NIGER DELTA: CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT IN WARRI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LAGOS 001210

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PARIS AND LONDON PASS AFRICA WATCHERS
DIA/J2 PASS GHAYES
ENERGY PASS CGUY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2014
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR EPET KDEM PHUM EINV ASEC CASC NI
SUBJECT: NIGER DELTA: CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT IN WARRI

REF: A. LAGOS 1204

B. 2003 LAGOS 2535

Classified By: Joseph Gregoire for reasons 1.4 (b),(d),and (e).


1. (C) Introduction and summary. This is the second in a
series of four cables addressing the security, political, and
humanitarian situations in the Niger Delta, based on a field
visit by Poloff and Econoff to Warri June 7 and 8. This cable
addresses the recent cease-fire agreement and the Ijaw and
Itsekiri ethnic groups' political demands. Now that they
have brokered a cease-fire, the youth leaders are moving
toward the goal of healing and eventually transformation of
the conflict to final resolution. Continued USG involvement
in the area, more robust funding of USG-funded
non-governmental organizations (NGO) involved in the peace
talks, and increased humanitarian assistance might go a long
way toward enabling a more stable environment for peaceful
resolution of the conflict. End introduction and summary.

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CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT
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2. (U) In early May 2004 Ijaw and Itsekiri "youths" formed
the Warri Itsekiri/Ijaw Grassroots Peace Front (WIIGPF) and
declared a cease-fire on June 1 with respect to fighting that
broke out in March 2003. The agreement begins with a quote
by Abraham Lincoln: "My greatest concern is not whether you
have failed, but whether you are content with failure." The
quote reflects the tone of the document and possibly the mood
of the Ijaw and Itsekiri youths who wrote it. They now seem
to have grown tired of the conflict and its effect on their
society. The youth leaders claim to recognize that through
their actions they have "depleted human and natural
resources, relentlessly scared away investments, recklessly
rendered our people homeless, and have ushered in a period of
unrest characterized by a rise in crime..."


3. (U) In their June 1 agreement, the Ijaw and Itsekiri
youth leaders referred to the April 23 attack on a Chevron
Nigeria Limited (CNL) contracting group that resulted in the
death of five people including two AMCITS (ref A),and called
on their communities to assist Joint Task Force (JTF)
Operation Restore Hope in apprehending the perpetrators. The
youths asserted that the "people at the grassroots" are the
only ones who can resolve the political differences, and
stated they have created a "mechanism" to address these
"differences and restore enduring peace." They also
explicitly warned "any persons or groups engaged in unlawful
activities that times have changed and that the rules are
clear." Regardless of ethnicity, they affirmed, "the law
will take its due course." They concluded the document by
giving credit to Delta State Governor James Ibori and JTF
Commander BG Elias Zamani for facilitating the agreement, and
renewed WIIGF's resolve to enforce it.

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BEHIND THE SCENES: YOUTHS AND ELDERS
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4. (C) The term "youths" in the Niger Delta and African
context can be misleading. The youths are middle-aged men
who are leaders of their communities. They are young only in
comparison to the elders, the traditional rulers and leaders
who are a generation or two older. This socio-cultural
distinction has influenced handling of the conflict.
Traditionally, the Ijaw and Itsekiri elders acted as brokers
for their tribes. As a group, the elders have tended to
focus on perceived wrongs dating to the beginning of the
colonial era in 1890 and have exercised limited control over
the militant youths. As the recent conflict raged, the youth
leaders involved in the ethnic fighting, illegal oil
bunkering, and attacks on oil installations began to
dissociate themselves from the elders. The youth leaders now
hold sway over their own constituents and appear to be
bringing the elders into the fold, out of cultural respect
and political necessity. Various sources have told us that
the elders have been effectively cut out of decision making,
however, which facilitated reaching the cease-fire agreement.



5. (C) Sam Ken (protect),a militant Ijaw youth leader and
key architect of the cease-fire agreement, told Conoffs that
the elders are no longer a factor in negotiations. He
asserted that the JTF and Delta State Government recognize
this fact and now work directly with the youths. Zamani
(protect) confirmed Ken's assertions that the JTF now deals
only with the youth leaders. He said bypassing the elders
facilitated the cease-fire, but in recognition of their
cultural status he will "pay attention" to them and bring
them along if need be. One Ijaw chief has voiced displeasure
with the agreement, but Zamani is confident that he can bring
him around whereas Ken said he has no choice but to abide by
the agreement. Daniel Reyenieju, a militant Itsekiri youth
leader and co-author of the agreement, told Conoffs that the
Itsekiri elders were also out of the loop.

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CEASE-FIRE IMPLEMENTATION
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6. (C) As stated in the cease-fire agreement, the rules have
changed and anyone not abiding by the agreement will be
"brought to book." Some criminal militant youth leaders who
failed to abide by the agreement were killed recently (ref
A). The Ijaw and Itsekiri youth leaders who have endorsed the
agreement have gotten public opinion behind the cease-fire.
Through the auspices of the U.S.-based International
Foundation for Education and Self-Help (IFESH),Ijaw and
Itsekiri leaders have gone into the creeks with IFESH
officials to publicize the agreement and bring their
constituents along in the political process. Zamani told us
their initiative has been well received.


7. (U) Numerous Ijaw and Itsekiri youth told Conoffs that
the NGOs, the Delta State Government, and the JTF peace
initiatives have been well received and continue to have a
positive impact on moves to resolve the conflict. Two NGO
peace initiatives funded by the USG and focused on conflict
resolution provide a forum for Ijaw and Itsekiri youths and
elders to discuss their views. IFESH's peace dialogue has
evoked the most favorable response from participants. IFESH
has also implemented USG- and ChevronTexaco-funded
humanitarian aid and sustainable development projects in the
region. Academic Associates Peace Works (AAPW) also receives
funding from USAID and DRL (ref B). AAPW's Warri Peace Forum
was the first of its kind in the region and is credited by
many people for having created an atmosphere of open
dialogue. The impact of these USG-funded NGO and GON peace
initiatives is clear. Of the six youth leaders who signed
the June 1 cease-fire agreement, one leader participated in
all four peace initiatives, two leaders in three of them, and
three in two of the initiatives.

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POLITICAL DEMANDS
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8. (C) Although a cease-fire has been agreed, addressing the
political and economic grievances (septel) of the Ijaw and
Itsekiri that fuel conflict is a bigger hurdle. The core
Ijaw grievance is the perceived political disenfranchisement
in the Warri Local Government Areas (LGAs) of Warri South,
Warri Southwest, and Warri North. Ken said the Ijaw are
mainly concerned with Warri Southwest and North. (Warri
South is predominantly Itsekiri and partly inhabited by many
Itsekiri villagers who fled their homes along the Benin River
as a result of recent conflict.) Ken said the Ijaw could
accept an agreement with the Delta State Government to create
additional wards within the LGAs. He said the Ijaw could
accept having fewer wards in Warri North, but insisted that
Warri Southwest be re-organized so that each ethnic group had
ten wards where the Ijaw perceive themselves to be more
populous. Ken insisted that under this arrangement, the
chairmanships of Warri North and Warri Southwest would rotate
between the Ijaw and Itsekiri at each election cycle. When
asked by Conoffs if such a practice would be democratic, Ken
said there were no "free and fair" elections in Nigeria,
making the point moot. Rotation would be agreed upon at the
primaries since both ethnic groups are predominantly
represented by the ruling People's Democratic Party. If the
Ijaw could do what they want, Ken said they would carve an
additional LGA out of each of the two contested LGAs
dominated by the Ijaw. But the gerrymandered creation of new
LGAs can be done only by the federal government, whereas
wards can be created by state governments.


9. (C/NF) Besides creating new wards and gerrymandering
LGAs, Ken wants development committees instituted in each
LGA. Ken proposes that such committees receive forty percent
of the LGA share of the federation account, which is largely
derived from oil revenues. The committees would use the
revenue to develop the Warri LGAs, which, Ken said, have been
grossly neglected by the Delta State Government and the GON.
When asked how he might persuade the GON to agree to these
demands, Ken replied that if the GON did not comply, he could
create a situation such that the GON would be required to
declare a state of emergency, as it did recently in Plateau
State.


10. (C) Reyenieju, an Itsekiri militant youth leader and
co-author of the cease-fire agreement, was more pragmatic in
stating Itsekiri demands to Conoffs. He said there is a
continued need to restore and reinforce the rule of law and
to reaffirm the GON's responsibility to maintain security in
the region. Aware of competing Ijaw political demands,
Reyenieju did not express support for the creation of LGAs or
wards. Instead, he called for elections reflecting the
combined will of the people, and said he would accept the
results, pointing out that the Ijaw had boycotted the last
federal election and had not registered to vote. He said
nothing about development committees or the federation
account, but underscored the need for the Itsekiri internally
displaced persons to return to their homes and for donors to
address the economic plight of the region (septel).


11. (C/NF) COMMENT. The USG-funded peace iniatives and the
$50,000 in humanitarian aid provided shortly after the
beginning of the conflict last year have created much
goodwill toward the USG among the youth leaders and area
residents. However, both the Ijaw and Itsekiri have an
exaggerated sense of USG influence on the GON, as was evident
from their plea to Conoffs that the USG press the GON into
action. Now, the cease-fire agreement appears to be in
effect and to be receiving broad support. The youth leaders,
especially the Ijaw, have shown they have the political will
and means to ensure others keep in tow (ref A). Both the
Ijaw and Itsekiri leaders seem to be looking at the conflict
comprehensively, and are implementing principles of conflict
resolution to cope with it. Now that they have brokered a
cease-fire, the youth leaders, particularly with the aid of
IFESH, are moving toward the goal of healing and eventually
toward transformation of the conflict to its final
resolution. Continued USG involvement in the area, more
robust funding of IFESH and AAPW, and increased humanitarian
assistance (septel) might go a long way toward enabling a
more stable environment for peaceful resolution of the
conflict. END COMMENT.
HINSON-JONES