ISLAM IN MALAWI: A POST-MALAWI FIVE PERSPECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 LILONGWE 000785

SIPDIS

LUSAKA FOR RAO
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E.O. 12958: DECL: X6
TAGS: KISL PINR KPAO PTER ASEC PREL KIRF OIIP MI
SUBJECT: ISLAM IN MALAWI: A POST-MALAWI FIVE PERSPECTIVE

REF: 03 LILONGWE 1246 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Pol/Econ Officer Peter W. Lord, reasons 1.5 (b/d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (S) The June 2003 expulsion of five non-Malawian Muslims
suspected of ties to Al-Qaida (AKA the "Malawi Five"),which
the press characterized as and most Malawians believe to have
been a USG-initiative, came at time when the Muslim-Christian
divide was being exploited by politicians in the run-up to
the 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections. Though
for different reasons, the event evoked fear and anger in
both of Malawi's distinct Asian and Black Muslim communities,
and in many ways united the two communities through a common
anti-U.S. sentiment. Though more challenging in the Asian
Muslim community, creating a more positive opinion of the
U.S. should be possible through intentional funding and
programming to Muslim communities, using local Muslim
organizations. END SUMMARY.

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A BRIEF HISTORY
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The Early Days of Islam in Malawi
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2. (U) Islam first made its way to Malawi in the late 1500s
through Arab Muslim traders seeking new markets in the
African interior via Lake Malawi. Thus, the greater
population of Muslims came to live along the lakeshore and on
the banks of the Shire River. Cultural practices of certain
ethnic groups, such as the Yao, married well with Islamic
customs and facilitated the spread of formalized Islam.


3. (U) When Western missionaries began settling in Malawi in
the late 1800s, they brought both Christianity and education
with them. Most missionaries required that children convert
to Christianity prior to attending school, thus many
indigenous inhabitants converted to Christianity, especially
the Chewa people. With education came economic opportunities
and access to the external world.


4. (U) Those who refused to convert to Christianity remained
largely uneducated and, therefore, had fewer opportunities
for economic betterment. To date, many Black Muslims are
still reluctant to send their children to government schools
for fear of forced conversion. The legacy of inequitable
access to education and, by extension, economic opportunities
has led to Black Muslim communities having the highest
illiteracy rates in the country.


5. (U) The Asian Muslim population came with the British
colonial administration in the first half of the twentieth
century. With their international connections and superior
access to education and economic resources, Asian Muslims
quickly gained an important voice in the Malawian business
sector. Many of them are among Malawi's most wealthy
individuals.

Islamic Sects in Malawi
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6. (SBU) Most Muslims in Malawi are Sunni. The two main
"tariqa" ("brotherhoods" or "orders"),both of which find
their roots in Sufism, are Qadriyah (or Quadriya) and Sukuti
(or earlier on Shadhiliyah). Though both orders came to
Malawi from Zanzibar via Lake Malawi, Qadriyah was dominant
in the early days. In the 1930's, a reform movement began
(Shadhiliyah first, then later Sukuti) that preached against
many of the syncretic forms of religious rites of the
Qadriyah. The reformists stressed the importance of Arabic
literacy for religion and English literacy for secular
communication.


7. (SBU) By the 1960's, Asian Muslims in Malawi began funding
the construction of mosques and the establishment of schools.
Their support went to the Sukuti branch. Today, the newer,
more impressive mosques and schools are Sukuti, and the
smaller, poorer ones are Qadriyah. Those Muslim Malawians
who have contact with Muslims in other countries (or who have
been educated outside the country) are generally Sukuti. The
Qadriyah often resent the Sukuti's superior access to
resources and education, a sentiment that extends to
organizations like the Muslim Association of Malawi (MAM),
which is seen as a "Sukuti organization." The very small
Shiite presence in Malawi is primarily composed of
foreigners.

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MALAWI FIVE: THE SPARK OF ANTI-U.S. SENTIMENTS
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The Political Context
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8. (S) The June 2003 expulsion of five non-Malawian (two
Sudanese, two Turkish, and one Saudi) Muslims suspected of
ties to Al-Qaida (AKA the "Malawi Five"),which the press
characterized and most Malawians believe to have been a
USG-initiative, came at time when politicians were using
religion as a political issue in the run-up to the 2004
presidential and parliamentary elections. Ten years of
Muslim former President Muluzi's administration and the
recently-mandated public observance of Muslim holidays gave
opposition political groups planks to build campaign
platforms against the "Islamization of Malawi." While
Muluzi's party and administration were not exclusively
composed of Muslims, the message resonated well with
opposition party Christian Malawians who saw Asian Muslims
gaining economic influence and development projects going to
the ruling party's strongholds. Muluzi's party, the United
Democratic Front (UDF),which was originally financed by
Asian Muslims, won the 2004 presidential elections with a
Christian presidential candidate and a Muslim vice
presidential candidate.

The Cultural Context: Asian vs. Black Muslims
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9. (S) Malawi's Muslim community is by no means monolithic.
The largest divide, between Asians and Black Malawians, is
based on economic and socio-cultural differences, not
religious beliefs. The two communities do not worship at the
same mosques or socialize at the same Islamic centers.
Largely speaking, the two communities have little personal
interaction.


10. (S) The relationship between these two groups, which is
important to understanding their distinct reactions to the
"Malawi Five," is that of giver and receiver. By and large,
within Muslim society, the Asians are the givers, and the
Black Malawians are the receivers. While there is little
social interactions between the groups, their belief in Islam
and observance of the "zakat" tradition (the Islamic custom
of giving to those less fortunate) enables a nexus of
positive interaction between the two groups and, to a certain
extent, creates a bond of loyalty.


11. (S) Several of the individuals in the Malawi Five group
served as the functional link between these two communities.
The Asians donated their zakat money to the organizations
managed by the Malawi Five, and the Black Malawians benefited
from the development projects and educational scholarships
funded by the Malawi Five's organizations. Both communities
viewed the Malawi Five as "local heroes," who gave
continually of their time and resources and who served the
Islamic community well. More specifically, the Asians saw
them as good members of the community and as well-intentioned
friends; the Black Malawians saw them as development workers
who affected real change in Black Muslims' lives.

Post "Abduction": Asian, Black Malawian Reactions Differ
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12. (S) In many respects, the June 2003 expulsion of the
Malawi Five united the Asian and Black Muslim communities by
removing one of the principal link between them and giving
them a common grievance against the U.S. The expulsions
evoked anger and fear in both groups, and no Malawian Muslims
recognized (or even entertained the thought) that the Malawi
Five could have been linked to extremist Islamic
organizations. Asian Muslims were angry because they felt
their friends had been wronged and scared because they
thought if these prominent members of their community were
spied on, then any of them could also be subject to
international scrutiny. Black Malawians, on the other hand,
were angry because the development projects they benefited
from ceased and were scared because they thought if
influential members of the community could be expelled, then
any of them could also be subject to mistreatment, in a
manner similar to what routinely occurred only ten years ago
during President-for-Life Banda's regime.
Post-Malawi Five Engagement
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13. (S) Because of the differing reasons behind their common
reactions, post-Malawi Five engagement has required different
strategies with the Asian and Black Muslim communities.
Asian Muslims want venues to voice their opinions about the
USG's foreign policy in the Middle East and still seek
justice for their Malawi Five friends who they perceived to
have been unjustly and illegally "abducted" from a country
where they were doing good work. Their concerns are not
completely unfounded, because the Malawi Five were expelled
extralegally by order of former President Muluzi and in
defiance of a court order barring deportation. For this
reason, there is still a strong and continuing cold animosity
toward the U.S. among Asian Muslims.


14. (S) Black Malawians, on the other hand, have been more
interested to engage with the USG on Islamic issues, such as
the life of Muslims in the U.S. and developing US-Malawi ties
between Muslim organizations. Generally speaking, Black
Muslims are looking for replacement of the benefits they lost
when the Malawi Five were expelled from the country. Focused
programming and continued dialogue should go a long way to
fostering good relations between Malawi's Black Muslims and
the U.S.


15. (S) NOTE: In the wake of the Malawi Five expulsions, post
formulated and cleared carefully chosen language and press
guidance which expressed support for the GOM's action, and
also explained some of the reasons for the expulsions. The
statement was especially for use with the Asian Muslim
community. However, after local consultations and careful
consideration, we determined it would actually be best not to
use the statement, as vilifying the individuals or their
organizations would not help the USG's cause. The Malawi
Five were so highly regarded and their organizations so
widely respected that the statement would have likely further
damaged the USG's credibility and been misconstrued as a
confirmation of the USG's involvement in the expulsions. END
NOTE.

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MUSLIM PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S.: USG VS. AMERICANS
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16. (S) Most Muslim Malawians, whether Asian or Black, view
individual American citizens positively and often report good
one-on-one interactions with Americans. Their criticism,
especially that of Asian Muslims, is generally focused on the
USG and its foreign policy in the Middle East. As most
Malawians do not think their own government acts in their
best interests, they often make the assumption that the USG's
actions and policies are not rooted in American citizens'
opinions or political beliefs.

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"MUSLIM DONORS" IN MALAWI
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17. (S) The only Muslim nation diplomatic mission resident in
Malawi is Libya, and continual delays have caused most
Malawians to cast a skeptical eye on its promised development
assistance. Egypt also has a small diplomatic mission to
Malawi. (Most Muslim nations have non-resident coverage from
Lusaka, Nairobi, or Pretoria.) However, there are several
Muslim aid organizations in Malawi, most of which build
mosques and health clinics in Black Muslim communities and
fund madrasses and scholarships for Black Muslim children.
The larger internationally-funded organizations, like African
Muslim Agency (AMA) and Youth Muslim Organization (YMO),also
provide scholarships for international study to the brighter
students in their madrasses. In fact, some of the leaders in
the Muslim Associations of Malawi (MAM),a predominantly
Black Muslim umbrella organization, studied abroad in various
Middle Eastern countries through such programs. Several MFA
officials also attended diplomatic tradecraft courses at the
Pakistani equivalent of the Foreign Service Institute (FSI).


18. (S) Local and international Muslim organizations with
development and education projects in Malawi do not publicize
their programs or coordinate with other NGOs and donors.
They are normally active only in predominantly Muslim areas.
Often the site of the only mosque in an area, the madrasa
compounds are generally open to the surrounding communities
for use. Emboffs have visited many sites around Malawi and
were warmly received and given free access to all the
facilities. In addition, most of the organizations welcomed
more involvement with the USG, through both funding and
programming.


19. (SBU) The US Mission has in recent years done very little
programming through and in support of local Muslim
organizations, in part because Muslim organizations have not
traditionally responded to proposal requests (even at post's
prodding).

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COMMENT
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20. (S) Malawian Muslims' concerns are not completely
unfounded, and it should be noted that the USG and GOM's
maladroit handling of the Malawi Five incident created many
of them. However, fostering a more positive attitude toward
the U.S. among Malawian Muslims is by no means an impossible
task, especially among Black Muslims. And one of the most
effective ways to do that is through focused funding and
programming to Muslim organizations working in Muslim
communities. Since many local Muslim aid organizations are
managed by Asian Muslims and benefit Black Muslims, using
these local organizations (both Qadriyah and Sukuti) would be
an effective vehicle to reach both Muslim communities. Given
previous reluctance to respond to post's proposal requests
(whether because of political aversion, cultural differences,
or capacity deficiencies),it will require creative thinking
and intentional planning on post's part to integrate Malawi's
previously ignored Muslim population into regular Mission
programs.


21. (U) COMMENT CONTINUED. To facilitate USG involvement in
and assistance to local Muslim organizations working in
Muslim communities, post suggests the creation of a Muslim
outreach fund that enables flexible small-scale funding,
similar to the Ambassador's Special Self-Help Program. Such
a fund would give post an easy entree to local Muslim
communities and would foster goodwill through tangible
support. END COMMENT.
RASPOLIC