SPAIN: DCM WITH SPANISH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001867

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL SP NATO
SUBJECT: SPAIN: DCM WITH SPANISH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
ON AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ AND ICC ROLLOVER RESOLUTION

REF: A. STATE 111287


B. STATE 111359

C. STATE 12355

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission J. Robert Manzanares for reasons
1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: DCM Manzanares met with Spanish President
Zapatero's national security advisor Carles Casajuana May 20
to brief him on our request for increased Spanish support for
ISAF, urge the GOS to vote in favor of the UNSC ICC rollover
resolution and share USG's initial thoughts on the UNSC Iraq
resolution (refs a-c). Casajuana said that the GOS was aware
that it needed to come forward with a more robust program of
troops and resources for Afghanistan, but said the GOS likely
would not be able to fulfill all of our requests. He said
that Zapatero would not likely make any decision on this
issue until after the June 13 European Parliamentary
elections, as he and his party want to ensure a big victory
for Socialist candidates and do not want to confuse public
opinion by authorizing an increase in troops to Afghanistan
just as Spanish troops from Iraq return. He noted that NATO
SYG de Hoop Scheffer would visit Madrid June 4, but said no
decision would be made by then. Casajuana said that Spain
wanted to abstain on the ICC resolution, unless the USG did
not have the votes to win (which he thinks we have). On the
Iraq resolution, Casajuana said he was aware of our thinking,
having been briefed by Dr. Rice in Berlin. He said Spain
would play a positive role in seeking consensus on the
resolution. End summary.


2. (C) In his initial call on new national security advisor
Carles Casajuana, DCM Manzanares, accompanied by PolCouns and
Poloff, expressed appreciation for the welcome given to
Assistant Secretary Burns earlier that week, including a
meeting with Casajuana. Manzanares noted that all of our
encounters with officials from the new government in various
ministries and at all levels have been very pleasant, and all
officials had expressed their desire for good relations with
the United States. Manzanares said the USG wanted to put
meat to the bones of this sentiment by building concrete
examples of US-Spain support and cooperation.


3. (C) One important area for cooperation, DCM noted, is
Afghanistan, where the NATO Secretary General had identified
significant needs that must be met by the NATO Summit in
Istanbul to ensure that ISAF succeeds. DCM reviewed each of
the six requests for Spain, detailed in ref a, and left
talking points as a non-paper. DCM stressed the need for a
decision by May 26 in order to properly prepare for the
Istanbul summit and noted we are seeking an appointment for
the Ambassador to present our request to Defense Minister
Bono. Casajuana was aware of our requests, as we had briefed
MFA earlier in the day (septel) and he had heard from Spain's
NATO channels.


4. (C) Casajuana replied that Zapatero was aware that Spain
needed to provide more than symbolic augmentation of Spain's
presence in Afghanistan and that proposals were currently
under consideration. Spain wants to show it remains
committed to the fight against terror, particularly in light
of its Iraq pullout. However, Zapatero, who would be the
final decision-maker, would probably not make any decision on
this matter until after the June 13 European Parliamentary
elections, which the Socialist party was intent on winning
big. He said Zapatero believes that authorizing a
significant increase in Spain's military presence in
Afghanistan now would confuse public opinion as Spanish
troops return from Iraq, making it appear that Spain was
trading its pullout from Iraq for increased troop presence in
Afghanistan.


5. (C) Casajuana acknowledged Afghanistan was different
from Iraq in that Spain considered it an authorized
international operation directly related to Spain's own
counter-terrorism needs. Nonetheless, the Socialist party
was intent on avoiding any controversy that could reduced
their chances for a strong victory on June 13. Casajuana
said that the next three weeks would be difficult for all of
us, as the Socialists essentially remained in a campaign mode
with all of the attendant rhetoric. DCM said he hoped the
rhetoric would avoid using the USG as a campaign target.
(Comment: The Socialists want the June 13 elections to
vindicate their March 14 electoral victory. They remain
stung by criticism that their victory was a result of the
terrorist attacks).


6. (C) Casajuana said that while the GOS likely would
increase Spanish presence in Afghanistan (and had already
decided to double their presence as a result of their
participation in EUROCORPS),it likely would not be able to
meet all of the requests we put forward. Casajuana noted,
however, that the GOS could easily market provision of a
medical facility to the Spanish public, simply on a
humanitarian basis. He said Spain's increase likely would
focus on the Kabul battalion. He seemed a bit taken aback by
the request for a 1000 troops for the Combined Afghanistan
Forces to rout out the Taliban, but acknowledged that this
activity was in Spain's own counter-terrorist interest.
Casajuana noted that Spain was also looking at participating
in a Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) with perhaps in
conjunction with Italy, but did not want to take on a PRT
alone, as that would indicate responsibilities and resources
for the long term that Spain was not prepared to undertake.


7. (C) DCM also took the opportunity to review USG thinking
on elements of a draft UNSC resolution on Iraq. Casajuana
was aware of our thoughts following his discussions with Dr.
Rice in Berlin. Casajuana raised the issue of the
two-conference proposal put forward by the Russians. We
noted A/S Burns' comment that the idea had not yet caught
fire and that we wanted to focus on areas of consensus as we
pursue this resolution. Casajuana said Spain was concerned
about an open-ended mandate for the Multinational Force (MNF)
and might want to have the resolution provide a one-year,
renewable mandate for the MNF. In any case, Casajuana
averred that the GOS would play a positive, constructive role
in developing the resolution, and did not want to make
trouble for the US. He said the US and Spain share the
desire for stability and democracy in Iraq. Casajuana
confirmed the GOS would fulfill its monetary commitments made
at the Madrid Iraq Donors' conference and would continue its
participation in the Iraq Core Group.


8. (C) Comment: On Afghanistan, we expect Spain eventually
to agree to augment the Kabul battalion by some 200 or more
troops. They may also provide the medical facility. We
doubt they will offer 1000 Spanish troops for the CFC-A.
Given the Socialists' desire to avoid any controversy that
might hurt their changes in the June 13 elections, Zapatero
will not likely announce Spain's increased participation in
Afghanistan until after the elections but, we expect, still
before the Istanbul Summit.
ARGYROS