Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04LAGOS2134
2004-10-20 16:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Lagos
Cable title:  

WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE DELTA - A LAGOS

Tags:  PREL PGOV EPET PINR NI 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LAGOS 002134 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF, INR, DS, AND EB
STATE PASS DOE FOR DAS JBRODMAN AND CGAY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2009
TAGS: PREL PGOV EPET PINR NI
SUBJECT: WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE DELTA - A LAGOS
PERSPECTIVE

REF: ABUJA 1675

Classified By: Consul General Brian L. Browne per 1.4 b and d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LAGOS 002134

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF, INR, DS, AND EB
STATE PASS DOE FOR DAS JBRODMAN AND CGAY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2009
TAGS: PREL PGOV EPET PINR NI
SUBJECT: WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE DELTA - A LAGOS
PERSPECTIVE

REF: ABUJA 1675

Classified By: Consul General Brian L. Browne per 1.4 b and d


1. (C) Summary: Supplementing the views expressed reftel,
this message provides Lagos' perspective of the Delta crisis.
This latest gush of violence is a moment of acceleration in a
negative spiral that began years ago. The eruption is a
byproduct of not only the 2003 elections but also of economic
stagnation, rivalries among local political actors, the
deracination of traditional social structures, criminality,
and an inchoate Ijaw nationalism that seeks to express itself
in strident terms due to the coarse environment the Delta has
become. Because the Delta crisis is such a complex ensemble
of factors, a quick fix is illusory. Without sustained
government attention to the political and economic
underpinnings of this crisis and flexibility from Delta
militants, we may see only a very brief respite before the
temperature heats once more. Because the crisis is in
Nigeria's oil patch, it is the country's most significant
internal national security threat. End Summary.

--------------
Ijaw Nationalism- An Evolving Dynamic
--------------


2. (C) Ijaws claim to be Nigeria's fourth-largest ethnic
group. They comprise a near majority in the oil-producing
Delta region. Rival Ijaw militant leaders Al Haji Dokubo
Asari(Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force - NDPVF) and Ateke
Tom (Niger Delta Vigilante Group -NDVG) have been behind much
of the violence that has occurred in Rivers State over the
past several months. While Tom is generally dismissed as a
political thug empowered by Rivers State Governor Odili in
the 2003 elections, Asari's leadership pedigree is more
nuanced and his ultimate ambitions more veiled than his
rivals. Like Tom, Asari was employed to do local dirty work
by the PDP (Obasanjo's party) during the 2003 election
season. He performed the job with relish. Thus, that the
2003 election was plush with fraud was not the reason that
Asari broke allegiance with the local power structure. It
was the failure of Asari, Governor Odili, and Ateke Tom to

reach a mutually satisfactory division of the spoils of
victory that ended their relationship and put Asari on his
present course.


3. (C) Odili had helped Asari obtain the presidency of the
Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC) in 2001. However, Asari apparently
was more ambitious than Odili would willingly accommodate.
Asari reportedly got involved with labor contracts at the
port in Port Harcourt. He hired out his men as protection
squads to Odili rivals within the PDP. He also put his hand
in chieftaincy squabbles, thus challenging what Odili felt
was his gubernatorial prerogative. Moreover, Odili reduced
his subvention to Asari and his minions once the 2003
elections were over.


4. (C) Only after the break with Odili did Asari assume the
mantle of militant Ijaw nationalist leader as the essence of
his persona. We believe the assumption of this role was more
tactical than principled. Yet, it has generated a certain
dynamic that controls Asari perhaps as much as he controls
it.


5. (C) Civil society sources in Rivers State say Asari has
managed to dissociate himself in the public's eye from his
foul play during the 2003 elections. Many perceive Asari as
a legitimate rebel leader with an attractive political
platform -- sovereign national conference and greater
resource control. Jaye Gaskia, president of the
Environmental Rights Association, told us Asari represents a
blend of Ijaw nationalism, personal ambition, and economic
opportunism. One's final opinion of Asari rests on which
element you grant the greatest weight, Gaskia maintained.


6. (C) Patterson Ogon (Director of the Ijaw Council for
Human Rights) and Chief Edwin Clarke (traditional Ijaw ruler
in Warri, Delta State) told us separately that Asari enjoys
the moral support of many Ijaw elders. They remarked that
his demands are not distinct from claims the elders have been
putting forth for years. However both leaders reserved their
prerogatives as elders to "negotiate" for the Ijaw people.

7. (C) Comment: Whatever the true motives behind Asari's
actions and rhetoric, he is now riding the undisciplined
tiger of Ijaw nationalism, which makes him both a leader and
a captive. He must move carefully. If he tarries too long in
negotiations in Abuja, people will begin to see him as a
sell-out or ineffectual. However, if he does not show
flexibility, further confrontation with the GON military is
likely. The adulation has probably caused him to start
believing much of his own propaganda. He will try to use
this climb in his popularity to secure a position as the
single most important Ijaw leader. However, rival Ijaw
leaders -- militant and mainstream -- are not likely to cede
easily to him. End Comment.

--------------
Limited Ability to Disrupt Oil Production
--------------


8. (C) As most recently demonstrated by Asari, militia
groups in the Delta have the capacity to disrupt normal
business operations in the energy sector. Even without the
direct threats of kidnappings, and sabotage, militants can
quickly manufacture such an environment of instability that
certain areas become "no-go" zones for companies, hindering
necessary repairs and maintenance work, which might
precipitate eventual production losses. More to the point
regarding the threat posed to Nigeria's national security,
there are some tracts within the Delta that are ungovernable
from Abuja because of the weak, short arms of the central
government and its security apparatus.


9. (C) While any diminution in production could hurt Nigeria
and rattle international markets, the extent of the potential
disruption is limited by a range of factors, including
facility distance from shore, security measures in place at
oil facilities, and the heretofore unproven capability of the
militias to conduct operations over a large distance. The
independent research institution Menas of the United Kingdom
assessed in its September 30 report that at most, crude
supplies of 150,000 - 200,000 bpd of supplies are at risk
from Asari out of the 2.4 million bpd produced by Nigeria.


10. (C) Extension of militia activity into Delta State,
Bayelsa State, and other areas of Rivers State where Ijaws
are a significant portion of the population could cast a
shadow over more of Nigeria's oil production. However, the
quick expansion of this threat is unlikely for several
reasons. Primarily, it would imply a copycat or that Asari's
influence has spread to these areas. For now, we do not
sense that other competing local militia leaders are willing
to subordinate their ambition to Asari's just yet.

--------------
GON Willingness To Talk - Good Political
Strategy If Nothing Else
--------------


11. (C) In the meantime, senior-level GON officials have met
with NDPVF leader Asari in recent weeks. A contact with ties
to the GON told us Obasanjo sees the recent flare-up as
essentially a localized political spat that just happened to
take place in the oil patch. Obasanjo's aim is to talk Asari
down to size and to hopefully revive the more moderate, older
Ijaw leadership with whom he feels more comfortable and able
to control.


12. (C) The level of distrust between the GON and Asari is
palpable. Ijaw community leader Patterson Ogon told us Asari
felt President Obasanjo would stop short of addressing the
fundamental Ijaw demands. Patterson maintained that Asari's
signature of the September 29 cease-fire document was thus
"tactical," designed to test how far Obasanjo would go.

--------------
Lots Of Aggrieved, But Few Carry The
Punch Of Those In The Oil Patch
--------------


13. (C) While Asari has not gotten what he wants from Abuja.
Just by meeting with Obasanjo, he has gotten more than most.
Asari's pilgrimage to Abuja and triumphal return home has
sparked a lot of criticism, particularly by mainstream
political opponents of the Obasanjo regime. They have cried
that the reward received for trying to work nonviolently
within the system has been Obasanjo's silence. Conversely,
by brandishing weapons, Asari has gotten Abuja's undivided
attention.


14. (C) The possibility of other groups taking a page from
Asari's playbook cannot be discounted. Noting the success of
Asari's tactics in gaining the president's attention, some
groups murmur they should take up arms as well. However,
other groups would find it difficult to approximate Asari's
impact. First, most do not operate in the oil-rich Delta and
therefore lack the same strategic leverage. Second, would-be
guerrilla fighters from outside the delta region do not enjoy
the same topographical advantages afforded by the Delta's
murky swamps and creeks. Militia groups from non-delta areas
would likely find it more difficult to combat government
forces. Last, many of the grumbling organizations do not
have the present capacity or funding to mount any significant
tactical military operations.

--------------
Calls for National Conference Ever Present -
But Will it Happen Or Matter?
--------------


15. (C) Agitation for a sovereign national conference is
increasing in Nigeria. At the forefront of this effort are
regionally or ethnically-based groups such as the Yoruba
Afenifere, the Ohaneze Ndigbo (Igbo),Southern Minorities
Movement, and Middle Belt Progressive Movement. Members of
these groups have formed an umbrella organization, the Ethnic
Nationalist Forum, for the primary purpose of garnering
support for a national conference. President Obasanjo has
consistently resisted a national conference, concerned it
would become a venue for secessionist demands as well as to
wrest power away from him. Against this backdrop came the
successful August 2004 stay-at-home strike organized by the
Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of
Biafra (MASSOB) in the Southeast. Given the tragedy of the
attempted Biafra secession, this strike caused the government
to take notice.


16. (C) In an attempt to dampen agitation for a conference,
presidential political advisor Jerry Gana publicly raised in
early October the possibility of a "national dialogue." This
trial balloon was also a chunk of bait. The GON is
attempting to see how many pro-national conference supporters
it can co-opt. Even if the government earnestly supported a
conference, the planning would take months. While there
would be militant agitation at such a conference, the
attendees would likely be carefully vetted to ensure the vast
majority opposed any form of secession. Even among the
southern groups who endorse a conference and oppose Obasanjo,
support for secession is not strong. However, among these
groups there are varying degrees of support for reducing
presidential power within the national government, devolving
power from federal to state institutions, reassessing
resource allocation between the different tiers of government
and reviewing the federal and presidential system of
governance in favor of a parliamentary system.

--------------
Comment
--------------


17. (C) The outbreak of violence in the Delta region is
rooted in economic stagnation, fighting over the spoils of a
flawed electoral process, rising criminality, Ijaw
nationalism, and the breakdown of traditional structures.
Because this agitation comes from within Nigeria's oil patch,
it represents a significant, highly visible challenge for the
government. This problem will not go away soon. GON
willingness to talk appears to have been a good tactical move
in the short run. It might also have been the only true
avenue open. The attempt at dialogue has ushered in a moment
of relative quiet.


18. (C) However unless substantive progress is made, raised
expectations will metastasize into renewed frustration and
possibly violence. In the end, Obasanjo will temporize as
much as possible and concede little. The militants will want
more, fast. For talks to work, both sides will have to
exercise a degree of statesmanship to which each is
unaccustomed. Given the level of distrust and gamesmanship,
we suspect the new rounds of talks to yield little progress.


19. (C) Groups in other regions of Southern Nigeria will be
closely watching how these talks unfold. However, we do not
predict that these other groups will imitate Asari's
confrontational tactics. Agitation for a national conference
will likely be more of a political force in most of the south
than will be armed aggression. While political frictions
exist throughout the southern tier of the country, most
contacts do not see the continued viability of the Nigerian
state as under imminent threat.


20. (U) This message has been cleared by Embassy Abuja.
BROWNE