Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04KUWAIT480
2004-02-11 14:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

(C) OFAC MEETS WITH CENTRAL BANK: KUWAIT TO

Tags:  EFIN ECON ETTC PTER PREL KU IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000480 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EB/ESC/TFS FOR GGLASS AND NROTHSTEIN
STATE FOR S/CT FOR SFOX; IO/PHO FOR APEREZ
NSC FOR GPETERS; TREASURY FOR GENERAL COUNSEL DAUFHAUSER
TREASURY FOR OFAC DIRECTOR RNEWCOMB; TREASURY FOR JZARATE
TREASURY TASK FORCE ON TERRORIST FINANCING
PARIS FOR PETER KUJAWINSKI AND UZRA ZEYA
TUNIS FOR NATALIE BROWN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2014
TAGS: EFIN ECON ETTC PTER PREL KU IZ
SUBJECT: (C) OFAC MEETS WITH CENTRAL BANK: KUWAIT TO
TRANSFER IRAQI FUNDS

REF: A.) 03 KUWAIT 5001 B.) 03 KUWAIT 5188 C.) 03
KUWAIT 5537

Classified By: CDA Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000480

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EB/ESC/TFS FOR GGLASS AND NROTHSTEIN
STATE FOR S/CT FOR SFOX; IO/PHO FOR APEREZ
NSC FOR GPETERS; TREASURY FOR GENERAL COUNSEL DAUFHAUSER
TREASURY FOR OFAC DIRECTOR RNEWCOMB; TREASURY FOR JZARATE
TREASURY TASK FORCE ON TERRORIST FINANCING
PARIS FOR PETER KUJAWINSKI AND UZRA ZEYA
TUNIS FOR NATALIE BROWN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2014
TAGS: EFIN ECON ETTC PTER PREL KU IZ
SUBJECT: (C) OFAC MEETS WITH CENTRAL BANK: KUWAIT TO
TRANSFER IRAQI FUNDS

REF: A.) 03 KUWAIT 5001 B.) 03 KUWAIT 5188 C.) 03
KUWAIT 5537

Classified By: CDA Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
Director Richard Newcomb met with Central Bank of Kuwait
(CBK) Governor Shaykh Salem Al-Sabah on January 19, 2004 to
discuss issues outstanding from OFAC's October 2003 visit to
Kuwait. Shaykh Salem verified that the CBK will give
instructions to transfer the $85 million in frozen Iraqi
funds that the Commercial Bank of Kuwait is currently holding
in the Bahamas to the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) within
one week,s time (Ref C). OFAC also discussed with CBK
financial transactions by Lajnat Al-Dawa Al-Islamiya (LDI)
that utilized multiple spellings, perhaps intentionally
bypassing the bank transaction filters. Shaykh Salem
confirmed that the CBK would act to plug a loophole that
currently allows originators and recipients of money
transfers to bypass bank filtering controls by using
different spellings of transliterated names. Shaykh Salem
pledged to investigate if the misspellings were intentional,
and if so, what parties were responsible. Shaykh Salem also
agreed to cooperate with an OFAC request for detailed
information on specific fund transfers made by or to LDI from
January 9, 2003 ) February 19, 2003, the period after LDI
had been designated as a terrorist supporter by the USG but
prior to the UN designation. He also agreed to search for
records of transactions by the Social Reform Society (SRS)
from February 20, 2003 ) April 16, 2003, the period during
which SRS started funding LDI beneficiaries. CBK agreed in
principle to provide the transaction information to LDI and

SRS at its discretion. End Summary.

KUWAIT TO TRANSFER FROZEN IRAQI FUNDS


2. (C) A delegation from OFAC headed by Director Richard
Newcomb met with Central Bank of Kuwait Governor Salem
Al-Sabah on January 19. Noting Kuwait's leadership in the
Gulf region, Newcomb asked Shaykh Salem when Kuwait would
transfer the $85 million in frozen Iraqi funds held by the
Commercial Bank of Kuwait in the Bahamas (Refs A,B and C).
Shaykh Salem said the GOK had had "legal questions" about
ownership and transfer of the funds, however those questions
had recently been resolved and CBK was now ready to move
forward. He said the CBK would instruct the Commercial Bank
of Kuwait to transfer the funds the following week. (Note: As
of mid-February, the funds have not yet been transferred.
End Note.)

CBK TO PROVIDE TRANSACTION INFORMATION


3. (C) Responding to questions on changes in Kuwaiti banking
laws, Shaykh Salem confirmed that the CBK's mandate had been
expanded to cover Islamic banking institutions, including
Kuwait's only existing Islamic bank, Kuwait Finance House
(KFH). Under the new regulations, KFH is entitled to a
three-year grace period before falling under CBK regulatory
authority. Nevertheless, Shaykh Salem said he expects KFH to
officially recognize CBK's regulatory authority in March or
April 2004.


4. (C) Once KFH is under CBK's regulatory authority, Shaykh
Salem said, the Central Bank would have access to all KFH
records, retroactively. He agreed to have the Central Bank
search its own and KFH records for evidence of transactions
made by or to LDI from January 9, 2003 ) February 19, 2003,
the period after LDI had been designated as a terrorist
supporter by USG but prior to the UN designation. He also
agreed to search for records of transactions by the Social
Reform Society (SRS) from February 20, 2003 ) April 16,
2003, the period during which SRS started funding LDI
beneficiaries. Newcomb explained that the USG was not at
liberty to provide such records to LDI and SRS directly.
(Note: USG release of the information without the proprietary
holder,s permission could result in violating Bank Secrecy
provisions. End Note.) Therefore, Newcomb suggested that CBK
could provide such transaction information to LDI and SRS.
CBK agreed that it would provide the transaction information
to LDI and SRS at its own discretion.

DELIBERATE MISSPELLING?


5. (C) Newcomb noted that there were more than thirty
spelling variations of LDI's name in transaction data
provided to CBK. Of the transactions that took place after
LDI's designation by either the US or the UN as a terrorism
supporter, ten different spelling variations of LDI's name
were used. Newcomb noted that filters used by a US bank,
designed to block financial transfers to and from
'designated' organizations, had failed to block 26 of the 27
transactions, and asked whether the misspellings may have
been deliberate on the part of LDI, SRS or KFH.


6. (C) Shaykh Salem agreed that the misspellings were a
problem, and said the CBK would have to look into its current
procedures for fund transfers. He proposed that the CBK
should issue new regulations requiring civil ID numbers and
official passport spellings of anyone attempting to transfer
funds through the CBK or any of the banks it regulates,
enabling it to uniquely identify originators and flag blocked
parties. "We should have an agreed upon policy to control
this," he added. "We have to close this loophole." Shaykh
Salem pledged to investigate how the misspellings occurred,
who is responsible, and whether it was inadvertent ) given
various transliterations tellers may have made from the
Arabic ) or was intentional on the part of one or another of
the parties involved.

BUREAUCRACY ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR TRANSFERS


7. (C) Shaykh Salem and CBK staff members explained why LDI
accounts were not frozen until 4-6 weeks after the USG
designation by noting that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) must issue instructions to the CBK before it can freeze
assets of persons designated by the USG or under the relevant
UNSCRs. In the case of LDI, they said, the MFA had dropped
the ball and took approximately one to one and a half months
to transmit these instructions to the CBK after the US
designated LDI on January 9, 2003. During that time, KFH
approached CBK for instruction on how to handle LDI accounts;
CBK informed KFH that no action need be taken until ordered
by MFA.


8. (U) This message has been cleared in MemCon format by OFAC
Director Newcomb.
URBANCIC