(U) INDIA AND THE PHILIPPINES IMPOSE BAN ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 002425

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARP, SA/INS, DRL/PHD, DRL/ILA, G/TIP
STATE FOR CA/OCS/ACS/NESA, M/P FOR JAY ANANIA
TUNIS FOR NATALIE BROWN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2009
TAGS: MOPS ETRD EAID PREL PHUM IN IZ KU
SUBJECT: (U) INDIA AND THE PHILIPPINES IMPOSE BAN ON
CITIZENS' TRAVEL TO IRAQ

REF: A. NEW DELHI 7175

B. BAGHDAD 541

C. KUWAIT 1598

D. NEW DELHI 2808

E. NEW DELHI 2795

F. NEW DELHI 2766

G. NEW DELHI 3175

H. KUWAIT 1683

I. KUWAIT 1834

J. KUWAIT 1835

K. KUWAIT 2006

Classified By: EconCouns Stephen Carrig; Reason: 1.5 (b and d)


1. (U) Action request at para 11.


2. (C) Summary. MFA reports that the Embassies of the
Philippines and India, responding to a deteriorating security
situation, requested GOK assistance on 3 August in banning
travel of their nationals to Iraq. MFA, reportedly in order
to provide USG an opportunity to propose additional security
assurances, asked MOI to "make haste slowly," in implementing
the ban. Embassy of India confirmed for us 3 August that a
travel ban had been requested on the instruction of New Delhi
to remain in effect until the situation in Iraq stabilizes.
Embassy of the Philippines did not respond to our calls
requesting clarification. Coalition forces are heavily
dependent on Filipino and Indian drivers and other logistical
support personnel for the humanitarian fuels, military food
supply and other mission-critical programs in Iraq.
Contractors and U.S. military report that a fully enforced
travel ban would cripple these operations. There are no
readily implemented short-term workarounds to ameliorate the
effect of a travel ban. Should Department concur, Embassy
proposes to collaborate with CFLCC in providing the concerned
missions here in Kuwait a detailed security briefing and
written assurances. We would note that none of the kidnap
victims in Iraq was taken from a military-escorted convoy and
request that a waiver be granted on the ban for individuals
who are in Iraq under the protection of Coalition forces.
Embassy requests that Department initiate similar demarches
at capitals of third country nationals working in support of
OIF. End Summary.


3. (C) MFA Consular Affairs Department Deputy Director Abdul
Aziz Al-Reshaid told EconCouns on 3 August that Kuwait's
Ministry of the Interior (MOI) had requested MFA guidance on
how to respond to informal requests from the Governments of
India and the Philippines that their citizens be prevented
from traveling to Iraq via Kuwait. Al-Reshaid reported that
he requested MOI "make haste slowly" in implementing the ban
in order to give the Coalition time to react.


4. (C) The Indian request of MOI reportedly was made by
telephone on 3 August, following up on a press release dated
31 July that was faxed to MFA on 1 August and to Embassy
Kuwait the evening of 2 August. Responding to recent
kidnapping in Iraq, the press release notes that the decision
to "ban deployment of Indian nationals to Iraq" was taken "on
account of the security situation." The press release
admonishes that "All Indian nationals in Kuwait are requested
to note this and strictly refrain from traveling to Iraq for
any purpose whatsoever (and that the Indian Embassy) requests
the cooperation of sponsor companies/individual
sponsors/Government agencies in the implementation of this
ban." There was no diplomatic correspondence supporting the
press release, or the telephone call. The Philippines'
request of MOI, also on 3 August, was, according to
Al-Reshaid, even less formal and made by telephone without
any press release or note requesting a ban on travel.


5. (C) Al-Rashaid was our principal interlocutor in Embassy
efforts resolving the earlier Indian ban on travel to Iraq
(Refs C, H, I, J and K). Today, he volunteered that the
Governments of India and the Philippines might -- given that
no formal, written request to ban travel had been provided --
be amenable to whatever immediate assurances USG might offer
them regarding enhanced security procedures for their
citizens traveling in Iraq in support of OIF. It was for
that reason, he said, he had asked MOI not to impose the ban
effective immediately.

6. (C) Al-Rashaid's message tracks with information provided
EconCouns in telephone conversations 3 August with Embassy of
India DCM Kanawal Jit Singh Sodhi. Sodhi reported that the
ban was a "temporary consideration" and would be lifted
immediately upon "an improvement in the situation in Iraq."
He said the negotiations in Iraq over release of three
kidnapped Indian employees of the local firm "Kuwait and Gulf
Link Transport Company" (KGL) -- purportedly held by members
of the so-called "Holders of the Black Banners" -- more
involved "bargaining with criminals than anything political."
He said the firm KGL, itself, had the lead in the
negotiations, that no/no Government of India officials were
involved in the process, press reports notwithstanding. He
emphasized that the ban was a decision taken by the
Government of India and could not be reversed at the local
level. The Philippine Embassy did not return our calls for
background regarding their decision to ban travel to Iraq.


7. (SBU) The GOK clearly wants to support Coalition efforts
and is looking to us for guidance. At the end of the day,
however, local authorities will have to comply if the Indians
and Filipinos stick to their decision, a decision apparently
taken in their capitals. It may be a bit harder to walk them
back this time because the ban now is squarely linked to
security conditions and kidnappings in Iraq, not to alleged
OIF subcontractors' mistreatment of employees. The latter we
have addressed with the active participation of CFLCC; the
former is out of our near-term control. We are concerned
also that a bandwagon effect may develop with other nations
officially banning travel of their citizens into Iraq.


8. (SBU) Coalition forces are heavily dependent on third
country national (TCN) drivers and other logistical support
personnel. The Philippines and India supply the majority of
these individuals so essential to OIF success. For example,
Public Warehouse Company (PWC),the prime vendor for the
supply of water and food to U.S. Forces in Iraq, confirmed on
3 August that fully 48 percent of the firm's 1500 drivers
are Indian and that at least 10 percent more are Filipino.
Defense Energy Support Center staff reported recently (Ref H)
that more than 60 percent of their 1150 TCNs employed in the
transport of humanitarian fuels to Iraq are either Filipino
or Indian. The firms report that a ban on travel would
cripple the humanitarian fuels and military food supply
programs. Similar TCN ratios are said to apply for other
firms with mission critical support functions in Iraq.


9. (SBU) Palliative alternatives to reversing the decision
of the Philippines and India are few and unlikely to succeed.
Embassy's 3 August straw poll of Kuwaiti and U.S. firms
engaged in transport operations drew these observations:

-- Hiring new drivers is a time-consuming and expensive
process, especially so in Kuwait given the now-enforced visa,
licensing and residency permit regulations.

-- Bringing Iraqi drivers and trucks into Kuwait to pick up
Coalition cargo certainly would encounter stiff commercial
and political resistance, and trigger security concerns as
well.

-- Transporting cargo to near-by cities in Iraq, e.g.,
Basra, to be stored there pending pick up by Iraq-based
transport assets offers no realistic short-term prospects.
Storage facilities are limited; they are not refrigerated
and, therefore, unsuitable for perishable reefer and other
cargo.

-- Trailer transfer at the border similarly offers little
benefit. The coupling devices on tractors are not
standardized regionally, so marrying compatible tractors and
trailers could create a traffic management nightmare. Also,
few are the Kuwaiti contractors who would trust to Iraqi
firms to return with the trailer at the end of the delivery
round trip.


10. (SBU) One alternative might be to expand on the present
practice of transferring cargo from Kuwaiti to Iraqi trucks
at the border. This would be time-consuming and provide no
relief for perishable cargo requiring refrigeration, but
containerized cargo and break bulk could be accommodated
somewhat. Kuwaiti/U.S. firms here are working to identify
Iraqi counterparts should this option prove necessary.



11. (SBU) Action Request. Embassy briefed CFLCC Deputy
Commander MG Speer and staff on 3 August regarding
developments in the ban on Indian and Filipino citizens'
travel to Iraq. MG Speer reiterated MG Speakes' earlier
concerns and offers of reassurance (Ref J) to the home
governments of TCNs working in support of OIF. CFLCC will
put these pledges into writing for Embassy's delivery in
Kuwait to the missions of India and the Philippines, and the
representatives of any other similarly concerned governments.
We propose also, should Department concur, to collaborate
with CFLCC in providing a security briefing for concerned
missions here in Kuwait. We would note that none of the
kidnap victims in Iraq was taken from U.S.-military escorted
convoys and request that a waiver be granted on the travel
ban for citizens of the Philippines and India who are in Iraq
under the protection of Coalition forces. Embassy requests
Department initiate similar demarches at capitals of TCN
drivers. End Action Request.


12. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
TUELLER