Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04MADRID2181
2004-06-09 16:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
Cable title:  

SPANISH DEFENSE MINISTER PREVIEWS POSSIBLE

Tags:  PREL PGOV SP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002181 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV SP
SUBJECT: SPANISH DEFENSE MINISTER PREVIEWS POSSIBLE
AFGHANISTAN INCREASE

REF: A. STATE 111287


B. MADRID 1864

C. MADRID 1867

Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002181

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV SP
SUBJECT: SPANISH DEFENSE MINISTER PREVIEWS POSSIBLE
AFGHANISTAN INCREASE

REF: A. STATE 111287


B. MADRID 1864

C. MADRID 1867

Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Ambassador Argyros, accompanied by DCM and PolCouns,
met June 8 with Spanish Defense Minister Jose Bono to
reinforce NATO's and the USG's requests for Spanish support
in augmenting ISAF and coalition operations in Afghanistan.
As Bono's schedule permitted this meeting only several weeks
after receipt of Ref A, Embassy had conveyed our points
earlier to senior officials in Zapatero's office and at the
MFA. We understand that OSD officials also shared our views
with the Spanish Embassy in Washington and with lower level
Spanish MOD officials (Ref B and C). Ambassador Argyros
stressed to Bono the importance of a robust Spanish response,
both for NATO and for the success of ISAF in Afghanistan.


2. (C) Bono reiterated, as Spanish officials have been
telling us for several weeks, that no decision would be taken
on Afghanistan increases until after the June 13 European
Parliamentary elections, in which the Socialist party and the
government seek a major victory in order to vindicate the
March 14 national election results just after the Madrid
terrorist attacks. However, Bono said that Spain likely
would commit transportation capabilities such as helicopters
and an advanced medical unit. Bono said that Spain also
likely would augment current troop levels to same 800.
(Comment: We thought there was some "fuzzy math" here yet to
be determined.) Bono told the Ambassador he could not say
any of this publicly yet, adding that the MFA had also to
approve the increase. He said the government would "consult"
with the Spanish Parliament.


3. (C) Bono said the Spanish public and others needed to be
reminded that Afghanistan was not "just about Bin Laden," but
about ridding the country of the Taliban and getting a handle
on drug trafficking in the region. He said these broader
issues were also very important (note: we have seen recently
in the Spanish press an apparent attempt by the GOS to lay
the groundwork for a decision to augment Spanish troops in
Afghanistan).


4. (C) However, Bono repeatedly stressed that the USG,
including Secretary Rumsfeld, must understand that any
increase in the Spanish presence in Afghanistan would not be
undertaken to "make up for" withdrawal of Spanish troops from
Iraq. Bono said that this was also important for the Spanish
public. The Ambassador underscored that the USG fully
understood this point and was not making such a connection.



5. (C) Both Bono and the Ambassador agreed on the need to
move forward after difficult rhetoric during Spain's national
election and European Parliament campaigns, US disappointment
over Spain's rapid decision to withdraw its troops from Iraq
and other irritants. Bono posited that it might be useful
for him to meet with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld during the
NATO Summit in Istanbul in order to dispel the image of
difficulties in the US-Spanish relationship and between him
and Secretary Rumsfeld personally. Bono stressed he was not
necessarily asking for a meeting, but wanted us to think
about the idea. The Ambassador undertook to convey this
thought to Washington.


6. (C) At the close of the meeting, Bono raised recent
local press reports related to a possible drawdown of Spanish
civilian personnel at the naval base at the Rota Naval Base
in Andalucia. The Ambassador explained the context of the
USG's global force posture review and said that no decisions
regarding Spain or other nations had been taken yet. Bono
also raised several other issues related to the base, and he
and the Ambassador agreed to remand these to lower levels to
work out.


7. (C) While noting he had said nothing publicly on the
issue, Bono mentioned press reports alleging Secretary
Rumsfeld, during his recent trip to Asia, had mentioned a
possible continuing terrorist threat to Spain following the
March 11 attacks. The Ambassador said that he personally had
read every readout of Secretary Rumsfeld's comments in
Singapore, Japan and on the aircraft and he had not specified
a threat to Madrid. The Ambassador stressed that Rumsfeld
had quite rightly noted the need to remain vigilant after the
attacks in the US September 11, the Madrid bombings and the
terrorist attacks in Istanbul and Bali.


8. (C) Comment: Bono is a media hound and we don't yet
know how much of what he says is for the good of the GOS or
for his own personal aggrandizement. He readily admitted
to the Ambassador he has much to learn as Minister of
Defense, and has had a very short time to do so. However his
lack of experience has not stopped him from making public
pronouncements. We do not know how much to expect from the
MOD under his leadership. Our first reaction is not to
believe anything until we see it and not to expect much until
he has a better grounding of his portfolio.
ARGYROS