to
the Director General of the Coordination Unit for Spain's
Participation in the UNSC at the Spanish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs August 2 to deliver reftel points on how to make KFOR
more effective and urge Spain to remove national caveats on
its KFOR forces. Yturriaga covers Europe, Africa, and
non-proliferation issues in the UNSC and also has
responsibilities for Kosovo issues in the MFA. He told us
that he would have to review the issue of restrictions placed
on Spanish forces in KFOR. Spain sees the proposal to remove
national caveats as an ongoing dialog within NATO that may
not affect Spain's participation in KFOR. Yturriaga
explained that Spanish KFOR forces are engaged in rural areas
where they carry out activities such as traffic control and
reconstruction projects. They are less likely to be involved
in the type of violence that occurred in March in urban areas
like Mitrovica, Yturriaga stated. The Spanish position is
that removing restrictions on Spanish KFOR or getting KFOR
more involved in internal security matters in general may not
be the best solution to improve KFOR's security preparedness.

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Improving KFOR
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3. (C) Poloff asked Yturriaga what types of measures Spain
would propose to make KFOR more effective. Yturriaga
responded that greater cooperation between KFOR, UNMIK and
OSCE to strengthen the Kosovo police force would be a better
way to prevent violence and make KFOR more effective over the
long term. If KFOR becomes more involved in internal
security matters, such as controlling domestic conflicts or
protecting property, it may send a negative message that the
KFOR was getting too involved in domestic matters or was
giving special treatment to the Serb minority. Such a move
would cast KFOR in a peacekeeping mode when the goal was to
move toward peace building, Yturriaga said. Spain would be
more willing to help improve how the Kosovo police force
protects civilians rather than to pursue a domestic legal
process to remove any national caveats that may exist on its
forces in KFOR.

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Spain's KFOR commitment
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4. (C) Poloff asked Yturriaga how the new Spanish government
planned to remain engaged in KFOR. Yturriaga replied that
Spain's posture was to honor its international commitments
and involve more civilian authorities rather than military
forces in its international peace activities. However,
following the violence that occurred in Mitrovica in March,
Spain was unlikely to pursue a policy of replacing troops
with civilian authorities in KFOR, Yturriaga stated.


5. (C) The Spanish Foreign Ministry had yet to formulate a
policy position on Kosovo, according to Yturriaga. Foreign
Minister Moratinos and State Secretary Bernardino Leon have
only made general statements expressing Spain's commitment to
increasing security and stability in Europe--including
Kosovo--and is now more focused on its foreign policy efforts
in the Middle East, Western Sahara, Afghanistan and Haiti.
Meanwhile, the Spanish Ministry of Defense is more involved
in setting the pace of Spain's continued troop presence in
KFOR.

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Comment
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6. (C) We will continue to pursue dialogue on this issue
with the GOS and NATO experts, most of whom have already
departed on traditional summer leave. We suggest that the
Department and/or US NATO also pursue this with their Spanish
counterparts also. End comment.
MANZANARES