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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
04KUWAIT1809 2004-06-08 13:49:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

(C) ASAD TELLS GOK HE WANTS DIALOGUE WITH USG,

Tags:   PREL SY IZ KU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
					  C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 001809 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARN, NEA/ARP
TEL AVIV FOR DCM LEBARON
RIYADH FOR TUELLER
TUNIS FOR NATALIE BROWN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2014
TAGS: PREL SY IZ KU
SUBJECT: (C) ASAD TELLS GOK HE WANTS DIALOGUE WITH USG,
SUCCESS FOR IRAQ


Classified By: CDA FRANK URBANCIC; REASON 1.4 (B, D).



1. (C) SUMMARY: According to the Kuwaiti FM, Syrian
President Asad used a brief visit June 6 to ask the GOK to
tell the USG he is serious about working together to promote
stability in Iraq. Asad was reportedly very concerned about
the Syria Accountability Act, particularly the insertion of
the Patriot Act into it, and eager to do some horsetrading
with the US. The visit reportedly was marred by Asad's
unexplained early departure. END SUMMARY.



2. (C) Foreign Minister Shaykh Dr. Mohammed Sabah al-Salem
al-Sabah gave Charge a readout June 7 on the visit the
previous day of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad (other topics
septels). He said Asad had been very concerned about the
Syria Accountability Act (SAA), particularly "the insertion
of the Patriot Act within the SAA," and had complained the
USG was being contradictory: it did not want Syria to
interfere in Iraq, but it did want Syria to influence Iraqis
to support the political process. Asad had asked the
Kuwaitis to convey to the USG the seriousness of his desire
to restore the deteriorating relationship and to cooperate
for the stability of Iraq. Asad had expressed the sense that
Syria and the US could accomplish a lot together. He had
reminded his hosts of Syria's helpful role in the liberation
of Kuwait, and of its intelligence contributions against
Al-Qaeda.



3. (C) Dr. Mohammed perceived that Asad's "sentiment was
very different from those around him"; the President had
remarked that he belongs to a new generation "not very
attached to old slogans," but he needs to show the people
that his course of action brings benefits. The Minister
summarized Asad's message as wanting to bargain "like in Souq
al-Hammadiyya." Charge promised to relay the message, but
noted that we have a direct dialogue with Syria already,
therefore he doubted that Washington would wish to use Kuwait
as a channel to communicate with Syria.



4. (C) Dr. Mohammed mentioned with some amusement that Asad
had criticized his own radio station's commentary as being
contrary to his official policy. He had insisted that the
SARG wishes Iraq the very best, wants a good election in
January, and will accept any Iraqi government that is
acceptable to the Iraqi people. That said, Syria would
consider the Iraqi Interim Government to be the de-facto, not
de-jure, government of Iraq, because it was not elected.
Charge said the US looked forward to the next free and fair
elections in Syria.



5. (C) The Minister mentioned in passing that Asad had come
and gone June 6. According to the French Ambassador
(protect), the Kuwaitis had expected him to spend the night
and were furious when he curtailed his visit without giving a
reason, after they had organized the usual lavish banquet in
his honor.
URBANCIC