Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04MADRID2136
2004-06-07 15:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
Cable title:  

SPAIN'S ZAPATERO: STILL IN CAMPAIGN MODE

Tags:  PGOV PREL SP PSOE 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002136 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL SP PSOE
SUBJECT: SPAIN'S ZAPATERO: STILL IN CAMPAIGN MODE


Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002136

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL SP PSOE
SUBJECT: SPAIN'S ZAPATERO: STILL IN CAMPAIGN MODE


Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Almost three months after his electoral
victory and a month and a half after formally taking office,
Spanish President Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and his
Spanish Socialist Worker's Party (PSOE) remain in campaign
mode, intensely focused on winning a decisive victory for
Spanish socialist candidates in the European Parliament
elections June 13. Zapatero and his party want to be able to
point to such a victory as confirmation that their March 14
election was not a fluke or a sop to the terrorists who
attacked a Madrid rail station just three days before the
national elections. Every decision the new government has
taken since the elections, including Zapatero's decision to
withdraw troops from Iraq, his trips to France, Germany and
Mexico, Spain's desire to abstain on the UNSC ICC rollover
resolution, and his plan to delay any decision on increasing
Spanish troops in Afghanistan are part of this June 13 win
big strategy. After June 13, we expect Zapatero and his
party to ease some of their rhetoric, but we are skeptical
that there will be any sea change on issues on which the
Spanish public has strong opinions, particularly those that
distinguish the new government from that of Aznar,s.
Zapatero will follow, not lead the Spanish public. Still, we
continue to press the Zapatero government to make good on
their professed desire to have good relations with the U.S.
by giving us concrete examples of support. END SUMMARY


2. (C) Still insecure after the March 14 elections that
took place three days after the Madrid terrorist attacks, the
PSOE government wants to vindicate its electoral victory by
scoring a decisive win against Popular Party (PP) candidates
in the June 13 European Parliament elections (usually a
yawner here in Spain, but this year a focus of political
life). Senior government officials have admitted to us over
the past several weeks that the GOS will not make key
decisions, such as whether to increase the Spanish troop
presence in Afghanistan, until after the June 13 elections.
The GOS's desire to abstain rather than vote in favor of the
UNSC resolution rolling over the one-year exemption to the

ICC for those not party to the Rome Treaty must also be seen
in this light, particularly in the context of the Iraq
prisoner abuse scandal. At least one official in Zapatero's
office readily admitted that until these elections are over,
those who deal in foreign policy within and outside of the
Spanish government will have to have considerable patience.
When we raised our concern that the U.S. was being used as a
foil in the June 13 electoral campaign, the official said
that the visit by President Aznar to the U.S. -- still highly
controversial here -- could be seen in a similar light.


3. (C) Though PSOE won the March 14 election convincingly,
if surprisingly, the party wants to dispel any notion that
their victory was a direct result of the terrorist attacks
and that the Spanish troop withdrawal from Iraq was a cave-in
to Al-Qaeda. The March 11 terrorist attacks have also become
part of the campaign here, with PSOE seeking to show that the
Aznar government did not read the warning signs on Islamic
terrorism and manipulated public opinion into believing that
the Basque terrorist group ETA had carried out the attack (in
the belief that if the Spanish populace blamed ETA, Aznar's
party would have won the elections). The PP counters that
the Socialists manipulated crowds and public opinion the day
before the elections and that PSOE supporters in the police
and elsewhere passed investigation information on to PSOE
before it reached PP government officials. All of this
played into the debate on whether to convene a commission to
investigate the terrorist attacks. Both parties eventually
agreed to establish such a commission, in the hope that
information developed would discredit the other. But the
commission, formally established on May 26, will not hold its
first session until after the June 13 elections.


4. (C) PSOE has made foreign policy the key issue in the
campaign. Rhetoric remains particularly harsh on Iraq, the
U.S. and Aznar. Zapatero has remained generally above the
fray, and has declined opportunities to criticize the U.S. on
the Iraq abuse allegations, instead allowing the PSOE chief
European Parliament candidate to take the lead. Still,
Defense Minister Bono has been very prominent in
"orchestrating" the return of Spanish troops from Iraq, and
he denied May 24 (though every interlocutor in Zapatero's
office and the MFA insist to the contrary) that the
government is considering augmenting troops in Afghanistan
and possibly sending a presence to Haiti. The government has
made clear, however, that especially during the June 13
campaign, it does not want to link the withdrawal of troops
from Iraq with an increase in Afghanistan. Zapatero's trips
abroad, including to Morocco, France, Germany, and Mexico,
fit into PSOE's desire for a large victory on June 13; each
visit has allowed Zapatero to showcase how he and his
government plan to differ from what they call Aznar's
excessive kow-towing to the U.S. at the expense of core
Spanish interests.


5. (C) The PSOE and the government remain extremely anxious
to avoid provoking public opinion even though polls show they
are ahead some 6-10 percent. While the PP had initially
hoped to pull off a strong showing June 13, the party seems
to have backed off of this idea in order to avoid
embarrassment. PP strategists tell us that the party regards
defeat as likely and is focusing on keeping the margin of
defeat as narrow as possible.


6. (C) Though we expect the government to settle down a bit
after the elections and ease the rhetoric, we do not expect a
major turnaround by the Zapatero government on issues the
Socialists feel are based on principles, Spanish consensus or
to which they expect Spanish popular opinion to be opposed,
in other words the vast majority of issues. We do not expect
a major troop increase in Afghanistan, nor a change of heart
on the ICC resolution. Even on the Iraq UNSC resolution, on
which the GOS has professed to want to be helpful, we expect
Spain to stand firm on their desire for a date certain for
withdrawal of coalition forces (or at least a one-year
renewal clause) and issues related to command and control of
coalition forces.


7. (C) One area, however, which the new Spanish government
has not made an issue, is the U.S. presence on Spanish bases
at Rota and Moron. Thus far, neither the new government nor
the PSOE has said this is a bone of contention with the U.S.
In fact, when press reports indicated a possible reduction in
local civilian presence at bases in Europe, including in
Spain, the press and some government officials expressed
concern -- probably because loss of Spanish jobs at Rota, for
example, could harm the economy of Andalusia, a major
Socialist regional stronghold.
ARGYROS