KUWAITI FM TELLS A/S BLOOMFIELD FUEL ISSUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 003658

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2014
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL PTER KU IZ
SUBJECT: KUWAITI FM TELLS A/S BLOOMFIELD FUEL ISSUE
RESOLVED; FOCUSES ON IRAQ'S FUTURE

REF: KUWAIT 03592


1. (C) SUMMARY: On October 20, Kuwaiti Foreign Minister
Shaykh Dr. Mohammad Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah told PM A/S
Lincoln Bloomfield Jr., PDASD Peter Flory, and the Ambassador
that a fuel contract for OIF support was required by the
GOK's constitutional framework and that Parliament would hold
the Minister of Energy responsible for any outlay of fuel not
formalized in writing. A/S Bloomfield outlined efforts to
set the stage for January elections in Iraq and reassured
the FM that the U.S. would remain in Iraq until the mission
is completed. The FM raised the regional conference on Iraq
in Sharm El Sheikh and GOK's opposition to France's proposal
for a concurrent meeting of Iraqi opposition figures. END
SUMMARY

OIF Fuel Contract
--------------


2. (C) In an October 20 meeting, Kuwaiti FM Shaykh Dr.
Mohammed told PM A/S Bloomfield, PDASD Flory, and the
Ambassador that the issue of fuel for OIF operations would be
resolved once a contract was signed. He confirmed GOK
support for U.S. activities in Iraq and the continued supply
of fuel, but explained that a contract was needed due to GOK
constitutional framework, and the duration negotiated by the
Minister of Energy. For the sake of transparency and to
protect the Minister of Energy from parliamentary inquiries,
there had to be a contract with the details clearly defined.

Need for Security and Credible Elections
--------------


3. (C) At the Minister's request, Bloomfield reviewed Iraqi
Prime Minister Allawi's plan to quell the violence and
efforts to provide security for the UN role in Iraq. He also
addressed the need to confirm Sunni support for the new Iraq
in order to isolate and defeat extremists in their midst.
The ability of Iraq to control its future was based on a few
key factors: the political process, building up the security
sector, and persuading all Iraqis to turn against violent
actors. The first, the political process, encompasses the
electoral process and the ability of Iraqi and Coalition
forces to overcome insurgent efforts to disrupt January's
election. Comparing Iraq to Afghanistan, Bloomfield noted
the strategic success of an election was the ability to hold
a credible election, adding that the goal in Iraq was always
100 percent participation. He noted that in recent days the
IIG has issued guidelines for the conduct of the election.

Iraq's Need For International Assistance
--------------


4. (C) Bloomfield expressed hope that in the upcoming Sharm
El Sheikh conference Iraqis would be able to stand in front
of their neighbors and the international community and focus
their attention on Iraq's need for support at an historic
juncture. Kuwait said the FM, supports the conference and is
doing what it can, from giving 65 million dollars in aid to
sending retired General Ali Al-Mumin to oversee the aid
distribution in Najaf. The GOK is building hospitals and
schools all over Iraq, the FM shared, and the GOK will
continue to help not only in the South where it has the
strongest interests. The Ambassador noted that there
appeared to be no support for French ideas to invite
opposition figures to Sharm El Sheikh. The FM stated that he
hoped the French idea could be stopped, adding that he had
already shared this sentiment with the Egyptians and they
concurred.

Sunni Perception of Their Place
--------------


5. (C) Bloomfield explained the need to change any negative
perception that Iraqi Sunnis have about their place in the
new Iraq. He emphasized that the Sunni population had to be
brought into the fold and counseled that their future was
with democracy and not with the insurgents, foreign or
otherwise. Bloomfield explained that the Sunni had to
distance themselves from the insurgents and to understand
that a democracy does not mean that Iraq will become a Shi'a
version of Saddam's dictatorship. He noted that the
insurgents had nothing to offer but bloodshed and murder.

Timetable for Scaling Back Troop Numbers
--------------


6. (C) The FM then asked about a timetable for U.S.
withdrawal. Bloomfield assured him that U.S. forces would
not leave Iraq until the mission is finished. If the
insurgents lose their footing then the timetable will change
for the better. PDASD Flory added that the strategic dynamic
in this regard is Iraqis taking control of their future;
Afghanistan is an example for the Iraqi people.

Syria and Iran
--------------


7. (C) The FM asked pointed questions about a recent U.S.
engagement with Syria to control the border. Explaining that
Syria must take control of its own border, Bloomfield
remarked that it is in Syrian interest to stop insurgents
from crossing into Iraq. The FM expressed concern about the
Ba'ath party reconstituting itself in Iraq but Bloomfield
stressed that a true democracy allows for all types of
parties and that he doubted Ba'athism would hold any appeal
for free Iraqi citizens after the history of abuses Iraq had
suffered under that party. PDASD Flory added that there is
more to the equation than just border control; Syria must
make a strategic decision not to oppose Coalition efforts in
Iraq.


8. (C) As for Iran, Bloomfield made clear that Iran needed to
keep out of Iraq's affairs, particularly as the Iraqi
election process unfolds. He added that Iran needed to
resolve international concerns about its nuclear intentions
and should cooperate fully with the IAEA. Concluding,
Bloomfield told the FM that he does not see the Shi'a in the
south turning towards Iran as Muqtdr Al Sadr was very
unpopular while Ayatollah Al Sistani's embrace of democracy
was more representative of Shi'a sentiment.


9. (C) Article 98 ratification discussion sent reftel.


10. (U) This cable was cleared by A/S Bloomfield and PDASD
Flory.


11. (U) Baghdad: Minimize considered.
LeBaron