SPAIN: VIEWS ON IRAQ RESOLUTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002096

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN: VIEWS ON IRAQ RESOLUTION

REF: A. STATE 121748

B. STATE 121718

Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY Spanish MFA Political Director Dezcallar,
who now has overall Iraq responsibility in the MFA, told us
June 3 that Spain appreciated the constructive and positive
attitude evident in the US-UK revised text. He said Spanish
President Zapatero personally had instructed Spanish UN Perm
Rep to be "helpful" in seeking to forge consensus. On the
revised text, Spain would like to see further clarification
of the end date of the MNF mandate, but is willing to discuss
pros and cons of leaving the date "indeterminate." The GOS
wants a specific reference to "international humanitarian
law," but Dezcallar insisted that the kind of clause Spain
would desire would be forward-looking, not refer to past
events (e.g. prisoner abuse allegations). Spain would also
welcome further clarification on the relationship between the
IIG and the MNF, and seeks language on this relationship to
reinforce, not undermine, Iraqi sovereignty. The GOS would
prefer a 3-month schedule for MNF reports to the Security
Council, rather than the 6-month schedule envisaged in the
current text. Dezcallar professed that none of these issues
was a deal breaker for Spain, but identified the IIG-MNF
relationship as the most serious issue for the GOS. The
Zapatero government clearly wants the US to see Spain as a
positive factor in developing the UNSC resolution on Iraq;
however, the GOS will not hesitate to raise difficult
"details." END SUMMARY


2. (C) In a June 3 meeting with MFA Political Director
Dezcallar, who has overall responsibility for Iraq in the
MFA, and will take over Iraq responsibilities formerly housed
in the MOD, PolCouns reviewed USG thinking on the revised
Iraq UNSC resolution (ref a) and urged strong GOS support,
including in public statements, for the new Iraqi interim
government (ref B). PolCouns noted USG,s desire to move
quickly in adopting the resolution, as a firm expression of
international support for the new government.


3. (C) As have previous GOS interlocutors over the past
several weeks, Dezcallar said that President Zapatero had
personally instructed the MFA to play a constructive role in
crafting the new UNSC resolution. "We have learned our
lessons from past mistakes," Dezcallar noted, clearly
referring to the Villepin parallel text process during the
negotiations of 1483. Dezcallar expressed appreciation for
the positive U.S. and UK attitude, clearly reflected in the
elements of the revised text that sought to meet concerns
expressed previously by Council members. He asked when the
USG might want to put the text to a vote; PolCouns responded
that the USG preferred to move sooner rather than wait for
discussions to take place among non-Council members such as
Iraq,s neighbors, as other members of the Council had
suggested. She added that while these views were important,
the priority was to demonstrate support for the new
government and the political transition process. Dezcallar
did not further comment on Spain,s view on timing.


4. (C) Dezcallar identified several key concerns for the GOS
(roughly paralleling issues raised by the Spanish Perm Rep in
New York),as detailed below.


5. (C) Reference to "International Humanitarian Law:" The
GOS wants a specific reference to "international humanitarian
law" in the text; the Spanish Perm Rep has made this point in
NY; subsequent to the conversation with Dezcallar, Foreign
Minister Moratinos, in a press conference in Finland, said
the text should include such a specific reference. Dezcallar
told us that, unlike the "Chinese proposal," which referred
to past actions in Iraq (e.g. prisoner abuses),Spain's
preference would be for language that looked forward to the
future. He said that the U.S. should welcome, not fear, such
a reference, and thought that the U.S. should have as much
interest in seeing it included as Spain or any other Council
member. Dezcallar opined that the UK supported some language
referring to humanitarian law.


6. (C) We asked why the reference to "international law"
that is already in the text was not sufficient, since it
obviously incorporates humanitarian law. In addition,
preambular language also refers to human rights. Dezcallar
responded that it would be important for the Iraqis to have
the Council specifically to refer to humanitarian law. He
indicated that this might well be handled in preambular
language rather than in the operative portion of the text.
Dezcallar also took the opportunity to note that Spain
understood the prisoner abuses were undertaken by a few, and
that in our transparent democratic system they were being
prosecuted in accordance with due process. He noted
President Zapatero,s comments to that effect on the margins
of the EU-Latin America summit, in which Zapatero also said
that the U.S. government was not to blame for the prisoner
abuses.


7. (C) MNF reporting schedule: As the Spanish Perm Rep
noted in UNSC informals, Spain would like the MNF to report
every three months to the Council, which the SYG would also
be called upon to do. Dezcallar said that a three-month
schedule would be a very good signal on the part of the MNF
to the Iraqis. He noted that on a six month schedule, the
MNF might end up reporting only once to the Council (say, if
MNF mandate ends with elections at the end of this year or
early next year). Again, this is not a deal breaker,
Dezcallar indicated, but something Spain wants to be
considered and would like to see incorporated in the text.


8. (C) IIG-MNF relations: By far this is one of the most
important issues for the GOS, Dezcallar said. Spain would
like more clarification on how the U.S. would envisage this
relationship, and noted that the resolution language on this
issue must not be seen in any way to undermine Iraqi
sovereignty. Dezcaller referred to a meeting between Deputy
Secretary Armitage and Secretary-General, EU High

SIPDIS
Representative Solana on this issue, in which Armitage had
identified a number of scenarios in which the IIG and the MNG
would have to develop arrangements. According to
Dezcallar,s readout, Armitage and Solana noted that
operations on which all agreed would not be problematic, nor
would defensive operations in which MNF troops clearly had to
conduct an operation to defend themselves. The most
problematic, would be an offensive operation which the IIG
did not approve.


9. (C) PolCouns noted that the USG certainly shared Spain's
desire to reinforce, not undermine, Iraqi sovereignty in the
resolution text. She also noted Secretary Powell's June 2
interview at the Middle East broadcasting center in which he
identified excellent examples of how this can be worked out
with a sovereign nation, such as with Germany and Korea where
our troops have been based for the past 50 years. When asked
whether Spain wanted more specific language on the
relationship issue, Dezcallar was unclear, but said the GOS
would welcome further details on USG thinking on the
arrangements between the IIG and the MNF. We discussed the
exchange of two letters process, in which the IIG would
communicate with the UNSC to express its desire for the MNF
to remain, and the lead MNF nation would send a letter also
outlining in general terms the process by which relations
would be developed.


10. (C) End of MNF mandate: Dezcallar noted Spain,s
concern that the closure of the MNF mandate remains too
"indeterminate" in the current text, which envisages the
mandate to end at the end of the political process leading to
democratization. Dezcallar acknowledged that flexibility on
the date might be beneficial, but said the Council should
discuss pros and cons of further clarifying the sunset
clause. (FM Moratinos in Finland subsequently said publicly
that "the sooner we give the Iraqi people a clear sign that
the multinational troops will leave Iraq, the better.").
Dezcallar declared the GOS "flexible" on this issue, however,
but would welcome further discussion in New York.


11. (C) Comment: The Zapatero government clearly wants us
to view Spain as helpful in the UNSC on the Iraq resolution -
even as it raises "details" that could be difficult to work
out.
ARGYROS