CENTCOM COMMANDER BRIEFS KUWAITI MINISTER OF AMIRI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 003504

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2014
TAGS: MOPS MARR ASEC PREL PTER IZ KU
SUBJECT: CENTCOM COMMANDER BRIEFS KUWAITI MINISTER OF AMIRI
DIWAN


Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron reason 1.4(a),(d)


1. (U) SUMMARY: On October 6, CENTCOM Commander General John
Abizaid met with the Kuwait Minister of the Amiri Diwan,
Nasser Mohammed Al Sabah. During a relaxed and friendly
conversation lasting over an hour, General Abizaid described
the situation in Iraq and efforts by coalition forces to
assist the Iraqis in providing stability before January
elections. The Minister, a senior member of the Sabah family
with a background in Iranian affairs, was confident that the
situation in Iraq would improve with time and was supportive
of U.S. efforts. Gen. Abizaid also used the meeting to
express U.S. appreciation for continued Kuwaiti support of
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. END
SUMMARY.


2. (U) Accompanied by Ambassador LeBaron, General Abizaid met
with the Minister of the Amiri Diwan, Shaykh Nasser Mohammed
Al Sabah. Also present was Kuwaiti Chief of Staff General
Fahed, other Kuwaiti officials, Gen. Abizaid's senior staff,
Gen. Speer, and Kuwait OMC/K Chief Gen. Mulholland. The
conversation centered on the current and future security
situation in Iraq. Starting with the centers of insurgency,
Abizaid gave an extensive overview of Coalition plans to
assist Iraqi forces in restoring order to Falluja, Ramadi,
and parts of Baghdad, notably Sadr City. Using the upcoming
Iraqi elections as his touchstone, Abizaid stated that the
security situation should improve after January and stabilize
between January and June. The problem with fighting the
insurgency, he said, is twofold: remnants of the Ba'ath Party
are still active and are financing the insurgents from Syria,
and the Sunnis have not yet begun to participate in the new
government and are allowing the insurgents to be their voice
when they should be fighting against them.


3. (U) Abizaid stressed that he and his commanders were
confident that stability and democracy would eventually
prevail. Shaykh Nasser agreed that the insurgency would end
and democracy would follow. He added that the GOK had been
impressed by Iraqi PM Allawi's level of confidence in his
ability to improve the situation before the elections.
Nasser also expressed understanding of the task facing the
Iraqi people in undoing 34 years of Saddam's influence and
likened it to the situation in North Korea when Kim Il Sung
died. Stating that the Iraqis are our neighbor and our
Muslim brothers, Nasser said that Kuwait must help them gain
freedom from misery and achieve democracy. Let them take
care of themselves, and they would rebound in time, he added.


Syria and Iran's Interests
--------------


4. (C) Shaykh Nasser then asked numerous questions on Iraq's
future military capabilities and other aspects of the
security situation. General Abizaid stated that he felt the
situation would improve once the elections were over and the
country settled down. On the insurgency front, Abizaid
distinguished between the foreign fighters, who he numbered
as less than one thousand in Iraq, and the Iraqi Baathist
remnants. According to Abizaid, Zarqawi's group is trying to
start a civil war pitting Shi'a against Sunni while the
Syrians are helping remnants of the Ba'ath party, and the
Iranians are interfering by supporting Muqtadr Al Sadr.
Abizaid said that it is a dangerous game that Syria and Iran
are playing inside Iraq. In response to a question by
Nasser, Abizaid distinguished between Syrian President Bashir
Al Asad and the hard-liners in his government who were
appointed by his father. The situation in Syria is
complicated, said Abizaid, but the Syrians do not deny that
there is money flowing into Iraq.


5. (C) On Iran, Nasser opined that it was in Iran's interest
that Iraq be stable but that the only true Shi'a leader is
Muhammed Baqr Al Hakim. He said that Al-Sistani and Al-Sadr
are not real Iraqis, as they were born in Iran, and he
posited that the Sunnis are scared of having a Shi'a state
and that is one reason there are foreign fighters from Sunni
majority countries taking part in the insurgency.


6. (C) General Abizaid stressed his belief that if the Iraqi
Sunni population did not soon become part of the solution in
stabilizing Iraq, then they would be considered part of the
problem and be unable to achieve a political base in the
future. In his view, those who took part in attacks against
civilians would never be forgiven by Iraqis and they would
never have a place in Iraq's future. The Sunnis must help
get rid of Zarqawi before they can be part of a new Iraq.

Iraqi Security Forces
--------------

7. (C) On Iraq's future military capability, Abizaid told
Nasser that Coalition forces would be present until stability
is established across three areas of insurgency: Al Amarrah
in the south, the area near Mosul in the north, and various
areas in central Iraq. Iraqi forces will number 200,000 by
June 2005, to include the regular Army and a Commando unit.
He said that the Army was plagued by poor leadership and
Iraq's political leaders are considering reaching out to
former military officers in order to find experienced but
loyal military leaders. Also, the police forces were weak
and corrupt and also suffer from poor leadership. The
Coalition has trained and equipped 100,000 policemen. After
the January elections, Abizaid foresaw a drop in Coalition
troop levels needed to maintain stability. Gen. Abizaid
summed up his overall assessment as confident, but realistic
about the challenges ahead in Iraq.

Other Iraq Issues
--------------


8. (C) In answer to Shaykh Nasser's question, he said that
the airports in Basra and Mosul could be moved to Iraqi
control immediately if Iraqi air traffic controllers could be
found. He noted that Iraqis already are operating the
civilian part of the Baghdad airport now. The overall Iraqi
infrastructure was in much poorer shape than the U.S.
expected and it will take time to construct what didn't
exist, as opposed to reconstructing existing facilities. It
appeared that Saddam had focused resources only on his own
palaces and on the road system, in order to be able to move
troops quickly to quell unrest.


9. (C) Shaykh Nasser asked about the timetable for Saddam's
trial and was told Iraqi leaders were saying that it would
most likely take place after the elections in January.
Stability and the fight against those who would keep Iraq
volatile come first. Abizaid closed by saying that the
bilateral military relationship was good and that together
we will make it better.

Planning for Kuwaiti Forces
--------------


10. (C) Gen. Abizaid told Shaykh Nasser that the U.S. looked
forward to working with Kuwait as it re-shaped its own forces
to meet current and future challenges. He stressed Kuwait's
strategic importance due to its location, influence, and
stability.
LeBaron