SPAIN: SCENESETTER FOR SECDEF AND DEPSECSTATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 001096

SIPDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR TO SECRETARY RUMSFELD AND DEPUTY SECRETARY
ARMITAGE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN: SCENESETTER FOR SECDEF AND DEPSECSTATE
MEETINGS WITH DEFENSE MINISTER-DESIGNATE BONO

REF: A. MADRID 919


B. MADRID 1052

C. MADRID 1074

Classified By: Ambassador Goerge L. Argyros, reasons
1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary: When you meet with Jose Bono April 5 in
Washington, you will find this long-time Socialist party
"heavyweight" an affable, smooth politician who could be a
pro-U.S. voice of reason in the new government headed up by
Socialist Party (PSOE) leader Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero.
We suggest focusing on the positive aspects of the
Spanish-U.S. defense relationship and caution against trying
to force Bono, in this first meeting, to define the new
government's policies in all areas of cooperation, in
particular the U.S.'s use of Spanish bases at Rota and Moron.
We think that allowing Bono and other members of the new
government some time to adjust to their new roles will
increase the possibility the U.S. can persuade them to take
positions favorable for American interests. End summary.


2. (C) Bono is one of the PSOE's key party bosses and
narrowly lost to Zapatero in a struggle for party leadership
in 2000. (Refs A and B contain more detailed bio
information). He is well respected by those in his party as
well as by members of the soon-to-be opposition Popular Party
(PP). He is also highly regarded by the Spanish military.
Bono is likely to be a strong and highly influential figure
in the Zapatero administration.


3. (C) In my meeting with him March 30, Bono said he was a
friend of the U.S. and looked forward to continuing Spain's
excellent defense relationship with the U.S. (ref C). He
asked to meet with Secretary Rumsfeld to convey personally on
Zapatero's behalf the new government's position on Spanish
troops serving in Iraq. He politely declined to preview the
position for me in the meeting. We are unsure as to what
Bono plans to say on the issue. Nonetheless, it seems odd
that Bono would not be willing to discuss the Spanish
position with me if he simply planned to repeat to Secretary
Rumsfeld Zapatero's publicly declared position on Iraq.
There is at least some chance Bono plans to pass on
information Zapatero has not mentioned in public.


4. (C) Although Zapatero made a big campaign issue out of
his opposition to the Iraq war and to Spanish troops in Iraq
reconstruction, neither he nor any other PSOE leaders made an
issue out of U.S. use of Spanish bases at Rota and Moron. We
thus think it is important to steer clear of pressing Bono
and the Spanish too hard to define their position at this
early stage on the U.S.'s use of the bases. The U.S. is more
likely to be able to favorably influence Zapatero government
thinking on the bases if we allow Zapatero, Bono and others
to assume their new positions and become familiar with this
complex issue (including learning from their own military how
positive our cooperation has been up to now). Forcing their
hand now may make them take a hard line position they might
not otherwise take.


5. (C) On the Spanish troop deployment to Iraq, we believe
that Zapatero and his PSOE advisors have not yet made up
their minds about whether a new UN resolution could cover
their campaign promise to withdraw Spanish troops if there is
no UN mandate. We also believe that Zapatero and his
advisors have not yet fleshed out the kind of content they
would need in such a resolution to provide them with
political cover to allow the troops to remain. Therefore,
this is a moment in which outreach at the senior leadership
level can have some influence, as long as we are not seen as
pushing them on other politically sensitive issues on which
the as-yet-to-be-formed government has not determined its key
interests.

ARGYROS