ITALIANS SEEKING GCC SUPPORT ON UNSC REFORM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 004026

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARPI AND IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2014
TAGS: PREL AORC KU IT UNSC
SUBJECT: ITALIANS SEEKING GCC SUPPORT ON UNSC REFORM


Classified By: CDA Matthew H. Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) In a November 20 courtesy call on Emboffs, Nico
Frandi (protect),2nd Secretary of the Italian Embassy, spoke
at length on Italy's views on UN Security Council reform. He
said his government was dismayed there was no common European
position on reform and, as a result, decided to approach
member states to advance its vision of the future structure
of the UNSC. The Italian Ambassador is seeking an
appointment with Kuwaiti Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah Al-Ahmed
Al-Jabir Al-Sabah in hopes of securing GCC support for the
Italian position. There are no current plans for GOI
demarches on other GCC capitals. The Italian proposal
(provided below) does not affect the P-5, encourages
continued geographic balance, and has a goal of establishing
regional seats, such as an eventual chair for the EU. Frandi
shared the paper with post as a courtesy and commented the
GOI knows its stance will anger some of its neighbors, most
notably, Germany.


2. (C) Begin Text of Italian Non Paper on Security Council
Reform

The starting point for UN reform in the field of peace and
security is a review of the Organization's policies. The
question of the Security Council role, functioning and
composition should be addressed within a comprehensive reform
framework on which to build consensus within the General
Assembly.

Italy is fully engaged in the debate on UN reform; with its
EU partners, Italy has provided a contribution to the High
Level Panel appointed by the Secretary General and is looking
forward to its proposals in December. Italy has also
presented to the Panel a national contribution on Security
Council reform, an issue on which there is no E.U. common
position.

The recent General Assembly debate has demonstrated that no
agreement has yet been reached on SC reform This should not
deter us from seeking solutions that are not divisive. Any
decision imposed through a narrow majority vote would
seriously undermine the credibility of the Council.
Confronted with global challenges of great magnitude, the
international community cannot afford profound divisions with
lasting consequences within its ranks and within regional
groups.

Italy is in favor of a Security Council reform inspired by
the principles of greater accountability, effectiveness,
democratic participation and geographic representation. We
are firmly convinced that the best way to pursue such a
reform is through the establishment of new elective, non
permanent seats for member States.

This would facilitate -- in the first place -- wider
participation of the increased membership to the Council and
rebalance its geographic composition, by giving developing
countries an enhanced presence.

Furthermore, by increasing the democratic and accountable
character of the Council, the political legitimacy of its
decision will be increased.

Last but not least, any reform should not impair, but rather
strengthen the effectiveness of the Council's action.

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Why We are Against the Creation of New Permanent Members
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Italy does not believe that the Council's difficulties can be
resolved through new permanent, irrevocable appointments and
national mandates. Such a move would sow division,
frustration, and perhaps disengagement among the membership.

These are the reasons for our opposition to new permanent
members:


1. the absence of regular political scrutiny and
accountability through elections to wider sections of the
membership would diminish the Council's political legitimacy;


2. the decision making process would be further hindered;


3. more privileged positions would be created, thereby
further eroding the principle of sovereign equality and
damaging the democratic process at the UN;

4. the elected non permanent members of the Council would be
further marginalized, thereby deepening division within the
membership and undermining the Council's credibility;


5. by freezing permanently some of the Council's seats, the
possibility for a more fair and equitable representation on
the Security Council for the rest of the UN membership would
be substantially reduced or denied;


6. should the new permanent members be endowed with the veto
right, this would run counter to the member States
overwhelming position which is in favor of reducing, not
expanding such a right. Should they be deprived of the veto,
a new category of UN membership would be introduced;


7. tensions would be perpetuated in each regional group,
where opposition persists against elevating individual states
to the status of permanent member;


8. such a reform would make the UN a more hierarchical and
less democratic organization, by giving a few countries
(maybe 10 or 11 out of 191) the exclusive right to decide,
through their overwhelming influence in the Council and
without any accountability, when the resort to force in
international relations is legitimate;


9. the increase in the permanent members would made more
difficult any further Council reform in the future, as the
permanent members -- old and new -- would have a stake in
preventing changes which might affect their status and
interests.

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Italy's Proposals: A) Longer Terms or More Frequent
Rotation for Elected Members
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Should the High Level Panel advance such a proposal, and if a
broad consensus emerges, we are willing to contemplate and
support more frequent rotation or longer terms in the
Security Council for countries that make a greater
contribution to the purposes of the United Nations.

In any case, this solution should retain the fundamental
principle of elections and ensure a larger presence of the
developing countries. Account should be taken of the
stipulation in Article 23 of the Charter that "due regard
being especially paid, in the first instance to the
contribution of Members of the United Nations to the
maintenance of international peace and security and to the
other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable
geographic distribution."

Under this proposal, elective seats with a longer duration or
more frequent rotation would be established in a non
discriminatory manner for all regional groups.

At the same time, the Charter provision prohibiting immediate
re-election of SC non permanent members could be eliminated.

In any case, this solution should rule out the creation of
permanent seats for single states and should preserve the
electoral process, as the foundation of representativeness,
accountability and legitimacy.

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Italy's Proposals: B) Non Permanent Seats
for all Regional Groups
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Should the UN membership be unable to reach a consensus on a
Security Council reform along the lines proposed in section
A),Italy believes that the only realistic compromise
solution for the time being would be a limited increase of
the non permanent seats (in line with the "fall-back
position" of the Non-Aligned Movement.)

This solution would reflect the enlarged U.S. membership and,
by increasing the number of available elective seats, would
facilitate the access of all member States to the Council.

An increase of non permanent seats could be accompanied by a
review-clause, i.e. an understanding that within a given
number of years (10 or 15) the member states would return to
this issue to seek a new agreement in light of the evolving
trends in the international community.
Finally, also in this solution the current Charter provision
prohibiting immediate re-electon of SC non-permanent members
could be eliminated.

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Italy's Proposals: The Regional Dimension
--------------

The increasing role of regional organizations is of paramount
importance among current international trends. Italy is
convinced that the UN will soon have to consider -- through
an innovate approach -- how to involve these organizations in
the Council's decision making processes.

In the framework of the options outlined in Sections A) and
B) above, we are ready to study solutions aimed at
strengthening the links between elected members of the
Council and the regional groups and/or regional organizations
to which they belong, though mechanisms providing for greater
accountability towards these entities. Seats permanently
allocated to individual regions could be taken into
consideration.

Furthermore, the possibility of a future seat for the
European Union, though not immediate, remains an objective of
Italy's foreign policy and would strengthen the contribution
that the EU can provide to the United Nations.

We will continue to work to make conditions come about for
this objective to become truly concrete and real. In the
meantime, we should avoid decisions -- such as new permanent
seats for one or the other member state -- which would
jeopardize this objective, and should work to strengthen the
role of the EU and its members States in the Security Council.
Tueller