PAKISTAN BAN ON DRIVERS TO IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 003547

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ARPI WORMAN, INR KIRSCH, S/CT MILLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2014
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, KU, PK, IZ
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN BAN ON DRIVERS TO IRAQ

REF: KUWAIT 03465

Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron. Reasons 1.5 (b) AND (d).

1. (C) SUMMARY. Post was informed the evening of October 12
that the Pakistani Embassy had requested that the GOK prevent
Pakistani drivers from entering Iraq, and was immediately in
touch with CFLCC regarding the situation. It remains unclear
whether the ban will be enforced by the Kuwaitis, who are
torn between their support for the coaltion (and Kuwaiti
contractors) and their desire to accommodate third country
concerns. If enforced, the ban will seriously impact the
coalition's ability to supply materiel, as Pakistani drivers
account for 90 percent of the fuel haulers under contract and
15 percent of drivers overall. Ambassador contacted the
Pakistani Ambassador in Kuwait, who claimed the decision had
come from Islamabad and suggested that an approach be made
there. Meanwhile, Ambassador asked that the Pakistani
Ambassador transmit back to Islamabad our grave concerns
about this action. END SUMMARY

MFA Senior Officials Surprised
--------------

2. (C) The MFA Chief of Protocol, who has been handling
issues surrounding expat drivers for Iraq convoys, called
Ambassador evening of October 12 to inform him that the MFA
had received a request for GOK assistance in instituting a
ban on Pakistani drivers working in Iraq. The official
stated that the note containing the request had not been
immediately seen by senior MFA officials, and had been
transmitted by lower levels of the MFA to the Ministry of
Interior for action. Ambassador made it abundantly clear
that the USG would prefer that this ban not come into force.
The Chief of Protocol said in a conversation on October 13
that he had managed to obtain a 24 hour delay, pending
further review of the issue.

3. (C) As of noon on October 13th the ban had not been
enforced, and Pakistani drivers were entering Iraq unimpeded
at the Kuwait-Iraq border crossing. The CFLCC General in
charge of Movement and Distribution, Brigadier General
Johnson, advised Embassy that such a ban would have a serious
effect on convoy capability as Pakistani drivers account for
more than 15 percent of the total driver workforce and 90
percent of the fuel haulers going into Iraq. There are
currently over 350 Pakistani drivers under contract for the
convoys, making them the third largest nationality after the
Egyptian and Turkish drivers.

Pakistani Ambassador: Acting on Instructions
--------------

4. (C) Ambassador spoke to Pakistani Ambassador to Kuwait
just before noon on 13 October to ask for clarification of
the request by the Pakistani Embassy to the Kuwaitis to halt
the flow of Pakistanis between Kuwait and Iraq. Amb. Niazi
said the decision, (as reflected in an October 5 note to the
Kuwait MFA from the Pakistani Embassy),had been taken in
Islamabad. It had been decided in response to situations in
which Pakistani drivers complained that they were being
forced to drive to Iraq by Kuwaiti contractors, and they then
asked the Pakistani Embassy for refuge and repatriation.
Eventually they were repatriated. When asked, the Ambassador
said about twelve drivers were involved in this repatriation.
(Note: out of hundreds of drivers.) The Pakistani Ambassador
also said that Pakistani drivers had failed to heed a
Pakistani travel advisory which warned against travel to Iraq
and this had been another factor in the GOP decision to ask
the Kuwaiti Government to prevent them from entering Iraq.
The Ambassador said that he had visited his Consular Section
this morning and found four drivers who were complaining
about the decision and who wanted freedom to pursue their
livelihoods through driving to Iraq. He said he sympathized
with them but said the decision was not his.

5. (C) Ambassador LeBaron asked that the Ambassador convey
to Islamabad in the strongest possible terms that 1) we would
have appreciated some advance warning of this decision in
order to do contingency planning, 2) this decision has the
potential to be very disruptive for our supply chain to Iraq,
especially since many of the drivers are driving fuel trucks,
and 3) we would like to see this decision reversed,
postponed, or delayed. The Ambassador seemed to be
sympathetic to our arguments, and not relishing facing more
angry truck drivers forced out of work. Ambassador LeBaron
also reminded Amb. Niazi that we had passed considerable
information to him in September on treatment of drivers, as
supplied by CFLCC Gen. Speer. Niazi said he had passed this
back to the Pakistani MFA. (Ambassador subsequently shared
the content of the conversation with the senior Kuwaiti MFA
official who first alerted us to this problem.)
Comment
--------------

6. (C) Post has been in touch with Embassy Islamabad earlier
in the day to provide advance briefing, and understands that
clarification is being sought in Islamabad.
LeBaron