SEDCDEF SCENESETTER FOR KUWAIT 22-24 FEB 04

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000572

SIPDIS

TAGS: OVIP KU
SUBJECT: SEDCDEF SCENESETTER FOR KUWAIT 22-24 FEB 04

CLASSIFIED BY JOHN MULHOLLAND FOR REASONS 1.5 A,B.
DECLASSIFY ON 19 FEB 14


1. (U) WELCOME TO KUWAIT. THE KUWAITIS ARE DELIGHTED TO HAVE
YOU BACK ON THEIR TURF, AND THEY ARE AGAIN EXTENDING FULL
COURTESSIES TO YOU AND GENERAL ABIZAID AT BAYAN PALACE. THIS
SCENESETTER PROVIDES THE CURRENT STATE OF ON-GOING HN ISSUES
IN ORDER TO PREPARE YOU FOR MEETINGS WITH KUWAIT OFFICIALS.
WE HAVE TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED A MEETING WITH THE PRIME
MINISTER (PM) ON THE EVENING OF 22 FEB 04.


2. (C) PRIME MINISTER: SHEIKH SABAH AL-AHMED AL-JABER
AL-SABAH (HIS HIGHNESS). UNPRECEDENTED APPOINTMENT AS PM JUL
03 (CROWN PRINCE HISTORICALLY HELD THE TITLE OF PM). YOU
LAST MET THE PM IN WASHINGTON D.C. IN SEP 03. IN A MEETING
ON 27 JAN 04 (SEE PARA 4 BELOW),THE PM STATED KUWAIT WOULD
CONSIDER THE U.S. REQUEST TO CONTINUE THE FUEL SUPPLY FOR
U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS. ACCORDING TO A CLOSE ADVISOR, HIS
DOMESTIC AGENDA IS TO OVERCOME TRIBALIST (CONSERVATIVE)
ELEMENTS IN KUWAIT TO ACCOMPLISH THE FOLLOWING: OPEN THE OIL
SECTOR TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT (PRESSING NEED EXISTS FOR
FOREIGN UP-TO-DATE TECHNOLOGY); PRIVATIZATION (REDUCING THE
WELFARE STATE); EDUCATION (ESTABLISH PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES);
AND WOMEN,S RIGHTS ISSUES (INCLUDING VOTING RIGHTS).


3. (U) CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF U.S. / KUWAIT RELATIONSHIP.

3A. (U) THE GOK CONTINUES TO PROVIDE A STRATEGICALLY-VITAL
SECURE OPERATIONAL REAR AREA ISO OIF AND USCENTCOM
INITIATIVES.

3B. (C) AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL (PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF
DEFENSE) KUWAIT REMAINS STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF U.S.
OBJECTIVES. SENIOR KUWAIT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE
ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT OPPORTUNITIES TO SUPPORT OUR EFFORTS. THE
PRIME MINISTER KNOWS THAT THE SUCCESS OF OUR EFFORTS IN IRAQ
IS CRITICAL TO THE WELL BEING OF KUWAIT. AT THE SAME TIME,
THE GOVERNMENT MUST ANSWER TO AN ACTIVE PARLIAMENT THAT CAN
AND DOES CALL MINISTERS TO ACCOUNT FOR THEIR ACTIONS AND A
CONSERVATIVE MINORITY SEGMENT OF THE KUWAITI PUBLIC THAT IS
SUSPICIOUS OF U.S. MOTIVES. THE RECENT ACCUSATIONS AGAINST
HALLIBURTON CORPORATION IN KUWAIT HAVE CAUSED THE MINISTER OF
ENERGY TO REFER THE MATTER TO THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR FOR
INVESTIGATION. LOCAL MEDIA HAVE REPORTED PARLIAMENTARY
DEBATE ON THE MATTER INVOLVING THE PM.

3C. (C) AT THE ARMED FORCES LEVEL CHIEF OF STAFF LTG FAHAD
INCREASINGLY ASKS FOR DETAILED JUSTIFICATION FOR OUR SUPPORT
REQUESTS. BUDGET CONSTRAINTS INCREASINGLY DOMINATE HIS
DECISION MAKING. U.S. SUPPORT REQUESTS IN EXCESS OF THOSE
AGREED TO IN YEARS PAST ARE SUBJECT TO INCREASED SCRUTINY.


4. (C) WHAT YOU SHOULD EXPECT FROM THE PM. HE WILL ASK FOR
YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN IRAQ AND YOUR VISION FOR
THE WAY AHEAD. KUWAITIS ARE ANXIOUS BUT OPTIMISTIC
CONCERNING THE POLITICAL TRANSITION. KUWAIT,S MAJOR
CONCERNS ARE: THAT IRAQ BE A STABLE FRIENDLY NEIGHBOR;
MAINTAIN ITS NATIONAL UNITY; AND THAT NO ONE (SPECIFICALLY
THE SUNNIS) BE DISENFRANCHISED.


5. (U) WHAT THE PM WANTS TO HEAR.

5.1. (C) THANK HIM AND HIS GOVERNMENT FOR THE OUTSTANDING
SUPPORT IN TERMS OF BASING, AND ASSISTANCE IN KIND INCLUDING
FUEL. KUWAIT IS OUR ONLY INDISPENSABLE ALLY IN SUPPORTING
OIF. CURRENT ESTIMATES BY AMEMB KUWAIT PLACE GOK COSTS BORNE
ISO U.S. FORCES AND OPERATIONS DURING 2003 ALONE AT
APPROXIMATELY $677M (NOT INCLUDING INTANGIBLE COSTS SUCH AS
WAIVED PORT AND IMMIGRATION FEES, SECURITY PROVIDED FOR U.S.
CONVOY OPERATIONS ETC). THIS FIGURE REPRESENTS ROUGHLY 15
PERCENT OF THEIR ENTIRE MILITARY BUDGET.

5.2. (U) REASSURE THE PM THAT THE U.S. IS DETERMINED TO STAY
THE COURSE IN IRAQ. WE ARE COMMITTED FOR AS LONG AS IT TAKES
TO ENSURE A UNITED AND STABLE IRAQ.

5.3. (U) COMMEND HIM FOR HIS LEADERSHIP IN SUPPORTING IRAQ,S
INCLUSION IN THE 14-15 FEB MEETING OF THE NEIGHBORING
COUNTRIES OF IRAQ HELD HERE IN KUWAIT. THIS MEETING RESULTED
IN SUPPORT FOR THE INTERNEL IRAQI POLITICAL PROCESS AND SET A
PRECEDENT FOR IRAQI INCLUSION IN THIS FORUM.

5.4. (U) ASSURE HIM THAT THE U.S. SUPPORTS KUWAIT IN ITS
EFFORT TO LOCATE AND RETURN ITS POWS AND MISSING PERSONS FROM

1991. TO DATE, REMAINS OF 75 OF THE 605 MISSING HAVE BEEN
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED (NO LIVE POWS HAVE BEEN LOCATED).



6. (U) ON-GOING BILATERAL ISSUES

6.1 (C) FUEL SUPPLIED AS ASSISTANCE IN KIND (AIK). THE
INTER-AGENCY (DOS/DOD) NEGOTIATING TEAM LED BY DOS A/S FOR
POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIRS LINCOLN BLOOMFIELD JR. AND JOINED
BY PDASD/ISA PETER FLORY MET ON 27 JAN 04 WITH
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MINISTRIES OF FINANCE, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, AND ENERGY, AS WELL AS THE KUWAIT PETROLEUM
CORPORATION. THE MEETING OCCURRED AT THE REQUEST OF HOST
COUNTRY AFTER GOK SERVED EMBASSY W/ $85M BILL FOR FUEL
CONSUMED AFTER 1 MAY 03. (THE BILL DID NOT SPECIFY THE AMOUNT
OF FUEL OR AN END DATE FOR THE BILLING PERIOD, BUT WAS DATED
1 DEC 03). THE GOK,S PRIMARY DESIRE IS A WRITTEN AGREEMENT
TO SERVE AS THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE FUEL,S PROVISION. THE
GOK REPRESENTATIVES AGREED TO REFER USG CONSUMPTION DATA AND
USG REQUEST FOR A CONTINUATION OF AIK FUEL SUPPORT TO THEIR
MINISTRIES, LEADERSHIP. WE HAVE RECEIVED NO RESPONSE TO
DATE ALTHOUGH FUEL CONTINUES TO BE SUPPLIED.

6.2. (U) JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION (JMC): THE JMC WILL OCCUR
IN WASHINGTON, DC 30-31 MAR 04. OMC-K IS ASSISTING IN
PREPARATION OF AGENDA ITEMS ICW CFLCC, CENTCOM, AND THE
KUWAIT ARMED FORCES.

6.3. (U) BORDER CROSSING / CUSTOMS / COMMON ACCESS CARD (CAC)
MOU. ON 18 JAN 04 THE EMBASSY FORWARDED A DIPLOMATIC NOTE TO
THE MFA CONTAINING OUR PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT OF THE BORDER MOU
WHICH WILL REGULARIZE BORDER CROSSING, CUSTOMS AND
IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES USED BY COALITION FORCES IN KUWAIT.
ALSO PROPOSED: 1) CFLCC RECEPTION BOOTH AT KCIA; 2) GOK TO
PROVIDE MULTIPLE-ENTRY VISAS (VICE SINGLE-ENTRY VISAS) AS THE
NORM; 3) ESTABLISH A WORKING GROUP TO DEAL WITH CONTRACTORS
PRESENTLY IN COUNTRY WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTATION; 4)
COMMITMENT BY THE U.S. TO HONOR HOST-COUNTRY IMMIGRATION
LAWS. THIS LAST TERM REFLECTS U.S. INTENTION TO REQUIRE
CONTRACTORS AND OTHER NON-U.S. PERSONNEL TO ENTER/LEAVE THE
COUNTRY WITH A PASSPORT AND VISA. TO DATE, THE MOU HAS NOT
BEEN SIGNED PENDING AGREEMENT ON WHICH SIDE WILL PROVIDE
X-RAY EQUIPMENT AT THE U.S.-MANAGED BORDER CROSSING POINT
TO/FROM IRAQ. KUWAIT CUSTOMS SEEKS LANGUAGE IN THE MOU
ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY TO USG. CFLCC IS RESEARCHING THE
MATTER. TOTAL ANTICIPATED COST OF THIS GAMMA RAY EQUIPMENT IS
APPROXIMATELY $7 MILLION.

6.4. (S) TAXATION OF USG CONTRACTORS: SEVERAL USG CONTRACTORS
IN KUWAIT HAVE RECEIVED NOTICE OF GOK,S INTENT TO TAX INCOME
EARNED FROM USG CONTRACTS. THE EMBASSY HAS SENT A DIP NOTE
TO MFA REMINDING THE GOK IT CANNOT TAX U.S. CONTRACTORS
REGARDLESS OF WHERE INCOME IS EARNED, PER DCA. ONE USG
CONTRACTOR SUBSEQUENTLY LEARNED ITS TAX LEVY WAS CANCELLED.

6.5. (S) Need For A Kuwait-Focused Strategic Review. Kuwait
clearly needs to conduct a strategic review to define the
current and future strategic environment that it will operate
in, and will need our help in doing so. LTG Fahad has
specifically asked for our assistance in doing so, referring
to the Defense Review Group conducted in 1991 that ultimately
became the blueprint for the current Kuwaiti military. The
Kuwaiti military is looking to move towards a
capability-based force vice the current, threat-based force.
Such a review, guided and shaped by the U.S., would
significantly address the requirement for Kuwait to
re-examine its national military strategy and that
strategy,s relationship to USG/CENTCOM regional strategy in
the wake of OIF. Additionally, such a review would spur
development of an appropriate, corresponding Kuwaiti force
structure, an accompanying acquisition strategy, and outline
for a continuing military-to-military relationship with the
U.S. We believe strongly that this is a premier opportunity
to focUS Kuwait,s National Security Strategy and draft a new
blueprint for the Kuwaiti Armed Forces consistent with U.S.
regional strategic intentions. To that end, we have
scheduled a Defense Resource Management Study for Kuwait
through OSD. Although primarily oriented to resource
management, we recommend that this study primarily focus on
the strategic assessment in order to shape the subsequent
requirements as outlined above. The upcoming JMC will be the
forum for initial discussions on the way ahead.

6.6. (C) FORCE PROTECTION FOR DOD CONTRACTORS: THE INCREASED
NUMBER OF CONTRACTORS IN KUWAIT HAS RAISED THE QUESTION OF
WHO HAS FP RESPONSIBILITY OVER THEM: COM, CENTCOM, OR
NEITHER. THE UNIVERSAL MOU ON FP DOES NOT MENTION CONTRACTORS
PER SE. THE COM HAS SENT A CABLE TO DOS ASKING IT TO ADDRESS
THE ISSUE (KUWAIT 566, FORCE PROTECTION RESPONSIBILITY TO DOD
CONTRACTORS IN KUWAIT, DTG 1813382 FEB 04). THE MATTER ALSO
RECEIVED HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION FROM RECENTLY COMPLETED (17 FEB
04) DOS/IG INSPECTION OF EMBASSY. CURRENTLY, THERE IS NO
COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNTING FOR DOD CONTRACTORS IN KUWAIT. FULL
ACCOUNTING IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE ALL PERSONNEL ENTITLED TO
FP ARE RECEIVING IT. THIS IS NOT A BILATERAL ISSUE THAT YOU
SHOULD ANTICIPATE RAISING WITH YOUR HOSTS. IT WILL BE
RESOLVED THROUGH THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS IN WASHINGTON.

MULHOLLAND