(C) PM ASSURES DEPUTY SECRETARY "WE'RE LONG-TERM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 001380

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/IR, NEA/NGA, NEA/ARP, T

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2014
TAGS: PREL MARR IZ KU
SUBJECT: (C) PM ASSURES DEPUTY SECRETARY "WE'RE LONG-TERM
ALLIES"


Classified By: CDA FRANK URBANCIC; REASON 1.4 (B, D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah assured Deputy
Secretary Armitage April 19 that "we are long-term allies."

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Shaykh Sabah urged the US to seek a new UNSC Resolution on
Iraq, and to resolve the situation in Fallujah -- peacefully
if possible, but if not, then above all quickly. The PM
advised the Coalition to stay away from holy places, and
dismissed Muqtada al-Sadr as having little influence. He
spoke condescendingly of UN envoy Brahimi. The PM reported
that Russian National Security Advisor Ivanov had just told
him Russia does not want the US to be defeated in Iraq, nor
for it to withdraw its forces after the transfer of
sovereignty.


2. (C) The Deputy Secretary briefed on developments in Iraq,
from where he had just come. He also expressed appreciation
for Kuwait's AIK support and stressed the continued need for
it, promising that we would not take advantage of the GOK's
generosity. He raised Article 98, and the PM replied that
parliamentary ratification is not necessary. END SUMMARY.


3. (U) Participants: Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmed
al-Jaber al-Sabah was accompanied by MFA Under Secretary
Ambassador Khaled al-Jarallah, MFA Americas Department
Director Ambassador Khaled al-Babtain, Babtain's Deputy Aiham
al-Omar, and a notetaker from the PM's office. The Deputy
Secretary was accompanied by NEA A/S Burns, CDA, and

SIPDIS
ADCM/POL Chief (Notetaker).


4. (C) The PM greeted the Deputy Secretary and A/S Burns as
old friends, emphasizing that "we are long-term allies, not
short-term." He expressed warm greetings to President Bush,
Secretary Powell, and "all our friends in the White House."

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He appreciated the MNNA ceremony and the attention shown to
his Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs during their
recent visit to Washington. He hoped the excellent state of
the bilateral relationship would continue.


5. (S) The Deputy Secretary, having just come from Baghdad,
sought the PM's advice on the way forward, especially on how
to deal with the Sunnis. Noting that we are at a turning
point in Iraq, he briefed on latest developments:

- In the South, Muqtada al-Sadr was at his strongest in Najaf
and Karbala but his influence was not spreading, and locals
were telling us they wanted him out. We were being careful
to stay away from holy places.

- An Iranian delegation recently visited Baghdad to meet with
the British, and the US sat in. The meeting was
straightforward, without heat. Our message: we do not
welcome Iran meddling in the South, nor want it to mediate
with Muqtada; we will judge Iran by its behavior.

- In Fallujah, we have detained a significant number of
foreigners; it is not clear how many of them belong to
longstanding Yemeni and Syrian communities. We believe
Zarqawi is there. There has not been one car-bomb since we
surrounded Fallujah. Ambassador Jones is heavily involved in
negotiations with local leaders. The first two days of talks
went "95% very well." Arrangements were made for food, water
and medical supplies, but we rejected a request for an open
road through town: women and children are welcome to leave,
but not men until they are identified and disarmed. After a
break yesterday, negotiations were to resume today. We do
not want Fallujah to become a rallying point for Sunnis, but
we cannot allow those who killed our citizens so terribly to
escape. The Deputy Secretary warned that military action
might be needed, but we want to show the world that we tried
to achieve a political solution and are not against the
Sunnis per se.

- Sunni ex-generals with good reputations are being brought
back into the Iraqi army under the Minister of Defense. This
is, among other things, a signal that Sunnis have a role to
play in the future of Iraq.

- The IGC had not been as helpful as it could have. Sunni
members threatened to resign in the event of heavy military
action in Fallujah. Shia members have not been courageous in
condemning Muqtada's actions. All IGC members fear their
days in office are numbered because of the Brahimi plan.

- The USG looks forward to UNSYG Annan's report on the proper
way to proceed in Iraq. UN envoy Brahimi has names in mind
for a transitional government, but has not shared them with
us. He did also ask us for a list of respected citizens from
all groups who could be included in a technocratic
government. Brahimi believes none of the IGC members are
worth keeping, but we need to think carefully before
excluding them.

- We are carefully considering a new UNSCR on Iraq. We need
to know the UNSYG's thoughts first, but when the time is
right, we intend to seek a Resolution, which should bolster
the legitimacy of the transitional government, affirm the
commitment of the UN, and provide an umbrella for
international forces to contribute to the security of Iraq.
- Plans by Spain and Honduras to leave the Coalition are an
unhelpful development. We have checked and do not see other
key Coalition-members going wobbly. We realize that a new
UNSCR could help some countries by giving political cover.


6. (C) PM'S ADVICE: Shaykh Sabah appreciated the briefing
and offered the following comments:

- The US should work on persuading Annan to support a new
UNSCR. With such a Resolution, other countries will "not
feel shy" about contributing troops. Sergio Vieira de Mello
did "such good work," but his tragic death caused Annan to
have reservations about involvement in Iraq.

- The Coalition should stay away from holy places.

- Muqtada al-Sadr has little influence, and only rose to
prominence because of the absence of eminent figures. The
IGC leaders, especially Ahmed Chalabi, "don't know Iraq; they
fled 20-30 years ago".

- The US needs to resolve the situation in Fallujah quickly
-- peacefully if possible, but above all quickly.

- Most of the fighters in Fallujah are foreign. Perhaps a
thousand are Saudi; even some Kuwaitis have been reported
killed there. Car-bombs and such are mostly the work of
foreigners.

- The US should do something about the slanted, inciteful
coverage by Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya satellite television
stations. Laughing, Shaykh Sabah recounted that he had asked
CJCS Gen. Myers if he had a spare missile that could go off
course.

- Brahimi was "a small employee" in the Arab League until
Shaykh Sabah took him along when he mediated in Lebanon, and
now he wishes he hadn't. Annan's dependence on Brahimi is
surprising, as there are many others better than he.

- The IGC fills a gap until better people can be found. The
problem is, the Iraqis usually "accept nobody" (i.e. as
leader). "They are like our parliament: each member is his
own party."


7. (C) RUSSIAN VIEW: Shaykh Sabah noted that he had just
met with Russian National Security Advisor (ex-Foreign
Minister) Igor Ivanov, who had told him Russia does not want
the US to be defeated in Iraq, nor for it to withdraw its
troops after the transfer of sovereignty. Ivanov had spoken
in favor of an international conference, but the PM had
replied this would not lead to a rapid solution; rather, the
solution lay with the UN, "which enjoys world respect."
Certainly a strong international presence would be needed
after the transfer of sovereignty, otherwise the Iraqis would
be at each other's throats.


8. (C) AIK FUEL: The Deputy Secretary expressed the USG's
deep gratitude for Kuwait's generous Assistance-In-Kind (AIK)
support, especially fuel for the US military. He stressed
that the need for it still exists, and urged continued
provision. He promised the need would not last forever and
we would not take advantage of Kuwait's generosity by drawing
on this support longer than necessary. The PM replied that
there are two fuel issues:

- Fuel products for the Iraqi market: the GOK is perfectly
willing to go on selling it to the designated company.

- Fuel for the military: the PM said this is between DOD and
MOD. (COMMENT: Shaykh Sabah seemed to think this issue had
been resolved in the recent Joint Military Commission; in
fact, it was not discussed there at all, nor was it resolved
in the Defense Minister's meetings with senior US officials
in Washington. END COMMENT.)


9. (C) ARTICLE 98: The Deputy Secretary hoped we could
bring the Article 98 agreement into force by a quiet exchange
of notes, as we have done elsewhere. The PM replied that
there is no need for parliamentary ratification; an exchange
of notes will suffice -- but we should not talk about it
publicly. (COMMENT: The only thing needed for the agreement
to enter into force is for the GOK to give us a diplomatic
note confirming it has completed its domestic legal
requirements; we already sent a similar note months ago.
After the meeting, the MFA's al-Omar told ADCM/POL Chief he
thought the GOK note would come quickly. END COMMENT.)


10. (U) The Deputy Secretary has cleared this message.


11. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
URBANCIC