NIGER DELTA: GUNS AND THUGS RULE THE LAND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 LAGOS 001204

SIPDIS

NOFORN

PARIS AND LONDON PASS AFRICA WATCHERS
DIA/J2 PASS GHAYES
ENERGY PASS CGUY

E.O. 12958: DECL: X1
TAGS: PGOV PINS EPET KDEM PHUM EINV ASEC CASC PTER XY NI
SUBJECT: NIGER DELTA: GUNS AND THUGS RULE THE LAND

REF: A. LAGOS 902

B. ABUJA NI 760

C. ABUJA NI 913

D. ABUJA NI 1003

E. LAGOS 1163

F. 2003 LAGOS 2434

G. ABUJA NI 906

H. ABUJA NI 420

Classified By: Robyn Hinson-Jones for reasons 1.4 (b),(d),and (e)


1. (C) SUMMARY: This is the first in a series of four cables
addressing the security, political, and humanitarian
situation in the Niger Delta based on a field visit by POLOFF
and ECONOFF to Warri June 7 and 8. This cable addresses the
overall security situation, Joint Task Force (JTF) Operation
Restore Hope's response to the April 23 killings of two
AMCITS, the proliferation of small arms, and the
consolidation of power and purpose by the militant youths in
the area. END SUMMARY.

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GETTING THE BALL ROLLING
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2. (C) The killings of two AMCIT oil services contract
workers along the Benin River (refs A,B,C) have precipitated
a course of events in the Niger Delta. JTF Commander BG Elias
Zamani (strictly protect) told Consulate Officers that after
the killings the JTF arrested over 60 militant youths from
both ethnic groups in a dragnet to obtain intelligence (ref
A) and warned them that whichever village was responsible for
the attack would "pay." Zamani told us he expressed his
"disappointment" with the youth leaders for their poor
leadership and for creating an atmosphere of chaos and
violence. He advised them to cooperate with the JTF and
provide information on the killings. Having been held in
custody together, the youths were able to discuss the attack,
as well as other issues. Ironically, this forced
togetherness in the wake of a JTF investigation helped create
an atmosphere that laid the foundation for a cease-fire
agreement (septel).

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IJAW YOUTHS, CONSOLIDATING POWER
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3. (S/NF) Sam Ken (strictly protect),a senior militant Ijaw
youth leader and one of the key architects of the cease-fire,
told Consulate Officers that he has been cooperating with
Zamani and the JTF. He explained that the April 23 attack
was a planned kidnapping gone awry and carried out by a
criminal Ijaw militant youth group, which he said are
self-styled "commandos." He explained that the commandos are
broken into groups of operation throughout the riverine area,
largely along Ijaw clan lines. Commando groups in general are
also responsible for bank robberies in Warri and other
violent crimes. Commandos located near the Benin River, Ken
claims, were responsible for the AMCIT killings and the
November 2003 kidnappings for ransom of expatriate employees
from the Scottish oil services firm Bredero Shaw (ref F).



4. (S/NF) Motivated by a fear of JTF reprisals for the AMCIT
killings and a desire to find a peaceful and political
solution to the crisis, Ken told CONOFFS that the Ijaw youth
leadership is cleaning house. The youth leadership has
targeted the commando groups, specifically its overall leader
John Ikpoko. Ken bluntly stated that the Ijaw youth
leadership had killed 17 commando leaders and members who had
refused to abide by the cease-fire or curb their criminal
operations and delivered them to the JTF headquarters.
Ikpoko escaped the assassination teams and is in hiding.
(Note: "Criminal operations" does not likely refer to
facilitating illegal oil bunkering, which Ken was reluctant
to discuss in detail. End note.) On June 5, the JTF held a
press conference and broadcast pictures of the slain commando
leaders on national television, claiming that the "sea
pirates" were killed by JTF forces. Zamani, in his
conversation with Consulate Officers, claimed that JTF forces
killed the 17 men. (Note: In our conversation with Zamani he
was warm and relatively open, willing to discuss even
sensitive issues in further detail. However, when asked
about the deaths of the 17 "commandos", his demeanor changed
and he became very closed-lipped. His change in behavior may
lend credence to Ken's version of events. End note.)

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THE ORIGINS OF GUNS
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5. (S/NF) Illegal oil bunkering runs rampant in the region.
Mission reporting has linked shady oil deals to First Lady
Stella Obasanjo (Ref G). Ijaw and Itsekiri youths and elders
accuse unnamed high-ranking politicians in Abuja, while
unconfirmed reports claim that Lebanese nationals possibly
funding the terrorist groups Hamas and Hizbollah, the Russian
Mafia, and drug cartels are involved (Refs B and H).
Militant youths have been used to protect and facilitate the
bunkering of crude oil and, to do so, have acquired small
arms, namely AK-47s. Ken told Consulate Officers that most
of the youth's weaponry and ammunition comes from the
Nigerian Army, who sells them in large quantities packaged in
crates. Other arms originate from conflict areas in West
Africa and some are locally made in Warri. However, Ken also
implicated Lebanon and North Korea as sources of arms.
(Comment: In his discussions, Ken was very frank about the
African origins of arms, including the Nigerian Army. He
showed signs of nervousness when implicating the Lebanese and
was very nervous, agitated, and possibly deceitful when
implicating the North Koreans. When pressed to clarify
further, Ken initially referred to the North Koreans as
"small white people," then "Asians," then "Koreans," then
"North Koreans." End Comment.)

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JTF Operations
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6. (S/NF) Although the JTF's ability to exercise its power
in the riverine areas around Warri is limited, its actions
have improved security along the Benin River. Zamani
confirmed he has set up a forward deployment base at the
mouth of the Benin River near the village of Ogheye Dunigun
(ref A). He has also set up a deployment area in another
village further down the Benin River and is slowly ratcheting
up his presence there. JTF forces already secure Chevron
Nigeria Limited (CNL) flow stations and facilities along the
river, but they are trying to provide longer-term security in
the area to ensure the safety of CNL operations and enable
over 10,000 Itsekiri internally displaced persons (IDPs) to
return (septel). A handful of Itsekiri youth returned to
their villages in April, hoping that others will follow, but
Zamani has told the Itsekiri to wait until he has finalized
his deployments before they begin returning home in large
numbers.


7. (S/NF) Zamani has also declared war on the commando
groups. Ken told Consulate Officers that with Ijaw youth
leadership cooperation, Zamani raided Ogbe-Ijoh (located
across the Warri River from Warri) and surrounding Ijaw
villages. These villages served as one of the major
operating areas from which criminal raids upon the city of
Warri and surrounding Itsekiri villages originated. Several
sources say that they are now abandoned and the people are
homeless, likely doubling the previous known figure of Ijaw
IDPs to 2,000.


8. (S/NF) As if ethnic conflict in Warri was not enough to
occupy the JTF, Zamani told Consulate Officers he has
recently deployed some of his troops to areas around Port
Harcourt, where there has been widespread gangland warfare
within the past two months (refs D and E). Zamani said that
part of his mandate was to protect oil installations
throughout the larger Niger Delta area and that his forces
were now protecting facilities there. He declined to state
how many have been sent. Recent press reports claim that
military forces had clashed with the gangs, leaving 50 dead
near Buguma. Zamani said he was unaware of such reports,
emphasizing his mandate to protect oil facilities only and
pointed out that two brigades outside of the JTF were
stationed in Port Harcourt.
HINSON-JONES